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ABSTRAGT. 
The Philosophy of Abu* l-BaraJcat with special reference 
to His Soncept of Time -
Abu'l-Barakat's philosophy i a detemined by his c r i t i c a l 
attitude against the Aristotelian philosophy on one hand and by his 
appeal to the immediate perceptions of the mindvOAiVie o'tWer, 
He was bom at Balad nearby Bagdad in 465 A.H./IO74 A.D. 
Having studied at Bagdad, towards the end of his l i f e , he became 
a Muslim either out of wounded pride or out of fear. He class i f ied 
sciences into the sciences of existing things which include Physics 
and Metaphysics; and the sciences of mentally related forais, i . e . , 
Psycholo^; and the science of sciences, i . e . Logic. Space, according 
to him, i s conceived i n the mind prior to everything else as tridimen-
sional, and as capable of being f u l l or empty. The prime matter i s iden-
t i c a l with the corporeal body. I n his theory of motion, his originality 
l i e s i n his explanation of the motion in the void, accelerated motion, 
and the quies media. 
His revolutionary attitude i s perhaps best exemplified in his 
Psychology. According to him, we have an immediate perception of our 
soul together with existence and time. Every theory which explains 
soul in terms of faculties or forces i s repugnant to him. 
I n the Metaphysics, Abu'l-Barakat identifies universals 
with the mental fom*. The forms that exist in the mind of God are 
the causes of the things existing i n external real ity. God i s the 
direct existentiating cause of eveiything. 
Existence, which forms one of our primary apperceptions, i s 
superadded to the things that are existent. Existence, and existent 
are identified i n God. His comception of God is detemined by his 
human psychology. The difference between God and man is one of degree. 
He identifies ce lest ia l bodies with ' angels'. They are the preserver 
of the species, guides and instructors, 
Avicenna, having eliminated the dif f icult ies inherent in 
time, held that time i s a measure of motion with respect to prior and 
posterior. He stressed the continuous nature of time,. Time, eternal 
duration, and perpetuity belong to the different domains of the universe, 
Avicenna, by identifying time *ith the continuity i t s e l f , however, may 
have prepared the way for the identification of time with duration. 
I n Hellenist ic philosophy, this trend started as a reaction 
etgainst the Aristotelian view. 
I n al-Kindl, we f ind the traces of Abu'1-Barakat's theory. 
According to him, the time of a corporeal body i s the duration of i t s 
existence. 
Iranshahrl, and al-Razx, under the influence of Galen, 
identify time with duration, and divide i t into absolute and 
limited. 
This trend culminates i n Abu'l-Barakat's theory of time. 
He puts time, existence, and soul on the same plane in so far as 
our primary consciousness of them i s concerned. Tisie, being insep-
arable from existence, must be defined as the measure or the dimension 
of existence rather than as that of motion. God, being the existence 
per se, cannot be beyond time. Time, duration, end perpetuity are a l l 
one and the same thing. By discarding these distinctions, he unifies 
the vis ible and spir i tual worlds. The difference between them is only 
one of degree, otherwise they are caosely related to each other. 
IV. 
AdgTOWLEDGEIVIElNfTS ' 
I would l ike to express my gratitude for his valuable 
help i n the preparation of this Thesis, to Dr. R. ff. J . Austin, 
who kindly undertook the supervision of this work. I also thank 
the Oriental and University Library staff for their help. 
TABLE OF OQMPENTR. 
Section I . Abu'l-BarakSt and Outlines of His Philosophy. 
L i f e 1 
Outlines of Abu'1-Barakat's Philosophy 11 
I . Classif icat ion of Sciences 12 
I I . Physics 16 
a) Space, Vacuuiii and Inf in i ty 16 
b) Matter and Form 37 
• c) Motion 45 
I I I . Psychology 68 
IV. Metaphysics 93 
Section I I . Time 
Time 135 
Di f f i cu l t i es concerning the reality and unreality of time 13^ 
Various Untenable Definitions of Time 141 
I . The Aristotelian View of Time 147 
Time and Motion 147 
Time as Measure and as Number 149 
Time and the Now 151 
d.) The Reality of Time 154 
e) The Ultimate Cause of Time I56 
f ) Things that are in Time 16O 
g) The Attributes of Time 162 
h) Time and Avicenna's Philosophy I64 
I I . Reactionc; against the Aristotelian View of Time 166 
I I I . aiime as Duration 182 
IV. Absolute and Limited Time 193 
V. Abn'1-Barakat's Theory of Time 201 
I s Tims connected with Motion 202 
Time and Existence 211 
Time, God and Creation 217 
The Reality of Time 220 
Time and Abu'l-Barakat's Philosophy 223 
Page No. 
Conclusion 230 
SECTION I . 
Abil'1-Barakat a^nd Outlines of His 
Philosophy. 
1, 
L i f e . 
Abp'1-Barakat Hibat Allah b. ^11 b, Malka (or Malkan) 
al-Baladi: I n connection with his birthplace 'Balad' he was called 
Baladi ( i . e , of Balad). But he was generally known under the naiae of 
Abu' 1-Barakat a l Baghdad!, due to the fact that at an early age he 
l e f t his birthplace for Bs^^dad with a purpose of study. He was also 
called Awhad al-Zaraan (Unique of his time), PaylasElf al-^raqayn and 
Sahib al-Mu«^tabar. ^ 
About the date of his birth as well gis of his death, there is 
a difference of opinion among the biographersj according to Tatimmah 
siwan al-hikmah, he died i n (5^7 A.H./-|15if) • he lived, as one 
version asserts, about 90 years, i t i s possible that he was bom about 
(454 A.H./1062), I f we accept the other version, he lived 80 years, 
2 
so he must have been born in (465 A.H./1074). Shahrazurl and a l -
Q i f t l are of the opinion that he died about the half of the 6th 
century Hicra. ^ 
1 .al-QiftT,A6ibar al-Hukama', (Cairo,1326H.) ,p.224;Ibn AbT Usaybfa, 
«Uyun al-anba» f i tabaqat al-atibba'*,ed.by Mflller,(Cairo, 1882), 
vol.I,f,278;Bayhaqt,Tatimraah siwah al-ljikmah, (Lahore, 1351/1932), 
p.150;Ibn Khallikan,Wafayat ai-A*^yan,ed.by Wilstenfeld,2vols., 
(Gbttingen, 1835-1843) , tr ,by M.de Slane,(Paris, 1888),vol,III,p.60O. 
2.Bayhacft, op. c i t . ,pp. 150f. ;ShahrazurT,Nuzhat al-arwa^,tr.into Persian 
under the t i t l e of "Kanz al-hikmah" by Diya? al-Din Durri , (Teheran, 
1316H.),P.103. 
3 .ShahrazurT, op. c i t . ,p. 102 j Qif t x, op. c i t . ,p. 224, 
2. 
Abu' 1-BaraJcat studied i n Baj^dad under a famous physician, 
Abu'l-fasan Sa^ld-JiHibat Allah a l - Is^ahanl (d, 495/1102). At f i r s t , 
being a Jew, he had some d i f f i cu l ty in attending to the lectures of 
this renowned physician, who had a rule against accepting Jews and 
Christiajis as students, so he acquired a position as an assistant to 
Abu' l-Hasan* s door-keeper to be able to l i s ten to the lectures from the 
vestibule. He was very attentive to the lectures. One day, a question 
which had already been studied cropped up, no one was able to answer. 
Seeing t h i s , Abtl'l-BarakSt came up and answered the question. Satisf ied 
with his answer, the renowned teacher broke his rule and accepted him 
as one of his students, ^ This i s the only teacher, we gather from 
the accounts given by his biographers. Prom the environment in which 
he l ived we may infer, however, that he had a sound knowledge of K a l -
- 2 
am and philosophy. 
He served as a physician at the court of the Caliph Mustadi* 
bi-'amr Allah (d, 566/117O), I n the same capacity he also served the 
Caliph ,:bl-Mustanjid bi l lah (d. 555/ll60) and M-Mustar^id (d.5l2/ l1l8) . 
He was consulted by various Seljugl sultans. 
1 .U?aybia,op.cit. ,pp.278-9jShahrazurT,op.cit. ,p.103. 
2.1bn Taymiyah,Minhaj al-Sunnah,vol.1,(ed.Misr,l32l),p.96, 
3.YaqiIt,The learned Men's Dictionary,vol.VI,bk.7,(London,1926),p.2U.; 
Usaybxa,op.cit.,vol.I,p.279;BayhaqT,op.cit.,p,151. 
3, 
Late i n l i f e he turned Muslim. About his conversion 
there are given a few versions whicsh are worth noting. 
One story of his conversion i s that one day he entered 
the Caliph's presence, although everyone stood up, the Qadi al-QudSt 
(The Chief Qadi), refrained from doing that. This made a great 
impact upon him and he accepted Is lSn, 
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The second version i s that after receiving a gre&t reward 
for having cured one of the Sel;3uii sultans, he was lampooned i n verse 
by iTaJtl Aflah, Then he realized that he could not have success, wealth 
and happiness in l i f e unless he embraced Islam, which he did on the 
condition that, contrary to the prevalent laws, his three grown-up 
BTewish daughters would not be deprived of his inheritance. 
The third version ^: During a battle between the Caliph a l -
Mustar^id (d, 512/1118) and Mas'ud b. Muhammad b. Malikshah (498,-511/ 
1105-1118). he was on the side of the caliph. After the battle he was 
taken prisoner, and out of fear of being executed, he embraced Islam. 
I f this version i s taken as true, then Abil'1-Barakat's conversion 
occurred about 18 years before his death. 
1 .Usaybi$L,op.Git . ,vol .I ,p.280, 
2 ,Q i f tT, op, c i t , ,pp, 22V-5 • 
3 .BayhaeyT, op, oit , ,p152, 
4. 
The fourth and last version is that Abu'l-Barakit was 
called upon by the Sel;5u^: sultan Ma^ jmGd ( l 118-1131) for the treat-
ment of his beloved wife Sanjar. He fai led in curing her, and 
thought that he could only save himself by becoming a Muslim. 
2 
According to Bayhaqi, his death also came upon him out 
of fear; Sultan Muhammad b. Malikshah (529-547/1134-1152) accused 
him of fai lure of his treatment and imprisoned him for some time. By 
the time Abu'1-Barakat died, the Sultan was dead too. Bayhaqi relates 
that Ab3'l-BarakSt died i n Hamadan and his coffin was taken to Baj^dad 
by a group of people who were going on a pilgrimage to Mecca. 
His conversion to IslSm annoyed his co-religionists so much 
that Samuel Sdhullam described his death, after curing himself of 
elephanthiasis at the cost of losing his sight ^ as being God's 
4 
punishment for disloyalty. These strong attacks were perhaps due 
to his scoffing at the Jews after his conversion. ^ 
During his l ifetime, he thought so highly of himself that 
he even la id claim of having attained to the degree of Aristotle (the . 
f i r s t teacher).^ His arrogance was cr i t ic ized in a poem by Badl* a l -
1 ,QiftX, op.cit.,pp.226-7. 
2.Bayha(ft,op.cit.,p.152, 
3.Shahrazt3:rT,op.cit.,p. 102;Usaybi|.,op.cit.,vol.I,p.280;Ibn Khallikan, 
op,cit. ,p.600. 
4.M.Steinsohneider,Die Arabische Literatur der Juden,(Prankfurt,1902), 
p.184. . 
5 .U s aybfa,op.cit . ,vol.I ,p.280. 
6 .B ayhaqT, op.cit,,p.151• 
5. 
UsturlabI (l2th Centuiy). "The doctor Abtl'1 Hasan and his imitator 
Abu'1-BarakSt, stand at opposite extremes, one by his modesty, has 
reached the pleidas, and the other by his presumption i s i n the 
lowest abyss." ^ 
His biographers also made mention of the rivalry between 
Abu' 1-Barakat and his contemporary, Ibn Tilmidh, who was a Christian 
physician at the court of the caliph Mustarshid ( I5 l2 / l1 l8 ) , together 
2 
with Abu'1-Barakat, A poem attributed to Ibn Tilmijh i s shown by 
some biographers as a proof of this r ivalry. I n another context, the 
same poem i s attributed to Ibn Aflah by a i - Q i f t l . 
"There was a Jewish philosopher, whose stupidity when he 
ta lks , appears i n his mouth. Even the dog i s higher i n rank than him. 
He i s so conceited that as i f he had not yet le f t the desert," ^ 
1, Abu'l-IJasan al-tabib wa muqtaflhi Abu'1-Barakat f i -Jjarafayy naqid. 
Pa haeiha bi'l-tawadu*- fTl - thurayya wa hadha bil-takabbur fi' l-hadxd, 
Ibn niallikan,op.cit . ,pp.600-1. 
2, Abu'l-PidS,Kitab al-Mukh.tasar,vol.III,(Misr,1323),p.43;Ibn IQiallikan, 
op.cit.,p,600;Yaqut,op,cit,,vol,VI,bk,7,p.244. 
3. Qiftx,op,cit , ,p,225. 
4. Lana §adxq yaliwdiyy hamaqatuhu idha takallama tabdu fxhi min fxhi 
Yatlh wa'l-kalb a*la mirihu manzilatan ka^annahu ba'dn yaMiruj min al-toh. 
6. 
What we gather from the works of his biographers con-
cerning his efficiency in sciences i s that he was a prominent 
physician as well as a philosopher. To bear out his prominence in 
1 -
the art of medicine this story may be cited. The physicians Abu'l-
Barakat had a cajse of a young man who imagined that he was carrying a 
large earthenware 5ax on his head. The patient always avoided low 
ceilings and walked carefully with his head low, for fear that the jar 
might f a l l and break:. Abu'1-Barakat instructed one of his servants to 
suddenly IMA the imaginary j a r over the young man's head with a large 
st ick, and another servant to simultaneously drop a big j a r behind 




a) The most imporfcariti., and the best work of his i s called Kitab 
2 
al-Mu*tabar, because, as he says in the preface to this book, i t 
1 .Usaybi'k,op.cit.,vol.I,p.279. 
2.c!Brockelmann,G.A.L.'</^61yl-5i(il89&^),p.460.Manuscripts of this book can 
be found in the Khedive Library in Egypt,and in Oxford.There are a few manus-
cript copies i n Istanbul Libraries:Mantiq,Kliprilltt Libraryjincomplete two 
copies one of which consists only of ' Ilahiyyat' and the other of 
TabT*iyyat and Ilahiyyat are in the Patih Library.The complete copy 
i s found i n the Esat E f endi Library .None of them are the f i r s t hand 
manuscripts.Kitab al-*/Iu*tabar was published by S.Yaltkaya in Hyderabad 
in 1938. 
7. 
includes the results of his personal investigations. I n the 
same place he also explains why he composed this book. The an-
cients gave their lessons by way of speech and did not commit anything 
into writing. The reason for th is v/as that they v/ere afraid that i t 
might have fa l len into the hands of those who were incapable of know-
ledge or of those who were not sufficiently instructed for this kind 
of knowledge. At that time, the scholars and the students were so 
many in number, and their life-span was so long that they could transfer 
their knowledge from one place to another i n i t s total ity. Therefore 
almost nothing was lost of what they had taught. But when their number 
decreased, and their l ife-span became short and the desire for know-
ledge extinguished, i n order to save their knowledge from fa l l ing into 
oblivion, they started composing books. They used in their books, 
obscure expressions and hidden remarks, which were only understood 
by those who were specialiasid in the ancient sciences. This led to 
innumerable commentaries by the subsequent writers. Thus, we found 
ourselves in a position very troublesome to distinguish the true from 
the fa lse . By carefully studying a l l the publications jJll gathered 
notes on the ancient doctrines and I made my objections. Then my 
friends insisted that I should put them in a book. With the assis-
tance of my best students, I have succeeded i n realizing i t . I n this 
book I followed the Aristotelian pattern, and put Mantiq (Logic) f i r s t , 
Tabi^iyyat (Physics) second) and Ilahiyyat (Metaphysics) third, 
1 .Abu' 1-Barakat al-BagladadT,K, al-MuHabar, (Hyderabad, 1357/l 938),vol.1, 
pp.1-4, 
8. 
Abu'1-Barakat took so much pride in this book that 
before the end of his l i f e , he made his las t request, saying 
that they (his students) should inscribe on his epitaph the fact 
that late i n l i f e he has been very iinhappy because of the illnesses he 
suffered, and that he was the author of Kitab al-*/tu*H;abd.r, 
b) The Risalah f l Sabab §uhur al-Kawakib laylan wa KhafS?nha 
Naharan (Why the stars are invisible during the day and vis ible 
at night). ^ This work, under a sl ightly different title,was thought 
to be the work of Ibn Sina. ^ According to Ibn Abi Usaybi^ k i t was 
written for the Sultan Giyath al-Din AbO Shuja* Muh. b. Malikshah. 
c) Commentary on Ecclesiastes which exists i n Hebrew charac-
ters , and was translated into Hebrew by Abu Sa^d'lsaic b. Abraham b. Azra 
5 
( l2th Century), with a penegrio on Abu'1-Barakat. 
1 .9.Ialtkaya,Ilahiyat, (Istanbul 1932),p.6. 
2. B.W.Ahlwardt,Die Handschriften-Verzeidhnisse der Kfiniglichen Bibliothek 
zu Berl in ,vol .X, (Berl in , 1899),p.385.This tractate was translated by E . 
Wiedemann in Eders Jahrbudh fttr photographie,(l909),pp.49-54. 
3. G.C.Anav/ati,Essai de Bibliographie Avioennienne,(Cairo,1950),no.l62. 
4. Usaybfa,op.oit.,vol,I,p.280. 
5. Bodl.,no.13'1 .The fragments of i t i s cited in Pococke's Porta Moses, 
pp.189-190.The Bulogy which the Oxford manuscript contains i s called 
Natanel,v/hich i s the translation of Hibat Allah. 
9, 
d) Maqalah fx al-Davi? , (e) Kitab al-Aj^rabazxn, ( f ) RisSlah 
fx a l - 'aq l wa mahiyatihi, (g) Amin al-arwat, (h) I ^ t i s a r fx 
tsghrih l i Calinus (Galen), These last five books ^ have long 
been extinct. 
- 2 Among Abu'1-Barakat's students are Jamal al-Dln b, 
Padlan, *Alx b, al-Dahhan, ^AlS b, YOsif, and Muwaf f aq al-DlnW 
a l - L a t l f , Muhadhclhab b, al-NaqqSgh to whom he dictated his famous 
book K. al-MuHabar, while he was blind. 
Since the nineteenth century at the latest , not so mudi 
study has been made on Abitl'1-Barakat and his works. Concerning his 
biography, a section i n The Die Arabisohe l i teratur der Juden by 
Steinsdhneider and M, Zobel's art ic le in The Encyclopedia Judaioa 
can be cited. Leolerc and Pozanski also made mention of him in 
their books, ^ 
1,Por the l i s t of Abu'l-Bara^t's works see:U§aybia,op.c i t . ,vol.I,p,280; 
Q i f t l , op. c i t . , p, 224; B ayhaqT, op, c i t . , p, 151, 
2 ,U s aybi%, op, c i t , , vol. I , p, 280, 
3.Steinsdineider,Die Arabisdhe Literatur der Juden,(Frankfurt, 1902), 
p.184;L.Leclerc,Histoire de l a Medicine Arabe,vol.II,(Paris,1870.), 
p,29;M,Zobel,article i n Encyclopedia Judaica,vol,VIII,(Berlin,193l) j 
Steinschneider,Arabic Literature of the Jews,in Jewish Quarterly Review, 
(second pub.)vol.XIII,(New York,1966),pp.93-4;Poznanski,Zeitschrift 
fttr Hebraiscjhe Bibliographie,(l913),Pp.33-36 (edition of some pages of 
the Commentary on Ecolesiastes) . 
10. 
As for h i s philosophy, the f i r s t account appeared i n 
M. I s m a i l Hakki's a r t i c l e 'Islamda Felsefe OerejBdi' Then an 
incomplete t r a n s l a t i o n of the t h i r d section of the Kitab al-Mu*tabar 
was made by S. Yalkaya. ^ Since 1938, S. Pines devoted four 
a r t i c l e s to Abu'1-Barakat• s philosophy. Apart f m n these, a resume" 
of Abu'1-Barakat's philosophy was given by him i n the Encyolopedy 
of Islam, ^ Another Turkish scholar also took interest i n Abu'l-
Barakat's philosophy on several occasions. ^ Among these scholars, 
H. Oorbin should also be mentioned. ^ Finally,. M. "^Ali Abu RayySn's 
a r t i c l e on the sub;)ect i s worth noting. 6 
I.M.I.HalckijDarfilfttnun I l a h i y a t Fakttltesi Mecrauasi,(Istanbul,1930),pp.J^34. 
2.S.Yaltkaya,Il^iyat,Istanbul,1355/1932. ^ 
3,S.Pines,article i n Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et L i t e r a i r e da Moyen 
Age.vol.XXI.(Paris. 1954) ;a3:'tiole i n Revae dss Etudes Juives,vol.inT 
( Janvier-juin)-, ( P a r i s , 1938); and Nouvelles Etudes sur Awhad al-Zaman 
Abu'1-Barakat,(Paris, 1953)jEncyclopedy of Islam,(New ed'.)vol.I,(Leyden, 
and London, 1954) ,pp. 111 -113. 
4. H.Z.tflken,La Pans^e de l'Islam,(J:stanbul, 1953) I Islam Dttgttnce s i , (Istanbul, 
1946) ; a r t i c l e i n the XX International Congress of Philosophy* (1948). 
5. H.Gorbin,Hitoire de l a Pholosophie Islamique,vol.l7(Paris,1964). 
fi.M.fAlT Abu Rayyan,article i n the B u l l e t i n of the Faculty of Arts of 
the Alexandria University,vol3.XII-XIII, (Hexandria, 1958-1959). 
11. 
Outlines of Abu'1-Barakat*s Philosophy. 
As we have seen, AbO.' 1-Barakat i s not a p r o l i f l o w r i t e r 
oompared with the other Muslim Philosophers. This was mainly due to 
his reluotEmpe to put anything into writing l e s t they m i ^ t f a l l into 
1 
the hands of unqualified persons^ misunderstood and distorted. I n 
fact t h i s happened exactly i n the case of The Hanbalite Theologian 
Ibn Taymiyyalli(d. 729/1328) and the I ^ r a q i t e philosopher Suhrawardl 
(al-Maqtul) (d, 587/1191 ) • The fowner defended Abu» 1-Barakat because 
of the closeness of h i s doctrine to the general tendency of the A^*a-
r i t e s without taking into consideration h i s fundamental doctrines which 
ran sigainst the orthodox view. The l a t t e r , i n h i s c r i t i c i s m which may 
be defined as ' c r i t i c i s m f o r the sake of c r i t i c i s m ' aociased Abu' 1-
Barakat of sheer ignorance of the philosophical doctrines he c r i t i c -
ized. ^ But by others he was given h i s due. PaMxr al-Dln S a | i 
(d, 606/1209) was g2?eatly indebted to Abu'1-Barakat i n his defence of 
the orthodox doctrines against the F a l a a i f a , and Naslr al-Dln TlMi 
* 
(d. 672/1273) derived great benefit from him. ^ 
His influence was confined to a small c i r c l e . He was 
unknown outside h i s environment. Although a pat-allelism e x i s t s 
1 .K.al-Mu*tabar,op.oit. ,volI,p . 1 . 
2.M.*A1T Abu Rayyan,Naqd Abi'1-Barskat alrBa^dadi li - P a l s a f a h Ibn sTna, 
a r t i c l e i n the B u l l e t i n of the Faculty of Arts of the University of 
-: ^^^^^•^u.i^ v^x o^io ja.uuxojr o i ArTiS i 
Alexandria, v o l . X I I I , (Alexandria7T959)7^72o:2T7 
3.See^ulaymah Nadwi's articlftv .silcU, at the end of K.al-*[u«tabar: 
§erafettin Yaltkaya;.- ,IlahiyatXlstanbul,1933);S.Pines,article i n Revue 
des Etudes Juives.vols.III-IY.CParis.lQ^fi'). 
12. 
between Abu'1-Barakat and a Jewish philosopher of the Occident, 
Cresoas (d. 1410), as S, Pines showed i n h i s a r t i c l e " we have no 
proof that the l a t t e r was influenced by the former. 
Ibn Taymiyyahrelates that Abu'1-Barakat, i n his un-
Ar i s t o t e l i a n attitude was inspired by the orthodox theologians of 
g 
Baghdad. However, h i s philosophy may best be characterized as 
the r e v i v a l of pre-Sooratic conceptions whioh la y latent i n the works 
of the previous philosophers, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n those of Ibn Slha 
(d, 428/1036) from whom he took up the problems, and whom he, i n 
places followed verbatim. 
The X l t h and X I I t h centuries were dominated by Avicennian 
philosophy, i t was also the beginning of the end of h i s domination. 
Avioennian philosophy was attacked from various quarters^ Ihe p h i l -
osophers and theologians a l i k e ; GhaaalS (d. 505/1111), Abu'1-Barakat 
i n ^he Orient, and Averroes (d. 595/1198) in'*he Occident. I t was 
the time when a philosophical t r a d i t i o n so i n f l u e n t i a l saw i t s down-
f a l l brought about by the incessant c r i t i c i s m s , and when the philoso-
phico-theologioal trend began to gain the upper hand. 
I . C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Sciences 
Abu'1-Barakat's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of sciences i s determined 
by h i s epistemolbgy and by h i s criticisms of the pi^ychological 
1.Ibidem. 
2.1bn Taymiyah,Minhaj al^unnah,vol.I,(CAiro,l32i/i903),p. 98 
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doctrines of h i s time. According to him, science (*ilm), 
apprehension (idrak) and knowledge (ma'rif#) are the attributes of 
r e l a t i o n obtaining between the knower and the known. We, f i r s t , know 
the things existing i n external r e a l i t y and consequently we attain 
the knowledge of our knowledge depending upon these attributes of 
1 
r e l a t i o n . I n t h i s respect science and knowledge are used equivoc-
. a l l y . 
I n accordance v/ith t h i s division of knowledge into tvio 
categories, he divides sciences into (a) the sciences of existing 
things, and (b) the sciences of mentally related forms. The l a t t e r 
kind of sciences i s secondary and derivative with respect to the former. 
This i s analogous to the r e l a t i o n that exists between substances and 
2 
accidents, causes and e f f e c t s . I n another context he includes 
among the sciences mentioned above, (c) the science of science, i . e . . 
Logic (Mantiq), which i s the f i r s t habitus and natural disposition 
by which knowledge i s acquired. I n the sciences of existing things are 
included the sciences of Metaphysics (*ulum al-Slihiyya^» ^ Physics 
1.It appears that science i s used by Abu'1-Barakat i n the sense that i t i s 
the attribute of relation obtaining betweeh the knower and the external 
objects known.As f o r "ma*rifah" which we have translated as knowledge, 
i t i s produced by a higher kind of mental operation by m e ^ of which 
we a t t a i n the knowledge of our knowledge. 
2.K.al-Mu*tabar,op.cit.,vol.III,pp.1-2;of.vol.III,p.2l4,and vol.I,p.225, 
3.Ibid.,vol.III,p.2i4. 
4.This unusual form used by Atfi' 1-BarakSt may be due to h i s intention 
-which he does not materialise- of dividing Metaphysics i n t i a)the 
Science of Being and b)the Science of that which has as i t s object 
God and the incorporeal beings.See S.Pines,Nouvelles Etudes sur Awhad 
al-Zaraan Abtl' 1-Barakat,(Paris, 1955) ,p.11 ,n,1, 
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and those pertaining to thcni: Zoology, Botany, Sthics and Medicine. 
A l l those may sometimes be subject to a part i c u l a r theoretical study 
(nazar khass). 
In h i s account the divergency botYfeen Avicenna and Abu'l-
Barakat i s clear. For Avicenna there exist (a) Theoretical and 
(b) P r a c t i c a l sciences. Ihe theoretical sciences comprise the natural 
sciences, mathematics and metaphysics,'^ which constitute, according 
to Abu'1-Barakat, the divisions of e x i s t e n t i a l sciences. This div-
ergency on thei r part i s due to psychological and metaphysical d i f f -
erences i n -tiieir systems, as v/e s h a l l l a t e r see. 
What of the sciences of the mentally related forms:, ^  or the 
sciences of cognita \ ('al-ma^lumal), or the sciences studying the 
mental representations-. ^ (mutasawwirat al-adhhlri). I n this respect, 
he has two diff e r i n g opinions. His division betvfeen the sciences of 
existing objects and the sciences of mentally related forms Vifhich 
i s studied i n Psychology ^ implies that these two domains are sep-
arate. But he deviates from t h i s position and incorporates Psychology 
into the sciences of that v/hioh exis t s . For, he asserts, our minds conger 
some kind of existence i n the concrete on the mental forms. To our 
1. K.al~Mu*tabar, op.cit., v o l . I I I . , p.2. 
2. Ibid., v o l . I I I . , pp.1f, 
3. Ibid., v o l . I I I . , .p.21 
4. Ibid., v o l . I I I . , p.8. 
5. I b i d . , v o l . I I I . , p.214. 
6. Ibid., v o l . I l l , , p.2; cf, v o l . I I I . , p.8. 
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mindjthis deviation li. due to strong A r i s t o t e l i a n influence on 
him, despite h i s struggle against the A r i s t o t e l i a n philosophy of 
h i s time. So he does not set himself the task of r a d i c a l l y clianging 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of sciences. This i s exemplified i n 
h i s treatment of the pr^ablems i n the sam.e context as the Aristotelians 
had already done. 
I t i s absolutely c e r t a i n that Logic, according to him, i s 
not part of the sciences of existing things. I t i s only introductory 
to the e x i s t e n t i a l sciences. V/e acquire by logic the laws of spec-
u l a t i o n ajad the standard of thinking. Here he follows the trad-
2 
i t i o n a l view v/hich regards Logic as the instrumental science. 
Mathematics which i s assigned a place between the natural 
3 
sciences and Metaphysics by Avioenna poses a problem. Should i t 
be considered among the e x i s t e n t i a l sciences or not. For Avicenna, 
insofar as i t has connection with matter, i t i s related to natural 
sciences, insofar as i t i s abstracted froin matter, i t i s related to 
metaphysics. After c i t i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l view, Abu'1-Barakat asserts 
that since the mathematical science studies extensions, configur-
ations and numbers, i t i s another way of studying that which e x i s t s . 
Therefore, Mathematics i s included by him among the sciences of ex-
i s t i n g things. ^ 
1 ,K. al-Mu*t abar, op, c i t . , vol, I , p, 2H ; cf, vol .1, p. 226, 
2,Ibn.STria,Man-^iq al-MashriqiyyXn, (Cairo, 1328/1910) ,pp.6f. 
3.1bn S!i:ria,K.al-ShifS',vol.II,(Teheran,l303/l886),p.1jsee also S.Munk, 
Melanges de Philosophigihiie jpuive et Arabe,(Paris,1927) ,pp.356f. 
if.K. al-¥iu*t abar, op. c i t . , vol. I l l , p. 8. 
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I I , Physics 
I n the Physics, following the A r i s t o t e l i a n pattern, Ahu' 1-
Barakat t r e a t s of Space, Void, I n f i n i t y , Motion, Time and various 
natural phenomena, which was common throughout the Middle Ages, 
a) Space, Vacuum and I n f i n i t y . 
The concept of space, so sinvple and i n t e l l i g i b l e i n common 
uaciLge, when we delve into the question, bears complicationa and 
contradictions. I t i s for t h i s reason that the problem of space has 
been the subject of heated discussions since Antiquity. 
I n Greek philosophy, we see two l i n e s of thought. One 
accepted the i n f i n i t y and absolute existence of space which i s gen-
e r a l l y connected with the ancient names: Leucippus, Democritus and 
l a t e r Epicurus. The other adhered to the notion of empirical and 
limited space whidi was l a i d down by A r i s t o t l e and accepted by his 
followers. 
These two notions of space found i t s echo i n the history of 
Muslim philosophy, ial-Kindl, PSrSbl, Avicenna and those who followed 
them joined A r i s t o t l e i n accepting the limitedness of space. The con-
cept of the i n f i n i t e and absolute space goes back to sudh writers as 
2 
I r a n s h a h r i and Abu Bakr Zakariyya a l - R ^ i . who are said to have taken 
1. For Greek Atomists see O y r i l Bailey,Greek Atomists and Epicurus,(Oxford, 1928). 
2. P.Kraus,0pera Philosophica,vol.I,(Oairo,1939) jMax Meyerhof,The Philosophy 
of the Physician al-RSzt.in 1.0.vol.XII. (Hyderabad. 1945) .p. 56 ;S .Pines. 
Some Problems of Islamic Philosophy,in I.O. vol.XI,no. 1,(Hyderabad, 1937), 
P.75. 
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t h e i r doctrine from the group;, c a l l e d the Harraniyyun or the 
Sabi^ijSfgna. ^ 
I n the hi s t o r y of Muslim thought, t h i s l a t t e r line of 
thought i n p a r t i c u l a r and the un-Aristotelian doctrines i n general, 
2 
are attributed to Plato and certain ancient Greek thirxkers. The 
attribution of the un-Aristotelian doctrines to Plato was called into 
question by S. Pines i n h i s a r t i c l e . ^ He i s of the opinion thabthe 
influence i n the case of 'M-Razi may have come from such sources as 
Galen and Plutarch for the reasons that RazS wrote a commentary on 
one of Plutarch's works, though t h i s commentary i s l o s t , and that of 
Galen, who i s well-known i n the Islamic c i r c l e s , i s known to have 
c r i t i c i z e d A r i s t o t l e on several points. 
Razl admits of f i v e eternal substances, namely the Creator, 
Soul, Matter, Space and Time. According to him, atoms and the void 
whicsh permeates them are constitutive of four elements. I n other words, 
the proportion obtaining between the atoms and the void determines 
the e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s of four elements, namely, the l i o n e s s and 
heaviness. Space and time are divided respectively into limited 
space, and the limited time, which i s the number of motion i n accord-
ance with the A r i s t o t e l i a n notion of space and time, and into absolute 
1.P.Kraus,op.cit. ,vol.I,p.191. 
2 .Max Meyerhof , op, c i t . ,p. 56, 
3.S.Pines,Some Problems,. .op.cit. ,p,73;cf.S,Pines,0mne Quod Movetur Neoesse 
est abliquo moveri,A. Refutation of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and 
the Theory of Motion,in Isis,vol.LII,Baltimore. 1962). 
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space and absolute time i n which respect they are i n f i n i t e , and 
eter n a l . I n the absolute sense, space i s tridimensional. F i n a l l y , 
Razx does not accept creation':*? by decree (aljii-ibda'^ or out of 
nothingness, but that i t i s eternal. 
Now, l e t us revert to P l a t o . Among the students of Plato, 
we f i n d two d i s t i n c t interpretations of h i s doctrine of space. Acc-
ording to one opinion, |)lato i d e n t i f i e s space with matter which i s 
also A r i s t o t l e ' s interpretation of Plato. As we s h a l l l a t e r see, 
Abu'1-Barakat interprets Plato's notion i n the way that would confoim 
to h i s own. As for the other opinion, space as receptacle i s d i s t i n c t 
from matter, indestixictible, immaterial and eternal; i t i s not known 
empirically, but by an innate idea of the mind. 
I f we accept the second interpretation, there i s no reason 
to think that those who attribute the un-Aristotelian attitude of 
c e r t a i n Muslim philosophers to Plato were completely wrong, though the 
l a t t e r may have obtained these doctrines from a secondary source. 
As f o r A r i s t o t l e ' s conception of space which had a Isisting 
influence i n Muslim philosophy, he tentatively discusses four prx»v-
i s i o n a l definitions of space only to discard three of them i n the 
1.P.Kraus,op.cit.,pp.252-264,quoted from "2ad al-Musafirxn" by N a s i r ^ i 
IQlusraw,ed.by Kaywanr,(l341H.),pp.96-108;see also other parts ol* "Opera 
Philosophica". 
2.I.Efros,The Problem of Space i n Medieval Jewish Philosophy,(New York, 
1915),PP.5-14. 
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course of h i s discussion. These definitions are: (a) i t i s the 
form, or (b) the matter, or (c) some sort of extension between the 
bounding surfaces of the containing body, or f i n a l l y , (d) t h i s 
boundary i t s e l f i f i t contains no extensioru: over and above the bulk 
1 
of the body which comes to be i n i t . He does not accept the f i r s t 
three for various reasons on which we s h a l l touch whenever the occas-
ion a r i s e s . Therefore, according to him, Abu'1-Barakat c i t e s without 
mentioning A r i s t o t l e , space (makan) i s 'fflie i n f e r i o r surface of the 
containing body contiguous to the exterior surface of the contained, 
and that from which or toweurds which the l o c a l i z e d object (mutamaklon) 
moves or i n which i t i s at rest.' This i s a r e l a t i o n a l concep-
tion of space which cannot be considered apart' from the relations 
subsisting between the adjoining objects, and which depends upon 
empirical observations. True space, according to A r i s t o t l e , i s immov-
able, otherwise i t would signify a space moving i n space which i s 
absurd. The true space i s the l i m i t of the heavenly sphere i n which 
a l l things move,'' This l i m i t being the highest boundary of the Universe 
leads him into inextricable d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
"1 
1 .Aristotle,Physics,IV,4,211 b, 7-8; cf .1 .Ef ros, op, c i t . ,pp, I4f f. 
2. K,al-MuHabar,op,cit.,vol,II,p,4.3jS.Pines,Etudes sur Awhad al-Zaraan 
Abu' 1-BarakSfb al-Ba^dadl, i n R.E.J. v o l . I I I , no, 1, (Paris, i 938) ,p. 6 ; 
Aristotle,Physics,IV,4,211b.jH.A.Wolfson,0rescas' Critique of A r i s t o t l e , 
(0amb.Mass, ,1929) ,p.A4. 
3. Aristotle,Physics,IV, 5,212b, 8-13; of .1 .Ef ros,op. c i t . ,p. 16. 
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A r i s t o t l e ' s definition of space or place i s accepted by 
1 2 - 3 the Brothers of Purity, Avicenna and i s cited by al-Qhazali 
i n tlae name of philosophers i n h i s Maqasid a l - F a l a s i f a h . 
I n contrast to A r i s t o t l e ' s definition of space, Abu'1-Barakat 
c i t e s a p r e - s c i e n t i f i c definition of space, according to which place 
i s the support of the l o c a l i z e d object. ^  This pre-scientifio con-
ception of space i s attributed by Nasir al-DIn al-Tusl ^  to the 
atomist mutakallimun who, l i k e Abu'1-Barakat,accepted the existence 
of a vacuum which i s the sine qua non of motion. ^  
He, further, mentions a t h i r d theory to which he v a i l , 
l a t e r , a f t e r a long discussion on the existence of void, adhersi. Eei-e, 
h i s interest l i e s partlcular.ly i n the h i s t o r i c a l aspect of the problem. 
1. D i e t e r i c i , Die Abhandlungen der Ickwan es-Safa,(Leipzig, 1886), p.30. 
2. Ibn SIna, K.al-ShifS*, op.cit., v o l , I . , p.62; S.M.M'nan,Avicenna: 
His L i f e and Works (London, 1958), p.21 6. 
3. al-Ghazali, Maqagid al - F a l a s i f a h , v o l . I l l , (Cairo,'1936), p.l3o 
if. K.al~Mu*tabar, op.cit., vol.11., p ,4l • 
5. 3. Pines, Etudes... op.cit., p.6., n.15; t h i s definition of 
space i s found i n Ibn Sina, see K. al-Shifa'J op.cit., vol.1., p ,51. 
6. A History of Muslira Philosophy, ed. by M.M. Sharif, vol.1, 
(Wiesbaden, 1963), p.259; M. Fakhry, Isleimic'"Oocasionalism, 
(London, 1958) p.28 
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According to t h i s theory, i t i s observed that a receptacle may 
possess successively different contents, as for example i n the case 
of a wine-bottle or of a house, and sometimes remains empty. This 
observation helps discard the notion of space as superficies, and 
leads to the notion that space i s the whole i n t e r i o r of the recept-
1 
acle which can be f u l l , or empty. Therefore, according to this 
opinion, space i s the khala (vacuum) possessing length, breadth and 
depth, i n other words space i s a tridimensional extension which con-
tains bodies, the absence of which constitutes the void. 
Empty place which i s capable of being f u l l i s anterior i n 
2 — -
existence to that whicjh i t contains. Abu'1-Barakat's whole argu-
ment against the Ar i s t o t e l i a n s for the existence of void revolves around 
theiSEpiDflyi character of our knowledge of the existence of empty space. 
F i r s t two A r i s t o t e l i a j i arguments ^ which Abu'1-Barakat reje c t s concern 
the f a c t that space can not be matter whidi i s defined by Aristoteliains 
as tridimensional. 
Ar i s t o t e l i a n s argue that whatever has tridimensionality can 
only be a body, therefore to attribute tridimensionality to space i s a 
contradiction i n terms. 
1 .K. al-Mu*tabar, op. c i t . , vol . 11 ,p .44, 
2 ,Ibid,, vol . 1 1 ,p . 4 4 . 
3. L i k e Muslim philosophers,the A r i s t o t e l i a n arguments against the existence 
of a vacuumand the i n f i n i t y of space was accepted i n general by Jewish 
philosophers,See for the A r i s t o t e l i a n arguments i n Jewish philosophy 
and the s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y between Abu'1-Barakat and Crescas,I.Efros, 
op.oit.;H.A.Wolfson,Grescas' Critique of Aristotle,(Oamb.Mass.I929). 
4 . Aristotle,PhysiGS,IV,7 , 21 k-a;Ibn STnS,K,al-Shifa*,op. c i t . , v o l . 1 ,pp,51 and 53. 
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Weakness of t h i s argument l i e s ' i n A r i s t o t e l i a n s ' iden-
t i f i c a t i o n of corporeality with tridimensionality. Abu'1-Barakat 
i s c e r t a i n l y aware of t h i s , and consequently he puts the weight of h i s 
argument against t h i s point. According to him, tridirnensionality i s 
not the only quality corporeal bodies llhave, they also have the qualities 
of softness and s o l i d i t y . I t i s these l a t t e r q u a l ities that offer more 
or l e s s resistance, and not the tridimensionality. On the other hand, 
the syllogism they form i s also f a l s e . FonjL the middle term (al-hadd 
al-awsat), i . e . , the body i n the syllogism i s not one and the same 
thing. I n the conditional proposition, namely^'if the void e x i s t s , i t 
w i l l be a body', they take i t to mean something possessing length, 
depth and breadth, but i n the second premise, namely 'but the body can-
not be void', they take i t to mean something perceived by touch. There-
fore the consequence i s bound to be f a l s e . 
A r i s t o t l e i s not j u s t i f i e d i n attributing to Plato the 
view that matter and space are one and the same thing. According to 
Abu'1-Barakat's interpretation of Plato, i t i s true that there exi s t s 
an identity between space and matter considered as extensions, yet t h i s 
identity i s not i n every respect. The difference between matter and 
space i s that the former serves as a substratum to forms and the objects 
composed of form and matter, whereas space i s occupied by the extended 
2 




This interpretation ir. certainly i n keeping vdth some of the 
modem interpretations of Plato. 
Similarly, confusing tSp-idimensionality with corporeality, 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n s propound the argument that void, being tridimen-
sional, nothing could penetrate into i t , since, according to them, 
oxtensity i s the sole cause of imponetrabilitj''. The commentators ( a l -
Sharihun) lend strength to t h i s argument by saying that i f two ex-
tensions can interpenetrate, there i s no reason v/hy the entire world 
would not be contained i n a m i l l e t seed (Jav/ars). " 
The Aristotelians never think ttot t h i s argument can be 
invalidated i f the tridimensional extension, namely the void, i s 
considered to be incorporeal. What they i n s i s t upon i s that vhatever 
has magnitude cannot be incorporeal. 
The contrary i s the f a c t whihh Abu'1-Barakat i s going to 
prove. The geometrical hypothesis that an indefinite number of geomet-
r i c a l points can occupy one and the same place without a dimensional 
increase v/hen ajpplied on to each other i s also, accord.ing to hitn, 
the case with geometrical l i n e s and surfaces. I n this respect. 
1. A r i s t o t l e , Physios, IV.8., 2l6b; Ibn Sina, K, al-^mfa*, op. 
o i t o , v o l , I , , p,57o 
2, A r i s t o t l e and Avicenna use the example of a drop of vfater which 
absorbs the whole sea. 
21.., 
there i s no differentiating principle between a surface possessing 
tvro dnJiiensions and a magnitude having three dimensions, dimensions 
being interchangeable. They are differentiated only r e l a t i v e l y and 
i n the imagination, but not generically or s p e c i f i c a l l y . Hence, the 
interpenetration of tv/o voids or one void and one plenum i s quite 
permissible. I t i s only the corporeal bodies that are Impenetrable. 
Then space, being incorporeal, having a tridimensional extension, and 
offering no resistance, admits of interpenetration. 
The A r i s t o t e l i a n arguments from motion has an outstanding 
place i n the c r i t i c i s m of the existence of a vacuum. As v/e have already 
seen, &reek atomists and the Mutakallamun in Islam argue that the e x i s -
tence of a vacuum i s the necessary condition of locomotion. But the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n s , because of th e i r b e l i e f i n the impenetrability of 
2 
dimensions, explain locomotion i n terms of the exchange of places. 
This argument obviously leaves no room for the existence of a vacuuia, 
Abu'1-Barakat finds the A r i s t o t e l i a n argument v/hich asserts 
the exchange of places as tin explanation of locomotion permissible, 
but not binding. For A r i s t o t e l i a n s themselves argue that a thing moves 
i n a medium more r'arified than i t s e l f . Accordingly, i t may be said that 
the most rftvified thing moves i n the void. Abu '1-Barakat propounds 
1. K. al-Mu*tabar, op.cit., v o l , I I . , p,56 
2, A r i s t o t l e , Physics, IV , 6 ,2 l3a , and IV,7,2l2fa, 
25. 
another argument to the e f f e c t that when a bottle i s completely 
f i l l e d with water, water does not move i n i t , but i f there i s l e f t i n 
1 
the bottle, some a i r which i s more rarefied than water, i t moves. 
Related to t h i s argument, i s the argument from condensation and 
rarefaction. The proponents of the existence of a vacuum explain t h i s 
fact by the amount of voids which permeate the ;garticles of a body, 
2 
whereas the opponents of the existence of vacuum are of the opinion 
that the principle of condensation and rarefaction i s the a i r whidi 
permeates the p a r t i c l e s of the body. ^ 
The f i r s t argument, according to Abu'1-Barakat, has a slight 
superiority over the other, because Aristotelians cannot explain the 
f a c t of rarefaction i n the case of a i r , ^ 
A r i s t o t e l i a n s , later, extend t h e i r argument from locomotion to 
a l l motions, violent or natural, since, according to them, the violent 
motion i s implied i n the natural motion. They argue that every iiimowiag 
body has a natural place, and af t e r being separated from i t by force, 
i t tends to return to i t . I n the void which has no diversity, there 
5 
can be no natural places and consequently, no motion. 
1 .K.al-Mu*tabar,op.oit.,vol.II,pp.57f. 
2,i.e,,the A r i s t o t e l i a n s . 
3. Aristotle,Physics,IV,6,2l3b and IV,214 b. 
4. K. al-Mu H abar, op, c i t , , vol, I I , p, 58. 
5. A r i s t o t l e ,Physics ,IV, 8,215a; Avicenna,K, al-Shifa', op. c i t . , vol. I ,p. 59. 
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Abu'l-Baralcat's argument against t h i s view i s sharp and 
pointed. Aocordlng to him, the undi f fe rent ia ted extension i s d i f f -
erentiated by the objects v/hich dwell i n i t . Therefore i t i s absurd 
to sp^ak of the non-existenoe of the natural places and directions i n 
the v o i d . 
The various A r i s t o t e l i a n arguments fram motion fonn the back-
bone of t h e i r proof against the p o s s i b i l i t y of a vacuum. The argument 
which a t t rac ted great a t tent ion from the commentators and Muslim p h i l -
osophers a l ike concerns the ve loc i ty of a motion i n the absence of any 
resistance. According to A r i s t o t l e , the time of motion i s determined 
by the t enu i ty of the medium, the weight of the moving object , and the 
motive force of t h i s object . ^ I n connection wi th these determinants 
A r i s t o t l e ' s laws of motion can be foimulated as fo l lows: the ve loc i ty 
of a moving object i s d i r e c t l y propo'rtional to the motive power and i n -
versely proport ional to the resistance of the medium i n which movement 
takes place. ^ I n the absence of any resistance the time of a move-
ment would be instantaneous, which i s impossible, since every motion 
must take t ime. 
The f i r s t attack, as f a r as we know, against th i s conception 
came from an Alexandrian philosopher and the commentator of A r i s t o t l e , 
1 . K.al-Mu^abar, o p . o i t . , v o l . 1 1 . , pp.59f. 
2. I b i d . , v o l . 1 1 . , pp.62-63; A r i s t o t l e , Physics, IV,8 ,2 l5a and 2l5b. 
3. A.G. Orombie, Augustine to Gali leo, v o l . 1 1 , (London I96if) 
p.48; H.A.Wolfson, Cresoas' C r i t i q u e . . . o p . c i t . , pp.56-57; 
L E f r o s , o p . o i t . , pp.80-81. 
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John Philoponus, who was to es tabl ish that in. a vo id a body would 
move Y/ith a f i n i t e ve loc i t y character is t ic of i t s g rav i ty , while i n 
a i r t h i s f i n i t e v e l o c i t y was decreased i n proportion to the resistance 
of the medium. ^ He reached t h i s conclusion by the observation of 
the celest is i l bodies, the cause of the uniform motion of whidi had been 
l e f t unanswered by A r i s t o t l e , Therefore, Philoponus seems to have been 
the f i r s t to show, contrary to A r i s t o t l e , that the medium cannot be the 
cause of motion. I n the Muslim Middle Ages, Avicenna held wi th John 
Philoponus that i n the absence of any obstacle a moving object would 
have a f i n i t e ve loc i t y , and showed, contrary to John Philoponus, that 
t h i s f i n i t e ve loc i ty would persis t f o r ever. I n the Muslim Occident 
Avempaoe ( Ibn Baj jah) (d , 533/1138) also accepted t h i s theoiy of a 
f i n i t e ve loc i ty i n the void eoid t h i s f i n i t e ve loc i ty he cal led the 
•originsuL time of motion. ' By doing so, he discarded the medium as a 
detemd'nant of the time of motion. According t o him, the o r i g i n a l time 
of motion remains constant and never disappears. I t i s only true to say 
tha t the excess i n time of two motions over t h e i r time i s proportional 
t o the resistance o f fe red by t h e i r media."^ 
Abu'1-Barakat i n h is argument fol lows J . Philoponus. Like 
Philoponus he distinguishes between the two components of the time of 
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a motion (a-) the o r i g i n a l part (hissa asliyyah) which i s a func t ion of . . . • 
the motive force and the spec i f iczqual i t ies of the mobile, (b) the part 
determined by the resistance of the medium. The time of a movement i n 
the void i s equal to the o r i g i n a l time of the motion. He c i tes i n 
support of t h i s theory, the movement of the c e l e s t i a l spheres. 
The arguments which v;e have mentioned above, a l l depend upon the 
observations of natura l phenomena and speculative reasoning. Apart from 
these, there i s one argument which en t i r e ly depends on ejcperiment, where 
the formation of the experimental science i s c lear ly seen. According to 
t h i s experiment, when the a i r i s sucked from a bo t t le and plunged into 
water, the water would r i se i n i t . There exist two d i f f e r e n t explanations 
f o r t h i s phenomenon. The one i s asserted by the partisans of the void . 
They argue tha t suction has created i n the bot t le a void which at tracted the 
water. The other so lu t ion i s A r i s t o t e l i a n , according to which the amount of 
a i r which remained i n the bo t t l e assumes a greater volume a f t e r the suction. 
I t i s i n v i r t ue of the tendency of the a i r to retui^n to i t s natural state 
2 
that a t t rac ts the water. 
Abu' 1-Barakat sifles w i th the partisans of the void , as he usually 
does. He asks whether the a i r l e f t i n the bo t t le a f t e r the suction increased 
i n dimension, or at the same time i n substance (^awhar). The f i r s t a l t e r -
native leads to the admission of the existence of a dimension 
(miqdar) devoid of a l l the a t t r ibutes of corporeity, whereas the 
1 . K.a l -4Iu*tabar ,op.c i t . ,vol . I I ,p .63;see f o r the s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y 
between Orescas and Abu'1-Barakat , I .Efros ,op.oi t . ,pp .8t -83;Vifol f son, 
Orescas' C r i t i q u e . . . op.ci t . ,p . l8if .0rescas ca l ls the ve loc i ty i n a 
vacuum "fundamental ve loc i ty" . 
2. This argument i s found i n al-FSrab"!:,Article on Vacuum,ed.and t r , by 
N e o ^ i Lfigal and Aydin S a y i l i , (Ankara,1951) ;K.al-MuHabar,op.ci t . , v o l . I I , 
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second t i l te rnat ive boars wi th i t s o l f a d i f f i c u l t y as to whence th is 
quantity of a i r v/hich was added to that r-emained i n the bot t le 
originates . Furthermore, i t i s said that the a i r remained i n the 
bo t t l e a f t e r the suction is more ra re f i ed , and consequently i t a t t racts 
the T/ater. Hovfever the f a c t is t t iat the denser bodies a t t r ac t the 
objects which are i n s imilar density, and not that the f i n e r bodies 
a t t r ac t the denser ones. Is i t that i t a t t rac ts the water because the 
a i r remained i n the bo t t l e i s i n a constrained state? But vjhat has 
forced the a i r a f t e r the suction to change i t s volume? I t cannot be 
the f a c t that i t has constrained i t s e l f . According to Abu'l-Barakat, 
the suction produced a void i n the b o t t l e . I n contradis t inct ion to 
the partisans of the void , the force of a t t r a c t i o n produced i n the 
2 
bot t le i s due to the £lenumi adjoining the void i n the b o t t l e . 
The Ar i s to t e l i ans , i n t h e i r argumentation, t i y to prove the 
famous maxim that 'Nature abhors a vacuum'.'^ Abu'l-Baralcat, proving 
the existence of a vacuum or of absolute space, removes t h i s mis-
leading dictum, as v/ail as the notion of the force of a vacuum,^ 
1. K,al-Mu*tabar, o p . c i t . , v o l . I I . , pp,65f. 
2. The underlying proposit ion, as i t appears, f o r th is argument, 
i s the dictum that " l i ke at tracts the l i k e " . 
3 . I , E f r o s . , o p . c i t . , p.7'i^. • 
i j . . This not ion i s accepted by J . Philoponus. See S.Fines, Etudes.. . 
o p . c i t . , p .22, , n.83 
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According to him, even i f the tridimensional space does not 
ex i s t i n r e a l i t y ( f i ' l - a ^ y a n ) we are s t i l l av/are of i t s existence i n 
the jjnaginatipn and i n the mind, abstracted from a l l corporeal bodies. 
I n f a c t , our knowledge of i t i s a p r i o r i (maftSran). The process of 
abstraction by which we arr ive at the conception of an absolute space 
i s s imi la r to that we conceive of humanity as devoid of ind iv idua l 
a t t r ibu tes , even though humanity cannot be separated from these a t t -
r ibu tes . For Abu'l-Barakat, t h i s i s the opinion of the common people 
and the e l i t e a l i k e , He does not disdain the opinion of the ordinary 
people, as has generally been done by the generali ty of the Muslim 
philosophers. I n f a c t , he generally makes i t the ba^is of his discuss-
ions. 
Another point which distinguishes him from other Muslim p h i l o -
sophers i s tha t he f i n d s no reason not to r e l y on the data acquired by 
the estimative f a c u l t y (quwwshmutasawwirel^, insofar as these data are 
perceived p r imar i l y . This i s ce r t a in ly unacceptable to many A r i s t o t -
2 _ -
.®iians. Indeed, Abu'l-Barakat, as we sha l l l a t e r see, does not d iv -
ide the human soul in to numerous f acu l t i e s , as was done by the A r i s t o t -
e l i ans . 
One of the most perplexing questions of philosophy i s the 
L K . a l ^ u t abar ,op .c i t . ,vo l . I I ,pp . 67 -68 ; the relevant passage was translated 
by S.Pa.nes in to French i n Nouvelles ^ tudes . . . ,op .c i t . ,pp : i6 -17 . 
2.See on Wahm,WolfsGn,The In te rna l Senses i n Latin,Arabic,and Hebrew 
^ ?n^?^o^^ . t e^s , in Harvard T];ieolpgina.1 B g y i f E , ( A p r i l , 1935) ,pp.86f. 
and 107f. ;S.Pines,Nouvelles Etudes . . . ,op .c i t . ,pp . l7-50. 
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i n f i n i t y of space which r i g h t l y formed one of the a\!|tbinomias of 
I . Ka.¥it, A r i s t o t l e admits of the i n f i n i t y of time and motion, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the c i r cu l a r motion on which time depends. Matter i s 
l i m i t e d by the surfaces, and therefore f i n i t e . The d i f f i c u l t y i n 
A r i s t o t l e ' s conception of the i n f i n i t e l i e s i n the f a c t that i t i s 
conceived as a process and a succession which i s exemplified by his 
not ion of p o t e n t i a l i t y and ac tua l i ty , and that he does not apply the 
same process t o space, namely, the successiveness of the parts of 
space. This d i f f i c u l t y was inher i ted by Muslim and Jewish ph i lo s -
ophers, i n general. 
The f i r s t reactiont. i n Muslim philosophy against the A r i s t o t -
e l i a n f i n i t e space came from Iranghahrl and AbU Bakr Zakariya a l -
Ragx. Both accepted the i n f i n i t y of space and made i t the basis of 
e ternal creat ion. According to d l - R i « i , the learned people appeal 
i n establ ishing the existence of space and time to ordinary people 
who maintain them as self-evident (badihl ) , and according to whom our 
minds conceive tha t outside t h i s world exists an extension (imtidad) 
This appeal t o ordinary people i s considered by Nasi]>-i-Khusraw, to 
1 . A r i s t o t l e ' s .argument on I n f i n i t y i s found i n the t h i r d book of h is 
P h y s i o s j o f . I . E f r o s , o p . c i t . , p p . 8 8 - 9 l . 
2 .P.Kraus,op.cit. ,p .264 ,quoted from Z l d a l - ¥ i u s a f i r x n , o p . c i t . , p . 1 0 8 . 
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whom we owe t h i s information, as a weakness on the part of igQ.-
Rall i . I t i s the very method of a l -Ri ig l that Aba'1-Barakat uses. 
Certain people, according t o him, assert tha t the i n f i n i t y of plenum 
and void , and, i n general, of the exbended dimension (al-Bu'd a l -
imtidadx), i s one of the a p r i o r i judgements of the mind (awwaliyyat 
al-^aqliyyd?), because our minds (al-adhhan) cannot conceive of a 
termination (nihayetj) i n space. This way of reasoning, as we have 
mentioned, i s u t t e r l y unacceptable to the Ar i s to t e l i ans , f o r whom the 
estimative f a c u l t y i s the source of a l l e r rors . They only r e ly on the 
judgements of the i n t e l l e c t which proves the f i n i t u d e of space. Here 
are the A r i s t o t e l i a n arguments contrasted w i t h those of Abu* 1-Barakat: 
Ar i s to te l i ans argue: ^Let us prolong a l ine t o i n f i n i t y from 
a given point ( A ) , SO that the l i n e (jb) i s f i n i t e on one side and 
i n f i n i t e on the other, 
A B b 
is i • 
Then l e t us take a par t of t h i s l i n e , again f i n i t e on one side, and 
i n f i n i t e on the other. Let the i n i t i a l point of t h i s l i n e ' ^ B ) . I f 
we apply the i n i t i a l points of these two l ines to each other, does the 
en t i re l i n e exceed the p a r t i a l l i n e i n length. I f we answer i n the 
negative, then the p a r t i a l l i ne must be equal to the entire l i n e , which 
1 .K. al-Mu*t abar, op. c i t . , v o l . I I , p . 8if, 
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i s absurd. But i f the ent i re l i n e i s longer than the p a r t i a l 
l i n e , then the ent ire l i n e must exceed i t by a f i n i t e distance. I f 
we add the distance between the points (AB) t o the p a r t i a l l i n e , can 
we get the length of the ent i re l i n e which i s i n f i n i t e ? To answer 
t h i s question i n the a f f i rma t ive i s absurd i n view of the f ac t that 
1 
f i n i t e distance when added t o a l i ne can only give f i n i t e r e su l t . 
According to Abu'l-Barakat, the p a r t i a l l i ne can be applied 
t o the en t i re l i n e only i f the former i s s h i f t e d from the i n f i n i t e . 
But sucsh a removal of an i n f i n i t e l i n e cannot be imagined unless i t 
has a terminating po in t , consequently f i n i t e . Since the p a r t i a l l i n e 
i s i n f i n i t e , i t s appl icat ion to the ent i re l i n e i s excluded. Therefore, 
2 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n argument i s untenable. 
Ar i s to te l i ans argue: Let us suppose two l ines formed an angle 
at (o) and extejad 
the l ines i n f i n i t e l y , then the distance between the two l ines must 
also increase i n f i n i t e l y . Yet the i n t e rva l between these two l ines i s 
l i m i t e d by them, and insofar as i t i s l im i t ed , i t cannot be i n f i n i t e . ^ 
1 .K.a l -Mu*tabar , ,op ,o i t . ,vo l . I I ,p ,85 ; Ibn SIna ,K.a l -§hi fa? , o p . c i t . ,p.99. 
2 .K. al-Mu*t abar, op. e i t . , v o l . I I ,p , 85. 
3 .1bid. , vo l . I I , pp .85 -86 . 
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According to Abu'l-BarakSt, the i n f i n i t e l y extended 
l ines i n the above argument are not actual ly i n f i n i t e . They, i n 
f a c t , t r y to establ ish that a l i ne can be i n d e f i n i t e l y extended. I t 
i s t r u e , two l ines may be extended i n d e f i n i t e l y and i n accordance wi th 
them, the distance between them may extend. But t h i s i s not the true 
i n t e rp re t a t i on of the doctrine of spa t ia l i n f i n i t y . What Abu'l-Barakat 
means here i s that by a successive synthesis of f i n i t e l ines we can 
never reach the i n f i n i t y . To whatever point we wish to extend both 
l i n e s , they are i n f i n i t e l y f i n i t e ( f a huwa rautariahin l a yataidahi) 
This d i f f i c u l t y was f i r s t f e l t by Avicenna whom Abu' 1-Barakat 
fo l lows here. Avicenna says that i t i s the same wi th number, namely 
that there i s no end t o the process of adding and consequently the 
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i n f i n i t y can never be reached. 
Aristotel ieins argue: Let us suppose q. c i r c l e i n space and 
prolong i t s radius ad i n f i n i t u m , and p a r a l l e l to t h i s radius draw a 
l i n e outside the c i r c l e equally i n f i n i t e . Now, i f the c i r c l e executes 
a c i r c u l a r movement, the radius w i l l intersect the l i ne outside the 
c i r c l e at various points . But since the l ines are i n f i n i t e , they con-
t a i n i n f i n i t e number of points , and an i n f i n i t e distance can not be 
traversed i n a f i n i t e t ime. Consequently a c i rcu la r motion i n an i n f i n -
1.Ibidem, : 
2.1bn ST i i a ,K .a l -Sh i f a? ,op .o i t , , vo l . I , p , l 01 , 
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i t e space i s impossible. ' 
According t o Abu'1-Barakat, the contact and non-parallelism 
of two l ines does not exis t by i t s e l f ; they exist only insofar as i t 
i s determined by observation or i n the imagination. Observation or 
the supposition of the contact i s possible only i f two l ines are def-
i n i t e , i . e . , f i n i t e . The notion of contact which imply an end i s 
inapplicable as f a r as the i n f i n i t e ' l ines are concerned. Furthermore, 
motion i s conditioned by s ix fac tors : (a) the mover, (b) the moving 
object , (c) the s t a r t i ng po in t , (d). the terminating poin t , (e) time 
and ( f ) the medium. The medium i s the distance traversed by the radius. 
Whether there exists a l i ne non-parallel t o the radius or p a r a l l e l to 
i t , whether the space i n which the radius moves i s f i n i t e or i n f i n i t e , 
the motion would not be a f fec ted by i t . To th ink that the c i r cu la r 
motion i s rendered jjnpossible because the two l ines intersect at an 
i n f i n i t e l y distant point i s to a t t r ibu te to these two purely imaginary 
l i n e s , an(., immobilizing force s imi l a r to tha t possessed by two i ron or 
wooden arrows. ^ 
1 . K .a l -Mu*tabar ,op .c i t . , vo l . I I ,pp .60-6 l and 86;Ibn S1r ia ,K.a l -^ i fa* ,op . 
c i t . , v o l . I , p . 5 7 . 
2, K ,a l -Mu ' t aba r ,op , c i t . , vo l . I I , pp .61 -62 . 
3 . I b i d . , v o l . I I , p . 8 6 . 
Aps.rt from the a p r i o r i chai>aotcr of our kriovilsdge of 
i n f i n i t e space, Abu'l-Barakat adduces another argument which, he 
th inks , i s more convincing than those of the Ar i s to te l i ans . He 
argues: Supposing that an arrow, having trs-versed a l l the ce les t i a l 
spheres,, at tained the highest l i m i t which, according to Ar i s to te l i ans , 
i s the l i m i t of space beyond which there i s neither void nor plenum. 
Can the arrow proceed fur ther? There are t\io a l ternat ive answers, 
none of which i s favourable to the Ar i s to t e l i an f i h i t o space. I t can 
e i ther go f u r t h e r because i t meets a void, or i t cannot, because i t 
•J 
meets a body Vfhich o f f e r s resistance to i t . 
Similar arguments are found i n Ant iqui ty and i n the Maqalah 
f l ma ba'd al-Tab3!% a t t r ibu ted to Abu Bakr Zakariyya al-Eaza. i n v/hich 
he gives an h i s t o r i c a l account of the philosophical viows on various 
points . One viev/ is a t t r i bu ted to Seleucus \7ho asks a s imi lar ques-
2 
t i o n 0nd reaches the same conclusion. 
The i i r i s t o t e l i a n objection that th i s argmient pertains to the es-
tiiijat^JsjBiofftoulty serves, according to Abu'l-Barakat, no purpose. There 
i s found no argument that can inval idate our a p r i o r i Judgement that 
there exis ts an i n f i n i t e empty or f u l l extension.^ 
Substcmtially, Abu'l-Barakat shares his views with al-ESzT 
1 , K.al-Mu*tabar, o p . o i t . , v o l . 1 1 . , p.87 / 
2, P, Kraus, o p . o i t . , p.133; see tilso a.Pines, Etudes. . . , o p . o i t . 
p.29, n . l 0 7 . 
3, K. al-Mu^tabar, o p . c i t . , v o l . 1 1 , , p.87 
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al-mutabaddilah) and various accidents wi th respect to generation and 
corrupt ion, change and transformation. Abode, taken ind iv idua l ly i n 
r e l a t i o n to what inheres i n i t , Just as body when taken i n r e l a t i on 
to whiteness, i s ca l led substratum, and when taken i n re la t ion t o what 
i s acquired from both i s ca l led matter or hy le , as, e .g . , a white 
object . Wheat i s the matter f o r f l o u r , f l ou r , i s the matter f o r dough, 
and dough f o r bread. From t h i s i t can be i n f e r r ed that there exists i n 
the world a hierarchy wi th regard to the products of the objects. I n 
the hierarchy the lower serves as the matter f o r the higher. Therefore 
he divides matter in to proximate and remote, or primary and secondary. 
I n the scale of existence, by going down, we reach the f i r s t matters 
(elements), namely, earth, water, a i r and f i r e . (Fa yakiln hadhihi hiya 
al-hayulat al-awwal a ' n l al-' 'ard. wa'l-mi? wa'1-hawa wa'1-nar). These 
four elemenbs also undergo a reciprocal transmutation, f o r example, 
water becomes a i r , and a i r water. I n a l l these reciprocal transmut-
ations, the underlying primary substance (al-hamil al-awwal) remains the 
same. Change requires a body having dimensions (a l -aq ta r ) . I t i s 
through these dimensions that water can become ice ( a l - t h a l j ) , an intense 
s o l i d and cold body, and which, i n the same njay, can warm up, be r a r i f i e d 
and consequently t u r n in to a f l u i d water, and which, by fu r the r warming 
up and ra re fac t ion , can become a i r . Generation, corruption (al-kawn wa ' l 
- fasad) , and t r a n s i t i o n which we f i n d i n ex is t ing objects, i s s e l f -
evident. Men, animals, plants , minerals, and the four basic elements, 
a l l par t ic ipa te i n the concept of corporeali ty (ma^na al-Jismxyyah), 
generation, corruption and t r a n s i t i o n . Earth, water, a i r and f i r e 
have also i n common w i t h the spheres and stars corporeal i ty which has 
dimensions capable of measurement. Corporeal body i s then the Prime 
Matter and the Prime Substratum f o r a l l existents which are perceived 
by the senses. I t i s named Prime Matter w i th regard to t r ans i to ry beings 
which are derived from i t , and substratum i n r e l a t i o n to various states 
from which i t obtains permanence (al-qarrqh) and changeability. 
The way i n which the subject is treated i s , without doubt, 
A r i s t o t e l i a n but the resul t reached by Abu'1-Barakat i s fundamentally 
d i f f e r e n t . A r i s t o t e l i a n argument from the phenomenon of the reciprocal 
transmutation of the elements, and the h i s t o r i c a l development i n 
Is lamic Philosophy may be siAmmed up as fo l lows: 
The process of transmutation, that i s a i r becoming water and 
water becoming a i r , e t c . , cannot be merely the a l t e ra t ion of one th ing 
in to another, f o r the elements represent opposites, and nothing can be-
come i t s opposite unless i t i s f i r s t completely destroyed. But when one 
t h i n g i s destroyed, i t can no longer give r ise t o another th ing , f o r 
from nothing, nothing can be generated. I t i s therefore necessary t o 
assume the existence of a cer ta in substratum common to a l l the four 
elements i n which the transmutation takes place. That substratum i s 
matter and the four elements are the four d i f f e r e n t forms which the 
matter assumes. Thus every one of the four natural elements i s cora-
posed of matter and form. 
1 .K.al-Mu*=tabar,op.Git. ,pp.1Qff . 
2 .Ar is to t le ,Phys ics , I ;Metaphys ics ,XII ,2-4 ;a l -Ghazarx ,op .c i t . ,vo l . i i ,p .86; 
f o r Iffiwan al-SAfa see S.H.Nasr,An Introduct ion to Islamic Cosmological 
doctrines, (Qamb.Mass.196!),) ,pp. 58f. 
The matter underlying the four yleraents i s Icnovm as 'absolute 
body' and the four forms which i t assumes arc variously icnoivn as 
the 'olementary', 'nixtural', 'proper', 'specific' or 'essential' 
forms. Ihis underlying and proximate matter of the four elements is 
not formless. So i t was supposed to have another matter, knovoi as 
Prime Matter, and another form, Icnown as 'Corporeal form' (al-Surat a l -
• 
Jisma^ryah).' In Plotinus'' as well as in tlie Bchwan al-Safa this 
corporeal form is called quantity, 
Aristotle hiraself is vague in his treatment of the subject, 
and makes no reference to 'corporeql form*. He l e f t unexplained the 
nature of the Prime Matter and the common matter of the four elements. 
Simplicius in his commentary on the Physics, mentions a contradiction 
in Aristotle's conception of matter. He i s of the opinion that i f 
Aristot le's proof for the existence of matter from the transmutation of 
the four elements is accepted, i t would lead to the belief that matter 
i s corporeal and extended. But he also finds the contradictory statement 
that matter i s not body and has no magnitude. Accord.ing to Simplicius, 
'Body is defined by three intervals, but matter i s perfectly indef-
inite''' and between the matter iimiiediately underlying the'four 
1. Dieter ic i , Die AbhandJ-ungen der Ichwan el-Safa (Leipzig,1886),p.25, 
S.Nasr, op.c i t . , pp.58ff,,; Avicenna,al-NaJah, (Cairo,1938), 
p p . 2 6 l f f . 
2. Plotinus, Snneads, I I , 4 ? 9 . 
3. H,A, tfolfson, Crescas' Cr i t ique . . . . , op . c i t . , pp.581-582, 
kit.. 
elements and the F i r s t Matter there i s a corporeal form. 
I n Muslim philosophy, t h i s sense of the corporeal form 
i s generally accepted. According to Avicenna and as to others Prime 
Matter i s inextended and has no magnitude. But they d i f f e r as to the 
nature of the corporeal form. Avicenna argues: Matter i t s e l f has a 
dispos i t ion to receive corporeal dimensions. This predisposit ion and 
not the dimensions, i s the corporeal form. The dimensions are added 
t o matter accidents. Avicenna believes tha t the corporeal form i s 
not i den t i ca l wi th cohesion ( i t t i f a l = continui ty) nor i s i t something 
t o whose nature cohesion i s essent ia l ly necessary. I f the corporeal 
form i s iden t i ca l w i th cohesion, then body w i l l have to remain coh-
erent even a f t e r i t has become divided. I t fo l lows , therefore, that 
there i s undoubtedly something that has a p o t e n t i a l i t y f o r both coh-
esion and d iv i s i on , namely, matter. Hence cohesion i t s e l f qua cohesion 
i s not the recipient of d i v i s i o n . Rather i t i s that which i s a rec ip-
ien t of cohesion that i s also the recipient of d i v i s i o n , namely, 
matter, i n as much as the recipient must remsdn wi th that which i s 
received. Nor can the recipient be something to whose nature cohesion 
i s essent ia l ly necessary, i n a» much as that cohesion may pass away. 
On the other hand, the corporeal form has no existence apart from 
matter which i s a substance, being the f i r s t abode i n which other 
thincra eviat s^na i t R P . I f dnP..ct nr>+. P.viat ir^  av^ r^f.Mng ^ Tao 1 
''•tTonnr^'^"^^^^'°P-°^*"^^-^°'''^^-' Horten,Die Metaphysik Avicennas, 
(1909),P.101;P.Duhem,Le System du Monde,vol.I\^,(Paris,1917),pp.54if.; 
For ".^l-tiGiiLazall, Matter has no corporeal i ty . Here he 
fo l lows Avicenna and others. As to the nature of the corporeal 
form he d i f f e r s from Avioenna i n tha t the corporeal form i s not a 
mere predisposi t ion. I t i s i den t i c a l wi th cohesion i t s e l f . On the 
other hand, he agrees w i t h Avioenna tha t the d.imensions are mere acc-
idents, 
Averroes i s i n complete disagreement wi th both Avicenna 
and al -Ghazal l . The corporeal form to him i s neither a predisposit ion 
f o r the cohesion of the three dimensions nor the cohesion i t s e l f . I t 
i s rather i den t i ca l w i t h the dimensions, not indeed the d e f i n i t e chan-
geable dimensions which consti tute the quantity of an object , but 
absolute dimensionality as such, indeterminate and unl imited. 
Abu'l-Barakat 's Prime Matter as the corporeal body conforms 
e n t i r e l y to Averroes' matter w i t h the corporeal form, which i s iden-
t i c a l w i t h indeterminate and unl imi ted dimensions, having inte^gceifed-l 
in to i t . Abu'l-Barakat says, i t has been asserted that the Prime 
Matter i s not corporeal and tha t i t has no extension. The corporeal 
body as the Prime Matter has a r e l a t ive extension. He means by r e l -
a t ive extension only the negation (salb) of the notion of extension 
which i a i t s e l f capable of d iv i s ion both i n imagination and i n r e a l i t y . ^ 
1 .Duhem, op, c i t . , vo l IV,pp . 541 f . 
2. K. al-Mu«t abar, op. c i t . , v o l . I I , p . 12. 
Here, i t may be asked: i f the Prime Matter i s i den t i c a l 
v/i th the corporeal body possessing three-dimensions, what i s the 
difference between t h i s and the empty space which also has three 
dimensions? His answer to t h i s question i s very b r i e f : the d i f f -
erence i s mainly due to the degree of resistance they o f f e r . The 
empty space having no resistance i s something l i k e a non-entity 
( k a l a ^ a y * ) , i t i s absolute p r i v a t i o n (al-ldiala mahd). To those who 
argue that the p r i v a t i o n or the non-entity cannot be measured ( l a 
yataqaddaru), whereas empty space can be measured, i t can be said tha t 
measurement or quant i ty i s not something inhering i n the essence of 
that which i s measured (maqdur), b\3tt i t i s only a mentally conceived 
relation ( i ^ t i b a r dh ihn l ) . Plenum (al-mal*) can be represented i n 
the mind as surrounded by an empty space (al-khala) essent ia l ly , but 
an empty space inside the plenum can only be regarded as accidental . 
Empty space always has the p o t e n t i a l i t y of being f u l l . 
We can, now, reverb to our subject . This corporeal body 
or the prime matter possesses a predisposition to receive forms of 
existent objects . By dis in tegra t ing a composite body we reach the 
basic elements which are ca l led (^ustuqusSLt)« By an inverse process 
we arr ive at the composite objects, the oompoaition i t s e l f i s also 
ca l led element ( ' 'unsur). The corporeal body i s the real element of 
2 
everything. 
1 .K.al-*Iu^tabar,op.cit . , v o l , I I I , p . 2 0 9 . 
2 .Kbid . ,vo l . I I ,pp .13f f . 
44. 
Natural objects are divided,with respect t o t h e i r 
existence, in to e n t i t i e s having permanent existence and the act-
i v i t i e s proceeding from them. That from which the a c t i v i t i e s proceed 
I S ca l l ed apent ( f a * i l ) , and tha t m whidh the agent inheres i s called 
rec ip ien t ( q a b i l ) . Recipient i s the abode or matter, or the sub;)ect 
f o r the existence of what exists m i t . Some of those that come into 
the subject by means of an agent are called foxm. I t i s through f o m 
that something i s , f o r example, humanity of men, sind the squareness of 
a square, and some are ca l led accident, f o r example, whiteness of a man 
and the heat of the f i r e . Fonn i s equivocally a t t r ibu ted t o both form 
and accident. Form i s the cause of the actual existence of objects. 
A c t i v i t i e s proceeding from natural objects also play an 
important role m dis t inguishing the true foim of an object . Accord-
ing to Abu'l-Barakat, the t m e foim of an object i s that from which a 
cerbain act proceeds p r i m a r i l y , f o r example, heat bums. Therefore heat 
I S the t rue form of the f i r e , and i t s raWity being consequent upon i t . 
I n t h i s connection. Aba'1-Baralcat t rea ts of the end and 
p r i v a t i o n . F i r s t the end. According to him, i t i s the agent that 
creates the form m matter, f o r the cause exists m the mind of the 
agent, and through t h i s cause he does what he w i l l s . For example, the 
end perceived m the mind of a carpenter acts as the f oiin of a bed-stead 
( a l - S a r i r ) , I t i s through t h i s form that the end i s achieved i n r e a l i t y . 
45. 
This end i s the cause of the causali ty of the agent ( * i l l a h * i l l l y y a t 
a l -Fa* i l ) and the agent is the cause of i t s existence. I t sometimes 
so happens tha t f o m may become the agent, f o r example, heat of the 
f i r e turns a piece of wood in to f i r e . Here f o m and the end coincides. 
The existence of p r i v a t i o n (al-*adam), and i t s being a 
cause i s accidental, because i t i s the condition f o r temporal events 
before they exis ted . I t can have an ex i s t en t i a l meaning not i n so 
f a r as i t i s non-existent, but i n so f a r as i t i s inc l ined to reach 
corporeal i ty . P r i v a t i o n belongs to the a t t r ibutes and the accompani-
ments of matter, and i s included among the causes only i n the mind, 
1 
not i n r e a l i t y , 
o) Motion. 
For Abil ' l-Barakat, motion i s the most universal accident 
of na tura l objects . There are f o u r categories of motion: (a) The 
Local Motion (al-harakat al-makani^-yah), (b) The Rotatory Motion ( a l -
liarakat al-wa^*iyyah), ( B ) The Quantitative Motion, i . e . motion of 
growth and d imin i t i on , (d) Transi t ion or the Quali tat ive Motion. I n 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between the Local and Rotatoiy motions he fol lows the 
lead of I b n Sina. ^ 
1 .K.al-Mu*tabar,op.cit . ,vol .11,pp.15-18. 
2 . Ibid. ,vol , I I ,p .28jS.M.Afnan,Avicenna:His L i f e and Works,(London, 1955) 
p.21 OjIbn Sxna,al-Najah,op.cit . ,pp. 105f. 
Motion i s defined by A r i s t o t l e i n teims of i t s substrat-
um as the ac tua l i ty of that which i s movable i n so f a r as i t i s movable 
and i n terms of i t s . form as the ac tual i ty of tha t which i s i n po ten t ia l -
i t y i n so f a r as i t i s i n p o t e n t i a l i t y . 
Having a mind f o r s t r i c t c lass i f ica t ions and de f in i t ions 
Avicenna opts f o r the second d e f i n i t i o n which has several variants 
i n his books. Motion i s the gradual passing from p o t e n t i a l i t y to 
2 
a c t u a l i t y i n t ime. I t i s the f i r s t enteleohy of that which i s i n 
p o t e n t i a l i t y i n so f a r as i t i s i n - p o t e n t i a l i t y . Motion i s the f i r s t en te l -
echy of that whicda i s in- -potent ia l i ty and the gradual actual izat ion of 
that which i s i n p o t e n t i a l i t y , ^ 
Ihen motion i s i n the process of actual izat ion i t i s r e a l l y 
ca l led motion. This process occurs between the i n i t i a l state which 
Avioennu ca l l s 'pure p o t e n t i a l i t y ' and the f i n a l state which he cal ls 
pure ac tua l i ty , nei ther of which being motion. 
Only the d e f i n i t i o n which includes time as an outstanding 
element can su i t Abu'1-Barakat's purpose. So he accepts the d e f i n i t i o n 
that motion i s the .gradual ac tual iza t ion, i n t ime, of that which i s i n 
1 .Ar is to t le ,Physics , 111,1,201 a, 10-11. 
2.1bn Sina,Funun-e samaS-e ijabi«a az Eetab-e s h i f a B j t r . i n t o Persian by 
M.A.FuiC[ghi,(Teheran, 1940j',p. 132jRisTaah fST' 1-Hudnd,(Istanbul, 129aH.) 
p.63. 
3,Ris8aah f i ' l -hudCld,op,c i t , ,p .63 ;Ar is to t le ,Physics , I I I , 1,201 a, 10-11, 
4^. 
potency. According to him motion can only be conceived i n t ime, 
as he w i l l make clear when he i s dealing w i t h the concept;;, of t ime. 
However, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s necessary f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
(motion i n t j jne ' and ' t imeless change'. He ca l l s the instantaneous 
or the timeless change absolute change or absolute actual iza t ion. 
Timeless change occurs i n a l l the ten categories. But the motion i n 
time i s only found i n categories of place, qua l i t y , quantity and 
2 
pos i t i on . 
Now, he asks 'does motion exist? ' considering the f a c t that 
motion i s made up of a series of contacts and absence of contacts, the 
former implying rest and the l a t t e r non-existence (*adam). He argues, 
i t i s only when we unite t h i s process i n our minds can we have the 
existence of motion. I t i s a constantly changing process. ^ 
Motion i s conditioned by (a) Mover, (b) Mobile, (c) I n i t i a l 
po in t , (d) F i n a l po in t , (e) Medium, ( f ) Time. ^ Passage i n time i s 
most essential t o every motion, v/hereas the i n i t i a l and f i n a l points 
and the medium are the necessary concomitants (lawazim) of motion. I n 
the case of rota tory motion there i s no i n i t i e i l and f i n a l points . ^ 
1 .The d i s t i n c t i o n between motion and timeless change i s found i n Avicenna 
though A r i s t o t l e i s not clear on t h i s point* 
2 ,K, al-Mu«t abar, op. c i t . , v o l l l , pp. 29f, 
3 .1bid, , v o l , I I , p p , 3 0 f , 
4 , I b i d ; , v o l . I I , p . 3 3 , 
5 . I b i d . , v o l , I I , p p . 3 7 f . 
48. 
Every mobile body must have a mover which must be d i s t i n c t 
from the mobile. Motion depends upon two causes: (a) the material 
cause which i s the mobile body i t s e l f , and (b) the e f f i c i e n t cause 
(*ill8ifc a l - f a * i l l y y a h ) which causes motion to exist and not t o ex i s t . 
I f i t existed through the essence of the mobile, i t would never cease 
1 
to ex i s t , which i s incompatible w i t h the nature of motion. 
This theory sets the foundation of A r i s t o t l e ' s 'Unmovable 
2 
Mover' (Mviharrik la-yataharrak). 
Natural objects may be c l a s s i f i e d in to those which have 
the p r inc ip le of . motion i n themselves or outside themselves. Those 
v/hich have the p r inc ip le of motion i n themselves move e i ther by reason 
of nature ( t ab ' ) or by reason of w i l l ( i r adaf l ) . Downward motion of a 
stone and upward motion of f i r e f a l l s under the category of motion by 
nature. Ce les t i a l objects and mankind move by w i l l . Those which have 
the p r inc ip le of motion outside themselves move by force . Nature i s 
not ofely the p r inc ip l e of motion o f natural bodies but also that of 
res t . Every natural body moves by nature towards i t s natural place 
where i t remains at rest unless i t i s removed from i t by fo rce . I t s 
movement i s i n a s t ra ight l i ne which i s the shortest way to i t s natural 
place. Like A r i s t o t l e , he also divides motion in to (a) Motion according 
^9-
to i t s essence, (b) accidental motion (c) Natura l ly accidental 
motion, and (d) Motion according to par t . For the f i r s t , the motion 
of the heavens which mover, as a whole; f o r the second, the motion of 
the passengers i n a ship by the movement of the ship; f o r the t h i r d a n a i l i n 
a ship whida moves accidental ly by the motion of the ship, but through 
i t s f unc t i on i t moves by i t s e l f , and f o r the f o u r t h , the motion of the 
hajid i n the act of w r i t i n g may be given as examples. 
Among the categories of motion, the loca],^rotatory, and 
c i r c u l a r motions are p r i o r by nature to a l l the other categories of 
motion. The circular::, motion, i n t u r n , is p r i o r to the l oca l and r o t -
atory motions, being most perfect among a l l the other categories of 
motionf'. I t s per fec t ion depends upon i t s being governed by continuous 
and pers i s t ing w i l l and i s evidenced by i t s equable ( l a yakh ta l i f ) and 
2 
stable motion. 
That thecciofcular motion i s d i f f e r en t from the 'motion i n 
place' i s not accepted by Averroes ( i b n Rushd), He maintained tha t the 
J , I b i d , , v o l , I I , p p . 1 0 3 f f , A r i s t o t l e has a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t c l a s s i f i ca t ion : 
a)the essential mot i o n , i . e. , the t rans la t ion of a body as a whole from 
one place to another,b)the accidental motion,which i s subdivided into 
the motion of some accident of a body by reason of the motion of the 
body i t s e l f , a n d the motion of part of the body by reason of the motion 
of the whole body.See Wolfson,Crescas' C r i t i q u e , . , o p . c i t , , p . 7 6 ; A r i s t o t l e , 
V,2,226a,19ff . ; IV ,4 ,211a , l 7 f f . ;VI I I , 4 , 254b ,7 f f . 
2,K, a l -Mu«tabar ,op . . c i t . , v o l , I I , p p , 103f., and 1.05;Aristotle,Physics,VIII,9, 
265a,16-23. 
50. 
c i r c u l a r motion must be c l a s s i f i e d as locomotion. He also laeeCjeoljBi 
the theory that the nature or form i s the pr inc ip le of motionj. of 
natural bodies. He argues that the nature or form being not d i s t i nc t 
from the matter of the substance, i s the act of the matter and cannot 
act on i t s own matter. According to s t r i c t A r i s t o t e l i a n doctrine which 
Averroes f o l l o w s , the mover must be d i s t i n c t from the mobile but i n 
aontact w i th i t . I t i s i n t h i s way that the continuance of every motion 
i s possible. I t i s easy f o r Ar is to te l ians to f i n d i n nature examples 
v e r i f y i n g t h i s statement i n so f a r as the voluntary accidental, natural 
and cer ta in v io l en t motions caused by push and by t r ac t i on i s concerned. 
But what of the v io len t motions which are separated from t h e i r movers? 
A r i s t o t l e t r i e s t o answer t h i s d i f f i c u l t y . He says, the hand which 
throws a stone imparts not only a violent motion to the stone, but also 
2 
a motive force to the medium which sustains the motion of the stone. 
This theory endows the a i r wi th the power t o stay i n motion, 
though i t denies the same power to the p r o j e c t i l e under s imi l a r circum-
stances. This inherent contradict ion was unsuccessfully explained away 
by A r i s t o t l e ' s commentators, Alexander of Aphrodi3:feis, Simplicius , and 
1.E.A.Moody,Gralileo and Avempace.in Journal of the His ta ry of Ideas, 
V01.XII,(1951),p.378;VVolfson,op,oit.,p,535;S,Pines,A refutation of 
Ga len , i n_ I s i s , vo l ,L I I , ( l 962 ) ,p .40 . 
2 .Ar is to t le ,Phys ics , V I I I , 10,267a;P .Duhem, op. c i t . , vo l .1 ,p . 376. 
5«. 
Themistius who argue that t h i s power i s analagous to the power 
imparted by the f i r e to water which, having been heated, not only 
preserves the heat, but i s also capable of t ransmit t ing i t to other 
bodies. 
Another theory which i s Plato 's i s cal led the theory of 
2 
ant iper is tas is according to which the cause of the p r o j e c t i l e motion 
i s the c i r cu l a t i on of the disturbed a i r i n f r o n t to the rear part of the 
JJrojectll'^a,^ According to another in te rpre ta t ion , the p ro j ec t i l e 
pushes the a i r i n f r o n t and t h i s impulse i s transmitted t o the next 
layer of a i r and so on, thus sustaining the motion of the p r o j e c t i l e . 
The above theories which f i n d i n the a i r the cause f o r the 
continuance of the motion of the p ro j ec t i l e are j/J?^.gsoted by John 
Philoponus, He asks: i f the cause of the p r o j e c t i l e motion i s the a i r , 
why must the hand touch the stone or the arrow be f i t t e d to the bow? Why 
does not v io lent beating of the a i r move the stone? Why can a heavy stone 
be thrown f u r t h e r than a very l i g h t one? Why do two bodies have to c o l l -
ide to be deflected and not simply pass close to each other through the 
a i r? 
1 .P ,Duhem, op, o i t , , v o l , I , p , 376, 
2,Plato,Timaeus,79b;Taylor,Gommentary on Plato 's Tim,,(0xford,1928),pp,558f.; 
A r i s t o t l e ,Phys, ,IV, 8,215a; V I I I , 10,267 a. 
3 .K. al-Mu«t abar, op, c i t . , v o l , I I , p , 112; Grombie , op, c i t , , v o l . I I , p . 50; S ,Pines, 
E t u d e s , o p , c i t . , v o l . I I I , n o . 1 ,p.41» 
4.0rombie,op. c i t . , F o l . I I , p p . 51-52;Duhem,op. c i t . ,vo3J,pp,350-371. 
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Philoponus' ovm theory v/hioh w i l l l a te r be accepted by the 
ma jo r i ty of Muslim philosophers a f t e r Avicenna i s that the mover 
oomniunioates to the p r o j e c t i l e a certain incorporeal motive force which 
enables i t to continue i t s motion. This motive force i s decreased by 
the resistance of the medium and the natural i n c l i n a t i o n of the bociy, 
f i n a l l y , the v io len t motion of the p ro jec t i l e comes to an end. This 
theory eliminates the a i r as the cause of motion. I n the Occident 
Avempace and h is disciple a l - B i t r u j i was the fo l lower of t h i s doctrine 
which is closely l inked vdth the p o s s i b i l i t y of motion i n the vo id . 
As v/e have already seen, th i s motion i n the void comes to an end as 
soon as the motive force i s exhausted. 
Many of the arguments concerning p ro jec t i l e motion found i n 
Avicenna are mentioned by Abu'l-Barakat, except that he makes rad ica l 
changes wherever he thinks necessaiiy. The argument that a i r receives 
an impulse from the mover at the same time as the p r o j e c t i l e wi th one 
d i f fe rence , that a i r moves f a s t e r than the p r o j e c t i l e and carries i t 
along i s rendered n u l l by Avicenna's argument that the f a c u l t y to 
continue denied to the p r o j e c t i l e must likev/ise be denied to a i r , and 
that i f the a i r moves f a s t e r than the p ro j ec t i l e i n order to sustain the 
motion, the a i r w i l l have to plunge in to a wa l l more deeply than an 
2 
arrov/. 
1, Duhem, o p . o i t . , V o l , I . , pp,350-371; S. Pines, Etudes. . . , o p . c i t , , 
y o l . i i i , , no ,1 , p p - 2 i . 2 ; f o r Avempace, see Moody, op .c i t .pp . l85- l86 , 
2. Avicenna, K.a l -Shi fa* , Fua?u_ghi's t rans la t ion, o p . c i t . , pp,524ff. 
55. 
I n the Muslim World a theory which i s quite near t o the 
theory of mayl ( i n c l i n a t i o n ) makes i t s appearance probably f o r the 
f i r s t tnjne i n Kalam. According to th i s theory, Avicenna says, i t i s 
i n the nature (tab*) of motion to engender another motion a f t e r i t 
and s i m i l a r l y i t i s i n the nature of the i<H;imad ( in tent ion) to 
engender another i ' t i m a d . The MutsL&alliiiiSigi, ( pa r t i cu l a r l y the 
Mu*tazi l i tes) does not regard as impossible a steady movement 
being broken by the moments of res t . 
This atomic theory of motion i s refuted by Avicenna. 
According to him, i f motion were composed of i n d i v i s i b l e units of 
motion, there could not be one movement more rapid than another unless 
one had less and the other more uni ts of rest intervening i n between. 
But t h i s could not conceivably be the case, because motion i s cont in-
uous; and i f one i s rapid and the other slow, i t i s because of the 
1 
very nature of the motion and not of intervening units of res t . 
1 . Avicenna,K.al-Shif§? .Furughi' s t ranslat ion,op,ci t , ,p ,525.The Mutakal-
limOh believed t h a t , l i k e time and space,motion i s consti tuted by discrete 
atoms of motion having a duration of an i n s t an t . I n view of th i s , they exp4 
lained the difference of the ve loc i ty between two motions by arguing 
tha t two objects traverse d i f f e r e n t lengths of space i n the same t ime-
i n t e r v a l because the motion of the slower object was interrupted by 
fewer moments of rest.So they declaired tha t no ve loc i ty i s greater than 
another.Of ,al-Ash<^arr,Ma<3tl'at al-Isl1Smiyyin,ed,by H .R i t t e r , ( I s t anbu l , 
1929-1930) ; Ibn Hazm,Kitab a l -Fi§al ,vol .V,(Gairo) ,p ,107;Maimonides ,Guide 
f o r the Perplexed,tr ,by S,Pines,(Chicago, 1963),oh.73.Atomio theory of 
the Mutakallimun i s i n keeping w i t h t h e i r denial of the p r inc ip le of 
causal i ty and f ree-will.When,for instance,a man i s said t o move a pen 
Continuation of Ref. No.1 from page No.54. 
such movement i s not really the result of h is w i l l i n g or act ion, but rather the . 
the resu l t of the d i rec t in te rvent ion of God,who creates Jfovir successive 
accidents simultaneously wi th the event,laeding up to the movement of the 
pen.The f i r s t of these accidents i s the w i l l to move the pen; the second i s 
the power to move i t ; the t h i r d i s the movement of the hand, and f i n a l l y the 
actual movement of the pen.Those four accidents are not causally related 
to one another but only conconiitantly,Of.Guide,op,oit. ; .Ghazali,al-Iqtisad 
fx' l-I«tiqad.(Egorpt),pp,lOO and 45;Tahafut al-Falasifah,ed.by Bouyges, 
(Beirut,1927),pp.237 and 279,The MuS;az i l i t e£ were anathemized by the 
Ash"^arites,because of t h e i r theory of "i ' t iraad" which established to a ctjrbain c 
ce r ta in extent a causal l i n k between two atoms of motion. 
55. 
I n his explanation of the p r o j e c t i l e motion, Avicenna 
fo l lows John Philoponus. Avicenna believes that the mobile borrews 
( is tafada) from the mover an i n c l i n a t i o n which brings about the 
continuance of the v iolent motion. 
Avicenna defines Mayl as the e n t i t y (al-ma'iJia) which i s 
perceived by the senses i n the body i n motion. I t i s perceptible by 
i t s resistance and by the e f f o r t i t exerts i n order to move i t s e l f . I t 
2 
i s a qua l i ty given to the p r o j e c t i l e as heat i s given to water by f i r e . 
Mayl d i f f e r s from motion i n tha t the former exists even i n the state of 
rest. For t h i s , Abu'1-Barakat ci tes the example of a l i n k drawn i n 
opposite d i rect ions by two equal forces, i n which case i t would remain 
immobile, ^ Mji^rl i s also d i f f e r e n t from the motive force , 'Awhile the 
l a t t e r continues to exis t a f t e r the completion (itmam) of the movement, 
the former does not. 
There are three categories of mayl: (a) Mayl mafsanl (Ps^clacal 
i n c l i n a t i o n ) , (b) Mayl t a b i * i (natural i n c l i n a t i o n ) , (c) Ms^l qasr i 
(v io len t i n c l i n a t i o n ) or Mayl gjharib, or quwwahmustafadaJSii.. The i d e n t i t y 
of the 'borrowed fo rce ' and the ' v i o l e n t i n c l i n a t i o n ' i s af f i rmed by 
Aba* 1-Barakat. ^ 
1 ,Avicenna,K.al-:giiif S* ,op.oit . ,pp.523-525. 
2.1bid. ,p .525;K,alHMu'tabar ,op.ci t . ,vol . II ,p . i13;S.Pines,Les pr^curseurs 
Musulmans de l a Theory de 1'impetus,in_Ar^eion,vol.XXI,(1938),p.301. 
3. K . a l - M u « t a b a r , o p . c i t . , v o l , I I , p , l 0 0 . 
4 , Abu'1-Barakat says, "having examined the problem we f i n d that the mobile 
assumes from the mover a force which we c a l l mayl".K.al-Mu«^tabar,op.oit . , 
v o l . I I , p . 1 1 3 . 
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Avioenna, l i k e A r i s t o t l e , does not believe that the violent , 
motion i s possible i n the vo id . He says i f there existed such mot-
ion i n the void i t would neither be annihilated nor interrupted i n any 
way. I f i t were annihi la ted, t h i s would happen e i the r through the 
intermediary of an external cause, or through i t s own essence. The 
second al ternat ive i s impossible, because the existence of that whose 
essence i s apt to be annihi lated i s impossible even f o r a moment. (Ohunke 
an^e dha t s^ mustahaqq-e 'adam ast wu^udagh h l^ghah inumfciltisJftl|st), I n 
the case of the f i r s t a l t e rna t ive , the external cause must e i ther reside 
i n the body i n motion, or outside tha t body. I g the former were t rue , 
because i n the beginning of the motion i t i s supressed, i t would need 
another cause i n order t o become a dominant cause. But th i s process 
goes on ad i n f i n i t u m . I f the l a t t e r were t rue , t h i s outside cause would 
ex«e rc i se i t s act ion ( t8?sir) e i the r being i n contact w i t h the body i n 
motion, or from afar . I f the former i s accepted, then the cause i n 
question w i l l have to be a body. No su<^ body exists i n absolute void . 
I f t h i s cause excersised i t s act ion from afar, why d i d i t not ex«Brcise 
t h i s action i n the beginning of the motion. Rather, the most acceptable 
doctrine i s that i t i s the continuous succession of resistances of the 
medium that annihilates the motive force imparted t o the p r o j e c t i l e . 
1 ,Avicenna,K,al-Shif l ' ,FurughT's t r a n s l a t i o n , o p , c i t , , p . 2 l 4 . 
5?'. 
The s t a r t ing point of t h i s theory i s obviously A r i s t o t l e ' s theory^ 
of the imposs ib i l i t y of motion i n the void . As we have already mentioned 
the relevant theories before, we s h a l l not go in to de ta i l s here. 
The above Avicennan theory presupposes only the gradual res-
istance of the medium f o r the annih i la t ion of the v iolent motion. I n 
t h i s respect, John Philoponus anticipates the c r i t i c i s m of t h i s theory. 
For him i n the vo id the resistance of the natural i n c l i n a t i o n of the 
p r o j e c t i l e i s i n e f f e c t , consequently i t does not persist i n d e f i n i t e -
Avicenna also deals wi th the question why the v iolent motion 
i s f a s t e r i n the middle of i t s course than i n the beginning and i n the 
end. He cites, the fo l l owing explanation i n order to c r i t i c i z e : i t i s 
because the a i r i n t r en t i s r a r e f i e d as the p r o j e c t i l e moves along. 
Avicenna argues that the more the a i r i n f ron t of the p r o j e c t i l e i s 
ra re f ied , less i t i s capable of maintaining the motion i t occasions, 
therefore i t cannot be the cause of the acceleration of the p r e j e c t i l e . 
Perhaps the r a r i f y i n g e f f ec t s of f r i c t i o n exceeds i n the beginning of the 
motions the ef fec ts ' o f the pregressive weakening of the motive force , so 
1 . A r i s t o t l e ,Phys. , I V , 8,215a, 19, 
2.Philoponus' commentary on the fou r th book of the Physios of A r i s t o t l e ; 
Duhem, op .o i t . ,vo l .1 ,pp .350-371, 
58. 
that the body accelerates i n the f i r s t ha l f o f i t s course. I n 
the second h a l f i t cont inual ly decelerates, 
Avicenna, having investigated the relat ions between the motive 
force and the weight of the objects , establishes the fo l lowing fom-
ulae. (a) Bodies moved by a given power v/ould t r ave l w i th veloc-
i t i e s inversely proport ional to t h e i r weights, and (b) Bodies moving 
w i t h a given v e l o c i t y would travel. , (against the resistance of the a i r ; 
2 
distances d i r e c t l y proport ional to t h e i r weigjhts. 
Another problem concerns the existence of the quies media. 
According to A r i s t o t l e , there must be a moment of rest between two 
successive and opposite motions. This i s v a l i d f o r a l l the categories 
3 
of motion except the c i r c u l a r motion, 
Avicenna favours the A r i s t o t e l i a n thes is . To prove the exis-
tence of the quies media, he proposes several arguments: (a) I n the 
end of i t s ascension, the p r o j e c t i l e s t i l l preserves a por t ion of i t s 
v io len t i n c l i n a t i o n . This por t ion of the v io len t i n c l i n a t i o n being 
equal to the natural i n c l i n a t i o n of the p r o j e c t i l e , the p r o j e c t i l e stays 
i n balance before s t a r t i ng i t s downward motion. This state of e q u i l i b -
rium ends when the residue of the v io len t i n c l i n a t i o n completely disappears. 
1.Avicenna,K.al-^ifa? , F u r u j ^ i ' s t r ans l a t ion ,op ,c i t , , pp ,526f f , 
2 .S.Pines ,Etudes , . ,op.c i t . ,pp.60-6l ;crombie,op,ci t , ,vol , I I ,pp.52-53. 
3 .Aris to t le ,Ph5rs ics ,VIII ,8 . 
(b) Vio len t rest can be caused by the i n i t i a l weakness of the 
na tura l i n c l i n a t i o n whi<Si at f i r s t i s incapable of moving the projec-
1 
t i l e downwards. To demonstrate h is case he resorts to the example 
jrhat nine people cannot remove the stone which requires ten of them. 
By t h i s argument he also proves that every mayl does not necessarily 
produce motion. 
A l t h o u ^ Avicenna accepts the existence of a mayl i n an 
immobile body, he i s reluctant to admit that two opposite mayls may 
exis t i n one body. For him, i n t h i s body, there can only exis t a 
p r inc ip l e (mabda*) t o produce the opposite mayl. But t h i s opposite 
i n c l i n a t i o n does not arise immediately a f t e r the f i r s t motion. I t 
2 
requires a moment of rest , 
Abu'l-BarakSfc, i n h i s account, has no in t en t ion of abolish-
ing Avicennian notion of v io len t i nc l i na t i on - or "borrowed force.;". But 
on several points his o r i g i n a l i t y stands out . 
Against the theory of ant iper is tas is , Abu'l-Barakat, l i k e 
Avicenna, ci tes the i n a b i l i t y of the a i r to plunge i t s e l f in to a w a l l 
1 . A v i c e n n a , K . a l - ^ i f a^  ,Furuehi' s t rans. , o p . o i t , ,0,471 
2 , Ib id . ,p ,477 . 
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more deeply than an arrow, and the i n a b i l i t y of the a i r to support 
an arrow, although, a heavy stone may be carried away or broken 
1 
i n to pieces by turbulent winds. He follows. Avicenna on the 
question o f the progressive acceleration of the p r o j e c t i l e u n t i l i t 
reacdies the middle of i t s course. To the argument mentioned before, 
he adds that i f the e f f e c t of the continual ra refac t ion i s admitted, 
the p r o j e c t i l e w i l l reach i t s maximum speed not i n the middle of i t s 
2 
course, but at the end. 
To solve t h i s problem, Abu'1-Barakat argues that the unnatural 
qua l i ty imparted to a body gains at the end of a oertetln t ime, a force 
superior t o that which existed i n the beginning of the motion. He 
explains why t h i s motion ever comes to an end. The medium and the 
natural i n c l i n a t i o n axe not the only causes. There i s one other cause : 
3 
the continual movement of the p r o j e c t i l e away from the mover. This 
motion implies that i n d e f i n i t e motion of a p ro j ec t i l e i n the void i s 
impossible. 
I n dealing w i t h the problem of the quies media, he f i r s t 
refers t o the au thor i ty of P la to . According to Pla to , he says, the 
unnatural force which determines the upward motion of a stone w i l l 
cont inual ly weaken, while the natural foroe of the stone i s increasing. 
When the stone has reached the extreme point of i t s ascension, i t w i l l 
s t i l l have an imperceptibly slow motion. This produces the i l l u s i o n that 
the stone i s at res t . ^ 
1 .K. a l-*Iu ' t abar, op. o i t . , v o l . I I , p . 114. 
2 . I b i d . , v o l . I I , p . i i 4 . 3 .1b id . , vol.11,pp. 114-115 
4 . Ibxd . ,vo l . I I , p . 94 .Th i s theory i s not fouAf In PllJo! 
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I n order to r e j e c t the theory of the quies media, Abu'l-Bajrakat 
recal ls some empirical observations. He c i tes the example of a 
large stone which encountered a t i r i y body such as a date-stone i n i t s 
dovmv/ard motion. Against Ar is to te l ians he says, at the time of c o l l -
i s i o n there can be no moment of r e s t . I f the date-stone undei-went a 
moment of res t , t h i s would necessitate the immobilization of the large 
stone (grindstone) f o r the same period of t ime. But Avioenna, to save 
the appearance, a t t r ibu tes the caiase of rest of the date-stone to the 
turbulent a i r carr ied down by the grindstone i n f r o n t , so that the 
date-stone would not stop the grindstone at the moment of i t s res t . 
Abu'l-Barakat, second-ly, gives the example of an experiment 
carr ied out by a cer ta in venerable man: This man put tlie one end of a 
piece of thread through the hole made in the middle of a ruler(mistarah)o 
On the other end he suspended a weight ( a l - ^ a q u l ) . Having t i e d the 
fonner end of the thread on to a mihatt (iunplement f o r cleaning hides), 
K -... he moved the raihatt on the r u l e r from one end to the other. 
During t h i s process, the v/eight suspended on the other end of the ±hi:esd 
would go up and down as the mihatt i s moved from the one end of the ru l e r 
to the other. Since the r e c t i l i n e a r motion of the mihatt i s continuous 
, , , 
there w i l l enter no moment of rest between the upvrard and downward motion 
of the weight, ^ 
1. I b i d . , v o l , I I , pp.96-97. _ 
2. Avicenna, K.al-Shifa* Furughl's t rans , , o p . c i t . , p.470. 
3. K,al-Mu*^tabar, o p . c i t . , vol .11. , p.97. 
6g. 
As we have already seen, Avicenna in fe r s the necessity of 
the quies media from the f ac t tha t two opposite mayls do not exis t 
i n one body. Abu'1-Barakat, to c r ipple th is ar^raent, establishes 
the coexistence of two opposite inc l ina t ions i n a l i n k (a l -ha lqa^) . 
p u l l e d i n two opposite d i rec t ions . I t i s the same, says Abu'1-BarakSLt, 
w i t h the objects thrown upwards. They always preserve t h e i r natural 
inc l ina t ions whicih are downwards. The natural i n c l i n a t i o n of bodies 
i s one of the causes of ra tardat ion of the upward motion of the p r o j -
e c t i l e . Unless vife accept t h i s f a c t , i t is impossible to explain why 
there exis ts a difference i n speed between the two stones of d i f f e r e n t 
size, thrown upwards by the same hand and w i t h the same force . Bigger 
the stone, more slowly i t ascends, possessing a stronger natural i n o l i n -
1 
at i o n . 
Abu'1-Barakat proceeds t o consider the more important question 
+ 
of whether the quies media ex is t s , when a l l the forces reach an e q u i l -
ibr ium. He o u t r i g h t l y re jects the existence of the quies media by 
saying tha t no reason can explain t h i s in te r rup t ion . The v io len t foroe 
cont inua l ly declines as na tura l i n c l i n a t i o n increases. The instant the 
p r o j e c t i l e ends i t s ascension i s when the equal i ty of forces occurs. 
But t h i s instant i s i d e n t i c a l wi th the beginning of the time of i t s 
descent. There i s no reason f o r a moment's struggle among the forces, 
since as soon as the p r o j e c t i l e ends i t s ascension i t i s overpowered. ^ 
1.Ibid.,vol .11,p.100. 
+ )Like Abu'1-Barakat,Oresoas (1340-1MO),the Spanish Jewish philosopher, 
denies the existence of the quies media.See Wolfson,Crescas' C r i t i q u e . . , 
op.cit. ,pp .84,279 ,28l,and 623ff. 
2. K.al-Mu*t aba r ,op . c i t . , vo l . I I , p .102 . 
The admission of the p r inc ip le that two opposite i n c l i n -
ations can exis t i n one and the same body enables Abu'1-Barakat 
to solve the problem of the acceleration of the f a l l i n g objects. 
According to him the f a c t that during i t s downward motion the p r o j -
e c t i l e s t i l l preserves a por t ion of i t s v iolent i n c l i n a t i o n which i n 
the course of the motion gradually disappears and that t h i s conseq-
uently, necessitates gradual increase i n the f a l l of bodies, explains 
only one of the factors causing t h i s acceleration. Sometimes t h i s 
f ac to r may be absent, as i n the case when the e f f ec t of the violent 
i n c l i n a t i o n disappeared completely and also i n the case of a stone 
dropped from a h i ^ place. I n both cases the stone cont inual ly accel-
erates. 
He explains acceleration i n the fo l lowing way: The violent 
mayl i s cont inual ly decreased by the resistance of the medium i n view 
of the f a c t t ha t , being separate from i t s mover, i t i s unable to produce 
successive mayls which can replace the amount of mayl l o s t . By contrast, 
the natural i n c l i n a t i o n inheres i n the body i t s e l f and i s able to produce 
2 
successive mayls, and consequently i t continually augments. 
S. Pines f inds i n t h i s account the ant ic ipa t ion of the modem 
1,This theory was also held by Hipparchus and Alexander of Aphrodisias. 
Cf,Duhem,l!,tudes sur Leonard de V i n c i , v o l . I l l , ( P a r i s , 1913),pp.57-90, 
2 ,K , a l -Mu ' t aba r , op . c i t . , vo l . I I , p .101 . 
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theory of acceleration and. formulates i t thus: "A constant force 
engenders an accelerated movejment." 
Although Abu'l~Barakat's account of the accelerated motion 
e x p l i c i t l y mp l i e s th is formulat ion, i t s t i l l reminds us of the A r i s -
t o t e l i an animist ic theory, and above a l l the hylozoism of the 
Prosocratic philcaophers, since Abu'l-Baralcat explains motion i n terms 
of m£!.yl, of natural and unnatural places. This i s even more evident 
i n the ivitab al-Sama' v/a' l*alam, f agl V I I I , where he explains the 
upward and downward motions of a stone i n terms of an i n f e r i o r kind 
of perception. He says, "The stone moves downvsrards, because i t con-
2 
ceives the place towards which i t moves f i t f o r i t s na ture . . . " 
Through the hierfJfchy of the four elements which arc earth, 
water, a i r and f i r e , accor<3.ing to A r i s t o t l e , vje reach the sphere of 
the moon and the f i f t h element, ether ( a t h i r ) . Each element has i t s 
natural place. vVhen i t i s removed from the place i n which . i t natur-
a l l y inheres, i t t r i e s to re turn to i t , iUthough the sublunary elem-
ents d i f f e r by t h e i r upward and downward motions, they s t i l l form a 
un i ty wi th regard to t h e i r r e c t i l i n e a r motion. They are substan-
t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the c e l e s t i a l element as wel l as by the i r motion. The 
1.S.Pines ,Etudes . . ,op.c i t . ,vol . I l l ,no.2 ,pp. i1-12. 
2.K. al-*[u=tabar, op. c i t . , v o l . I I , p . 153. 
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The c e l e s t i a l substance i s e ternal and imperishable, and has a 
c i r cu l a r motion which, unlike the subMaary elements, i s perpetual, 
and no part of the ce l e s t i a l substance can be separated from i t s 
whole. The Stoicians and most of the Neo-Platonians among them John 
PhiloponuSj deny the existence of the ce les t i a l substance. They 
a t t r ibu te to the heaven e i ther an igneous nature or regard i t as com-
2 
posed of a l l the f o u r elements, among whicda f i r e dominates. They 
endow f i r e w i th a r e c t i l i n e a r motion as wel l as a c i r cu la r .'^  When the 
f i r e i s i n an unnatural place, i . e . i n the sublunary region, i t s motion 
i s r e c t i l i n e a r , but when i t i s i n i t s natural place, i . e . i n the heaven, 
i t has a c i r c u l a r motion. 
Plutarch declares that natural places as such are not the cause 
of natural motions, and these places do not exist i n the sense A r i s t o t l e 
4 
understands. A part of any element separated frxjm i t s whole t r i e s to 
1»The Cambridge His tory of Later Greek and Medieval Philosophy,ed.by 
A.H.Armstrong,(Cambridge, 1967),pp.479ff. ;E.Gilson,History of Chris t ian 
Philosophy i n the Middle Ages,(London,1955),p.90iS.Pines,A r e fu t a t i on 
of Galen by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Theory of Mot ion , in I s i s , 
V 0 I . L I I , (Maryland, 1962) , p . 50. 
2. Plotinus ,Enneads,II,1 , i f -7 . 
3, Alia Bakr al-Razi i s of the opinion that the melting gold and the b o i l i n g 
water has a c i r cu l a r motion i n the sublunary world,Cf ,S,Pines,Nouvelles 
i^ tudes , , ,op.c i t . ,p .55• 
4.Plato,Timaeus,dh.62 and 63;Duhem,Le System. . ,op .c i t . ,vol . I I ,p .360. 
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re tu rn t o i t , wherever the place of the whole may be. A s imi la r 
1 
doctrine i s found i n Thabit b. Qurra. 
Abu'1-Barakat, l i k e Avicenna, rejects the fundamental pr inc ip le 
that natural places i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n sense do not ex i s t . I f the 
whole of one element i s removed from i t s natural place, i t w i l l t r y to 
2 
re turn to i t . He denies the igneous nature of the ce les t i a l elem-
ent. For him, i t i s of a pa r t i cu la r substance. ^ But, on the other 
hand, he a f f i rms the thesis that part of the ce les t i a l substance can 
be separated from i t s whole and t h i s part , i n t u rn , t r i e s to return t o 
i t . This theory evokes the A r i s t o t e l i a n object ion that two opposite 
mayls cannot inhere i n one and the same body; i n th i s case the 
p r inc ip le of r e c t i l i n e a r motion and that of c i r cu la r . Ar is to te l ians 
also object to the emalogy made between the sublunary elements and 
the c e l e s t i a l substance. They say: This i s inadmissible by the f ac t 
that the former are always at rest when they are i n t h e i r natural places, 
unlike the ce les t i a l element. 
— - -
1 .S.Pines,Etudes. . ,op,ci t . ,voUII,no ,2 ,p .2if ;Pakhr a l -Din Raai.Mab'ehith 
a l -Ma^r iq iyyah , v o l . 1 1 , (Hyderabad, 1343H.) ,pp7S3f. 
2 .K. alMM[u*t abar, op. c i t . , v o l . I I , pp. 106-10?. 
3 . 1b id . , vo l . I I , p . 136 . 
4 . I b i d . , v o l . I I , p . 1 0 9 . 
With regard to t h i s comparison, Abu'1-Barakat says that the 
c i r cu l a r motion of the c e l e s t i a l spheres corresponds not to the 
1 
r e c t i l i n e a r motion of the elements, but to the state of res t . When 
a part of the ce les t i a l substance i s removed from i t s natural place, i t 
acquires a r e c t i l i n e a r motion as i n the case of the sublunary elements. 
This part of the c e l e s t i a l substance moves i n a s t raight l i ne t i l l i t 
reaches i t s natural place wher-e i t has a c i rcular motion. Therefore 
2 
there i s no need to admit the coexistence of two d i f f e r e n t inc l ina t ions . 
I n point of f a c t , he admits the coexistence of these two d i f f e r e n t inc-
l i n a t i o n s , then we have neither a c i rcular nor a r e c t i l i n e a r motion, 
but a curv i l inear motion,^ 
The c i rcu lar motion of the spheres i s only possible v/ith regard 
to something immobile. This immobile something can not be the 
earth, since the sublunary order i s dependent upon the ce les t i a l order. 
Then there must exist outside a l l the sphered an immobile sphere, ( f a 
harakat k u l l sama'* ?7a kawkab innama hiya b i ' .l-qiyas i l a ma huwa '"»a*la 
minhu l a b i ' l - q i y a s i l a ma huwa dunahu), The immobile sphere i s the 
object of desii'e f o r the ce l e s t i a l element just as f o r the sublunary 
e lements the natural places are the objects of desire, A s imilar 
1 . I b i d . , V o l . 1 1 . , p.110 
2. I b i d , , V o l , I I , , pp.110-111. 
3. I b i d . , V o l . 1 1 . , p.111 ^ 
4 . I b i d , , v o l . 1 1 . , pp.l45f.> i ^ . Pines, Etudes.., o p . c i t . , V o l , I I I . 
No,2. , p.28, n,3hk.o 
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a t t r ac t i on exists also between the spheres themselves. These two 
fac ts explain the c i r cu la r motion of the spheres. 
I I I . Psychology. 
According to A r i s t o t l e and the subsequent philosophers 
fo l lowing the Neo-Platonian t r a d i t i o n , among them Alexandrian comm-
entators o f A r i s t o t l e and the f a l a s i f a h i n Islam, the science of the 
soul forms part of natural sciences. Abu'1-Barakat, fo l lowing the same 
t r a d i t i o n , t rea ts of t h i s science i n the Physics of the K. al-Mu^tabar, 
i n spite of his non-conformist a t t i tude towards A r i s t o t e l i a n philoso-
phies of h i s t ime . Among others one important point i n Abu'1-Barakat's 
psycjhology, orsmore precisely throughout his main work, K. al"4vlu*tabar, 
stand out prominently: cer ta int ies of our knowledge, that i s , the 
knowledge tha t we have before everything else. He distinguishes three 
categories of a p r i o r i knowledge: (a) the Knowledge of Being, (b) the 
Knowledge of Sel f or the Soul, (c) the Knowledge of Time. Our t r ea t -
ment here w i l l concern the second k ind of knowledge, namely that of the 
soul . 
Avicenna defines soul i n terms of forces ( f a c u l t i e s ) , per fec t ion 
and form. According to him, soul i s the f i r s t perfect ion of a natural 
2 
body endowed w i t h organs. The soul as a ' s ingle g e n u s ' i s divided 
1, K.a l -Mu'^ tabar ,op .c i t . ,vo l . I I I ,p .39 ; the tex t concerning t h i s notion 
has been t ranslated by S.Pines i n Scripta Hierosolymitana,vol.I 'y, 
( Jerus.alem, 196O) , p . 150. 
2, AviGenna,K.al-NaJ-ah,tr.by F.Rahman under the t i t l e of "Avicenna's 
Psychology",(Oxford) 1,952),pp.2^.;see also Afnan,op.ci t . ,p .136 ;E. 
Gilson, op, c i t , , p , 198 ;K. al-Mu'^tabar, op, c i t , , v o l , i i , p . 299, 
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in to three species: (a) the vegetable soul which i s the f i r s t 
entelechy of a. natura l body possessing organs insofar as i t i s re-
produced, grows and assimilates nourishment, (b) the SnM©!]. soul, wh-
ich-'-ib the f i r s t entelecjhy of a natural body possessing organs, insofar 
as i t perceives par t icu la rs and moves by v o l i t i o n , (c) the human soul which 
i s the f i r s t enteledhy of a natural body possessing organs insofar as i t 
acts by r a t iona l choice and r a t i ona l deduction, and insofar as i t per-
ceives universals, 
Abu'1-Barakat, i n his treatment of forces operating i n 
corporeal bodies t r i e s t o f i n d a common name f o r the vegetable, animal 
and human souls. This common concept i s 'apperception' (shu*ur). These 
three categories of the soul are i n accordance w i t h i t s capacity of 
apprehending. Men and animals have i n common the apperception of t h e i r 
apprehending, but d i f f e r w i t h respect f o ra t iona l choice and del iber-
a t ion , which exclusively belongs to men. Both are d i f f e r e n t from 
plants which have no apperception of t h e i r apprehending, and are 
capable of various a c t i v i t i e s , and from inanimate bodies which only 
have one kind of a c t i v i t y . A f t e r these preliminary remarks, A b u ' l -
Barakat proposes t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of the soul: "Soul i s a force v/hidh 
i s uni ted to an organic body (badan) and which, because of i t s appenTception 
1, K,a l -Mu ' tabar ,op .c i t . ,vo l , I I ,p ,298;of ,S .P ines ,La Conception fle l a 
Conscience de Soi ohez Avicenne et Abu' l -Barakat . in Archives d 'Histoire 
Doctrinale et L i t t ^ r a i r e de Moyen Age,vol.XX:i, (Paris, 1954) ,pp, 86f, 
and perceptive knowledge which are proper to i t , produces i n and 
through t h i s body, a c t i v i t i e s and motions proceeding from i t and 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d as to t h e i r times and spa t ia l directions and i t leads 
the body to i t s s p e c i f i c perfect ion and preserves i t . " 
Having explained that soul i s equivocally predicated of the 
vegetable, animal 9. human and c e l e s t i a l soul by the ancients, he 
concludes that i n the above d e f i n i t i o n the primary knowledge that man 
has of h i s soul i s not included. This knov;ledge i s anterior to the 
knowledge that we have of other things . Even i f we were devoid of a l l 
that which i s v i s i b l e , audible and perceptible, we should be aware of 
. our sou l . And i n the process of a l l a c t i v i t i e s which we accomplish, 
me have the apperception of our soul and that i t i s v;ith us . The 
common people, as we l l as the e l i t e know that we have a soul which i s 
our i p s e i t y and being (anniyah) when they say, " I f e l t Joyful", " I became 
angry", and so on, even though they do not know whether i t i s an accident 
or a substance. However we can a t t a i n perfect knowledge by ava i l ing 
ourselves of speculative proofs i n virtue of a gradual improvement of 
our knowledge. F o r example, we know that our body can be small or big, 
t h i n or f a t , but i n both cases, we remain ident i ca l with ourSs l f . There-
fore we perceive that our soul i s other than t h i s body. On the other hand 
1, K . a l - M u ^ t a b a r , o p . c i t . , v o l . I I , p p . 3 0 3 f . ; S . P i n e s , L a Concept ion . . , op .c i t . , 
p.61. 
2. K . a l - * i I u « t a b a r , o p . c i t . , v o l . I I , p p . 3 0 5 f . ;S .Pines ,La Concept ion . . , op .c i t . , 
p .6$f. 
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i t might happen tha t one of our organs was amputated, even then, we 
should s t i l l v e r i f y that we have remained iden t i ca l wi th Qur-self. We 
s h a l l therefore know that the amputated organ i s not part of our being 
and the ipse i ty of which we have apperception. By an analogical 
reasoning based on the knowledge that we have of ourselves, we can say 
tha t we have an apperception of the modes of being (ahwal) of animals 
and plants whose content resembles i n cer ta in respects that which we 
perceive of our own mode of being. This apperception shows us that 
i n these bodies there ex is t en t i t i e s which are the pr inciples securing 
t h e i r un i ty consti tuted by the cohesion of t h e i r parts, temporal dur-
a t ion , n u t r i t i o n , growth and configurat ion (asMtal) , a l l the acts which 
proceed from them. These pr inc ip les are the souls whose bodies, wi th 
a l l that which subsist i n them, are, by t h e i r manner of being, the sub-
2 
ordinates. 
The above exposi of Abu'1-Barakat i s obviously influenced by 
Avicenna's argument f o r the existence of the soul apart from the body 
where he gives as an example the ' suspended man' I t has f requent ly 
been shown that t h i s argument had been the insp i ra t ion of many of the 
Scjholastics of Medieval Europe,^, 
1 . K.al-Mu*4 ;abar,op,cit . ,vol.II,pp ,305f . ;S.Pines,La Concept ion. . ,op.ci t . , 
p.62. 
2, K.al-Mu«fcabar,op.cjjt.,vol .11 ,p.3OI2S .Pines,La Conception. . ,op.ci t . ,p .60. 
3, Avicenna,K,al-Mub'a^athat,in Aris^u ^'ind al-*'Arab,ed.by A.Badawi,(Cairo, 
1947) ,p,207jK,al-IsKarat,ed,by Forget,(Leyden, 1892) , p . 120;E.Gilson,op. 
o i t , ,p , 198 ;Af nan, op. c i t . , p . 150. 
4. S.Pines,La Concept ion. . ,op.c i t . ,p .62. 
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• We sha l l dwell upon the consciousness of se l f l a t e r at 
great length. Let us, now, t u r n to the theory of the m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
the f a c u l t i e s of the soul acknowledged by A r i s t o t l e and h is fo l lowers . 
As we have seen before and s h a l l see l a t e r , Abu'1-Barakat's .:'c -
MeifthloelfX of exposition has three stages. I n the f i r s t part he relates 
the e a r l i e r arguments, i n the second, he polemizes against them and 
i n the . t h i r d he arrives at the t r u t h . I t i s at t h i s stage that we 
usual ly f i n d his personal r e f l e c t i o n s . 
According t o e a r l i e r philosophers, the d ive r s i t y of psychical 
acts corresponds to the d i v e r s i t y of the facu l t i e s of the soul . The 
n u t r i t i v e f a c u l t y comprises fou r secondary f acu l t i e s : (a) the a t t r ac t ive , 
(b) the re tent ive , (c) that which transforms nourishment, and (d) that 
which re jec ts what i s aa^erfluous. They ermumerate along the same 
l ines the f a c u l t y of growth, that 'of procreation which has two aspects; 
male and female aa^jwhich i s subordinated that which transforms semen 
in to the organs of the foe tus . The vegetable soul watches over these 
f a c u l t i e s and i t i s also ca l led t e r r e s t r i a l and physical soul, (leafs 
ardiyyah and ^aafis taJj i^iyyah), or a l l these f acu l t i e s constitute the 
vegetable soul . ^ 
Animals which move by v o l i t i o n and del iberat ion have two 
f a c u l t i e s : (a) the motive f a c u l t y , and (b) the perceptive f a c u l t y . 
1. K .a l -MuHabar ,op . c i t . , vo l . I I , pp .309f . 
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Each motion of the organs has a pr inciple or a f a c u l t y 
subsist ing i n the muscles pa r t i cu la r ized t o that motion. Accord-
ing t o t h i s opinion^motive f acu l t i e s found i n a cer ta in ind iv idua l 
.come to 527, the same number as the muscles discerned i n the body. 
They put at the head of these f acu l t i e s the v o l i t i v e motive f a c u l t y 
(al-muharrikat a l - i radiyyah) to virhich they a t t r ibu ted two f acu l t i e s : 
(a) Concupiscence (quwwah shahwaniyyah) which urges the appetit ive 
f a c u l t y towards the desired object , (b) the f a c u l t y of anger which 
turns i t away from what i s harmful (al-mu? adhdhl), or urges i t t o go 
near and cause, i n i t s t lurn, i n j u r y . 
To each category of sensory and mental perceptions corresponds 
a f a c u l t y or a p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e . 
The sense-perceptions are f i v e , aooording to the number of 
external senses, or eight i f the f a c u l t y of touch i s divided i n to 
fou r d i f f e r e n t f a c u l t i e s discerning four pairs of contraries: (a) 
hot and co ld , (b) hard and s o f t , (o) moist and dry, (d) rough and 
smooth. Abu' 1-Barakat wonders why they did not regard the f a c u l t y 
of taste as possessing more f acu l t i e s by d iv id ing i t in to f acu l t i e s 
discerning b i t t e r and sweet, sour and acr id ; and sight i n to f acu l t i e s 
discerning white and green, red and yellow, and so on. The reigning 
philosophy also d i f f e r en t i a t e s the fol lovdng facu l t i e s of mental per^ 
ception: (a) Sensus Communis. Here he again wonders why they d i d not 
mul t ip ly t h i s f a c u l t y i n accordance wi th the m u l t i p l i c i t y of i t s objects 
1 . K .a l -Mu*taba r ,op . c i t . , vo l . I I , p .310 . 
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of perception, (b) fflie primary imagination ( ^aya l iyyah ula) which 
i s the representation of forms perceived by the sensus communis, (c) 
The imaginative f a c u l t y (al-mutakhaajaiSBilah) which combines and sep-
arates these forms, (d) the Estimative f acu l ty , and (e) Recollection 
and Memory. Abu'1-Barakat states tha t some of these philosophers 
divided memory and reco l l ec t ion as tv;o separate f a c u l t i e s . The 
Estimative f a c u l t y i s something considered as tha t which controls 
others. This term i s also used by some to designate t h i s group. 
The aggregate of these motive and perceptive f a c u l t i e s are regarded 
1 
as being cont ro l led by a single f a c u l t y cal led the V i t a l Soul, 
The i n t e l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s are also divided in to two facu l t i es : 
(a) the Theoretical I n t e l l e c t which i s the sum-total of opinions and 
universal notions, (b) the Prac t ica l I n t e l l e c t whicdi determines the 
pa r t i cu l a r a c t i v i t i e s and controls them wi th respect to i t s ends and 
theore t i ca l in ten t ions . At the head of these f acu l t i e s stands the 
Rational Soul, or the Po ten t ia l I n t e l l e c t , whidi i s also cal led the 
2 
Human Soul. 
Having completed his account of the f acu l t i e s of the soul , he 
recounts the arguments i n favour of the m u l t i p l i c i t y of the f a c u l t i e s . 
They said that the primary imagination which preserves the sensible 
1, K , a l - M u ^ a b a r , o p . c i t . , v o l . I I , p . I H , 
2. Ibidem. 
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forms r e su l t i ng from the mental perceptions i s d i f f e r e n t from the 
Sensus Communis which also perceives fo3:Tns of t h i s k ind . I f the 
percipient of these forms subsisting i n us also preserves them because 
they are wi th i t and i n i t , i t w i l l at the same time be the percip-
ient and sentient of these forms as long as i t i s the preserver. But 
they are preserved i n us because we t u r n t o the examination of these 
forms a f t e r they have disappeared wi th no reference to external per-
ceptions. This i s why they are preserved i n us but not perceived 
ex te rna l ly . Therefore there needs to be two d i f f e r e n t f a c u l t i e s . 
The other argument which very much occupied Abu'1-Barakat 
concerns the f a c t that we can hardly, or i n no immediate way, discern 
the transformation of food i n the i n t e r i o r of our body. This process 
i s very seldom perceived when the food is i n the stomach, and never 
v/hen i t passes i n to the l i v e r . I f we had immediate perception of the 
passage of food in to d i f f e r e n t nerves, veins and ar t icu la t ions and of 
the t ransformation i t undergoes, we should d i r ec t l y know the l o c a l i z -
a t ion i form and func t ion of the i n t e rna l parts of the body and could 
save us the laborious study of anatomy. This would prove that there 
2 
exis ts various pl]jsiaW.cal f a c u l t i e s . 
According t o Abu'1-Barakat, t h i s i s not the only possible 
1 . I b id , , pp .311f . 
2, Ib id . ,vo l .11 ,p .313 . -
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explanation of the phenomenon. One would rather tfend to believe 
that our incapacity to perceive the digestive processes is due t o 
t h e i r continuous and gradual character. For example, gradual change 
of pos i t ion of the sun and gradually in t ens i fy ing pain does not make 
i t s e l f f e l t . To a t t a i n consciousness of t h i s sort i s d i f f i c u l t , but 
harder s t i l l t o have an apprehension of th i s apprehension. The fac t 
i s that the m u l t i p l i c i t y of apprehensions of the human soul prevents 
i t from being conscious of a l l . I n t h i s case, i t cannot pay a t tent ion 
to the process of simultaneous and diverse digestion and growth taking 
place i n various organs gradually and without any break. Furthermore, 
by studying the fac t s of fo rge t fu l lness , mental confusion and inebr ia t ion 
we can v e r i f y that a man can perfonn acts of which he has no knowledge. 
But t h i s does not prove that t h e i r causes subsisting i n our bodies i s 
other than us, that i s , other than our soul which i s our se l f and ipse i ty . 
According to them, the f a c u l t y of growth disappears at a certain 
period of l i f e , whereas the n u t r i t i v e f a c u l t y goes on operating t i l l 
deatife, This proves that both facu l t i e s are d i f f e r e n t . Another argument 
asserted by them along similaS l ines i s that the m u l t i p l i c i t y of fac-
u l t i e s can be i n f e r r ed from the absence of motive and sensory facu l t i es 
i n plants and ra t iona l f acu l t i e s i n animals other than men, as we l l as 
from the f a c t that cer ta in animal species are deprived of one or 
several external and in te rna l senses which are found i n others. For 
example, moles have no eyes and some species of snakes have no sense of 
1 . I b i d . , v o l . I I . , pp3 l5 f f . 
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of hearing and most insects have most of the senses except the 
sense of touch and tha t of tas te , and evidently the estimative f a c u l t y 
i s not found i n most animals generated spontaneously, f o r example, 
moths have a desire f o r f i r e and they throw themselves in to i t , a n d 
because they are hur t , they move away. But they return to i t f o r the 
1 
second t ime, having forgo t ten what happened. 
For Abu'1-Barakat, these arguments are not admissible. 
Because i f the soul does not exercise a certain act ion, t h i s i s not a 
defect i n the f a c u l t y which i s endowed with t h i s act ion, but because 
there i s no corporeal organ required f o r the func t ion i n question, or 
2 
because i t i s not prepared t o exercise th i s f unc t i on . 
I n r e f u t a t i o n of the arguments i n favour of the m u l t i p l i c i t y 
of the. f a c u l t i e s of the soul , he f i n a l l y resorts to self-evident t ru ths . 
We have an evident apperception of the fac t that each of us i s himself^ 
l ^ e subject who sees and hears, thinks and r e f l e c t s , preserves i n his 
memory and recol lects , l i kes and d i s l ikes , i s glad and angry; his 
i p se i ty and his being remain one and the same i n every act ion, and do 
not admit any change i n them. But a multitude of things has no un i ty 
i n themselves, seeing that two things cannot be one wi th regard to a mode 
or t o an a t t r ibu te which are common t o them. I f we were to admit the 
1 . I b i d . , v o l . I I , p p . 3 1 2 f f . 
2, Ib id . ,vo l .11 ,pp .317f , 
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u n i t y of the mul t ip le and the diverse, i t would not be possible that 
the mul t ip le f a c u l t i e s which ex is t i n a single ind iv idua l should be 
i d e n t i c a l w i th t h e i r unique ip se i ty of which we have no apperception. 
Therefore, ip^thSycase when they e x i s t , th i s i p se i t y would only be one 
of them. But supposing that both t h i s ipse i ty and the f acu l t i e s ex is t , 
i t w i l l be the l a t t e r that operate. The agent would consequently be 
other than the i p s e i t y . I f i t were the visual f a c u l t y that sees, the 
f a c u l t y which i s other than mgrself, i t would fo l low tha t i t i s not me, b ^ 
some other t h i n g that sees. But I have an apperception and knowledge and 
an evident i n t e l l e c t i o n and the t r u t h of the fac t that i t i s me who sees, 
hears and acts. Supposing now that the visual f acu l ty sees at the same 
time as I , and me at the same time as i t , each of us separately and i n 
such a way as t o perform t h i s act by himself, I should, i n t h i s case, 
have no need f o r i t . I n t r u t h , we have the apperception of the f ac t 
that i t i s us who see and not tha t some other t h i n g i s perfowning i t 
f o r us. This i s also expressed i n our manner of speaking. Supposing, 
on the other hand, that the v i sua l f acu l ty transmits eveiy v i s i b l e 
object ,and that i t has seen the seeing subject, who would then see 
i n i t through i t ? . . .The seeing subject of whom I have knowledge and 
apperception, i s myself, i t i s my soul which i s my ipse i ty and being, 
whereas a l l the rest i s only a substratum or an instrument of t rans-
mission, as i s , f o r example, the eye and the v i t a l s p i r i t (a l - rOh) . 
1. Kbid . ,vol . I I ,p .319;S.Pines ,La Concept ion , . ,op .c i t . ,pp .66ff . 
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He, l a t e r , dwells upon another important point ; a given 
f a c u l t y could e i ther have the apperception of another f a c u l t y , which 
wouM not be the apperception of the s e l f , or an apperception having 
as i t s object only i t s e l f . But the t r u t h i s that man has the apper-
ception of h i s apprehending h i s own ipse i ty and that t h i s l a s t apper-
ception shows tha t t h i s i p se i t y i s one and not mul t ip le . Everyone 
has the apperception of the u n i t y of his i p se i ty whatever the differences 
2 
of periods and circumstances. 
I t i s clear from the passages c i ted above,, that Abu'1-Barakat 
f i e r c e l y attacks the foundation of the t r a d i t i o n a l doctrines of 
psychology and establishes instead a "Psychology of Consciousness". 
We know that attempts have been made by Avicenna to prepare the way 
f o r Abu'1-Barakat, bgct his close attachment to the Ar i s to t e l i an 
psychology prevented him from going f a r enough. His explanation i s 
l i m i t e d and only establishes the existence and a c t i v i t y of the i n t e l l -
ective soul . I n other parts he mainly follows the t r a d i t i o n a l path. 
Everything considered, i t may be said that Abu'1-Barakat i s closer to 
the French philosopher Descartes than Avicenna. ^ 
Abu'l-Barakat distinguishes two kinds of perceptions: 
(a) the external sense-perception which is the outcoire of hearing, 
smell and taste and touch, (b) the mental perception which pertains t o 
1. K.al-Mu*tabar,op.ci t . , v o l . I I , p . 3 " l 9 . 
2. Ib id . ,vol .11 ,pp.314 and 319. 
3. S.Pines,La Conception..,op.cit.,pp.22-56;F.Rahman,Avicenna6s Psychology, 
op . c i t . , p . 10 . 
mental representations. We alone a t t a i n mental knowledge without 
the interference of the external senses, jus t as the man who i s 
asleep sees i n h i s sleep and the man who cogitates sees inwardly and 
i n h i s mind and perceives things which are not present i n his body 
and members, f o r example, arnlountain of gold or a s i l v e r taree, or a 
sea of blood, or a r i v e r of honey. 
Abu'1-Barakit i s aware of the l i m i t e d knowledge we have 
concerning the nature of our perceptions. Perception ( idrak) i s a 
state of r e l a t i o n corresponding to the th ing whic±L perceives and to 
the th ing perceived. Without these two terms, t h i s state of r e l a t ion 
cannot e x i s t . There i s , therefore , no perception of any sort of a 
non-existent t h i n g . Supposing tha t there i s , then t h i s i s not the 
case of t rue nothingness. We know that the existence of a perceiv-
ing subject and a perceived object i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r a perception 
to e x i s t . For i f i t were so, the human soul would perceive a l l the 
existents which behoveL i t to perceive. Thus, there would be nothing 
that i s concealed to i t . But i n f ac t what i t does not know exceeds 
by f a r what i t knows. Therefore i t i s i n need of a mode (hal) which 
i s superadded t o i t s existence and to that of perceptible things, i n 
order to a t t a in knowledge and perception of what i t ac tual ly perceives. 
1. K.al-Mu«t aba r , op . c i t . , vo l . I I , p ,323 , 
2, I b i d . , v o l . I I , p p . 3 2 3 f . 
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The external perception i s consti tuted by f i v e senses: 
s i ^ t , hearing, smell , taiste aiid touch. 
The v i sua l perception was escplained by the ea r l i e r p h i l -
osophers e i the r i n terms of images proceeding from objects which are 
perceived when the images are impressed on the organ of s igh t , ©k" i n 
terms of rays presenting the feature of a cone and proceeding from 
1 
the p u p i l of the eye. I n the l a t t e r case, the v isual perception 
takes place when these rays reach the object of s igh t . 
As f o r the former, Abu'1-Barakat i s doubtful whether the 
image of the heaven can impress i t s e l f on the pup i l of the eye, 
considering the obviousddl^appoSlioa of magnitudes. But i f i t i s said 
that the whole image of an object i s not impressed on the v isual organ 
a l l at once, bjpt only the part present i n the d i rec t ion of s ight , and 
by changing i t s d i rec t ion w i t h great r a p i d i t y i t discovers the other 
parts of the object and consequently perceives the whole as i f i t took 
place simultaneously. Abu'1-Barakat objects by s ta t ing that we should 
then perceive eadi part successively, one disappearing a f t e r the other. 
Even though th i s happened w i t h the greatest r ap id i ty , we should not be 
able to see, the every part of an immense object . On the other hand, i t 
may be said tha t we see the successive images i n the common sense v.tiicia 
1. The former theory i s pos t -Ar i s to te l i an i n o r i g i n , and the l a t t e r 
Platonian,See F,Rahman,op.cit, ,pp,76f, ;K,al-Mu'^tabar,op.cit . ,vol .11, 
PP.32Uf. 
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which i s the meeting point of the images coming from the two eyes, 
f o r otherwise we should see one object as i f i t were two. I t i s 
through t h i s f a c u l t y that the posterior: images are superadjded t o 
those which have preceded them simultaneously. I t i s f o r th is reason 
that we can perceive an object as being i n the act of depicting a 
c i r c l e i n the a i r , t h o u ^ i t i s not simultaneously i n every part of 
the c i r c l e . Abu* 1-Barakat propounds h i s former argument against t h i s : 
He says, how i s i t then possible f o r the images of immense objects 
such as a large mountain or t h f heaven to be contained i n t h i s facul ty? 
'Bu-tf; he says,'we know tha t we see things, small or large, according to t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n t dimensions. Their being smaller or bigger than the others are 
perceptible to the sight and can be the object of comparisons f o r the 
mind. ' ^ 
The argument the|,t v i s i on i s due to rays issuing f o r t h from 
the p u p i l of the eye i s also inadmissible, because i t i s absurd to hold , 
as the fol lowers of t h i s theory do, that i t i s these rays that perceive 
or that the percipient i s i n these rays. For these rays, or that which 
2 
i s i n them are not the human soul . I f these were the soul of man, i t 
would fo l low that the l a t t e r i s separated from the body every time he 
sees something. But the separation of the soul from the body means death. 
1. K .a l -Mu«tabar ,vo l . I I ,p . 327 . 
2. Ib id . ,vo l . I I ,pp .323-324 . 
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The oase'l.'would be the same i f i t was supposed tha t these rays were 
not the soul but were residing i n i t as the v i t a l s p i r i t does. I f 
a part of the soul goes towards the object and perceives i t , then 
t h i s part must be other than the soul , f o r the very reason that the 
soul i s i n d i v i s i b l e . The true explanation of the f a c t i s that we 
know by an evident knowledge which cannot be cal led in to question, 
t 'hat i t i s the soul which sees by means of the eye, and hears by 
means of the ear and so on. Moreover, the soul , which i s our ipse i ty 
and being, sees objects themselves as they r e a l l y are and according t o 
t h e i r magnitude, and not t h e i r images which are inside the bra in . I f 
i t were to see an object inside the brain, i t would ce r ta in ly be cap-
able of seeing t h i s very i n t e r i o r i t s e l f where i t i s supposed to see 
t h i s object . But we cannot see the eye, how, then, can we see what i s 
behind? 
The theory of rays, however, has more force i n the eyes of 
Abu'1-Barakat than that o f images. These rays l i k e the bodi ly organs are 
only the instaruments f o r v i sua l perception ^and the agent of t h i s per-
ception i s the soul i t s e l f . ^ 
According to the current theory of hearing, we hear the 
sound when the ae r i a l waves produced, by the clash of two hard bodies 
reach the cav i ty of the ear. I f i t were so, according to Abu'1-Barakat 
1, IbidemjEIejj'inus appears to be of the same opinion.See Enneads, 
I V , 6 , 1 . 
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we should not be able to d i f f e r e n t i a t e whether the object produc-
ing sound i s near or f a r , no*' should we be aware of the difference of 
d i r e c t i o n . The d i f f i c u l t i e s , f o r Abu'1-Barakat, are that the v i b -
r a t i on , when i t has reached the cavi ty of the ear, does not bear any 
trace of d i r ec t i on from which i t comes, and that when we heard two 
sounds of equal distance but of d i f f e r e n t strength, then v/e should 
confuse the distance w i t h the strength of the sound. There i s no 
doubt that we perceive the sound as i t i s produced, jus t as we perceive 
the object of s i ^ t ^ w i t h only one exception, naraely, that we parceive 
the objects of sight as possessing durable existence, whereas the 
sounds have no such existence. But how is i t to be explained the 
f a c t tha t there passes a cer ta in time between the production of the 
sound and the instant we hear Itl According to Abu'1-Barakat, the 
hearing process i s only s tar ted by an aer ia l wave which has arr ived at 
the cavi ty of the ear, but i t f inds i t s perfect ion i n the f a c t that 
1 
we ourselves retrace the course of t h i s wave to i t s source. 
Concerning the remaining three f acu l t i e s , that i s touch, taste 
and smell , he observes v/hy they a t t r ibu ted four spec i f i c f acu l t i e s t o 
touch and not to smell and tas te . The subject who has a sensation of 
touch, smell and taste and so on i s one and the same e n t i t y which i s the 
1. K.al-Mu*tabar,vol.II ,pp .329ff .and 334ff. 
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soul i t s e l f . I f some other e n t i t y accomplished one of these acts, 
then t h i s e n t i t y would not be conscious of i t s perception. For i t 
1 
i s only the soul which has the apprehension of i t s own consciousness. 
Unlike Avicenna, he does not d i f f e r en t i a t e the apperception 
of s e l f from that of the a c t i v i t i e s i n which the corporeal organs come 
2 
i n t o play. There i s no reason t o accept t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , because 
the cer ta int ies of consciousness establish, on the contrary, a un i ty 
of the subject, as i t i s incompatible wi th the m u l t i p l i c i t y of psy-
chica l f a c u l t i e s ; i t i s only th@t I that acts i n order to accomplish 
a l l the functions i n question. On the other hand, imposs ib i l i t ies 
would fo l low i f we accepted the f a c t that the multitude of d i f f e r e n t 
qua l i t i e s , such as hot and cold , dry and moist co-exist i n a very small 
space contained i n the bra in and that the v i t a l s p i r i t i n which the f ac -
u l t i e s inhere lend themselves to every transformation which corresponds 
to the m u l t i p l i c i t y of sensations, becoming i n t h e i r tu rn and i n a very 
short i n t e rva l of time as dsy as>iearth and as hamid as water. ^ 
Then, what i a the r e l a t i o n of the soul to the body? This 
i s , according t o him, a love-passion relat ionship devoid of any act 
of w i l l , " I t also resembles the r e l a t i on between the proprietor and 
1. Ib id . ,vo l . I I ,pp .337-340 . 
2. S.Pines,La Conception.. ,op.oit . ,pp.22-56. 
3. K,a l -Mu*4 ;abar ,op.c i t . ,vol . I I ,p .34l . 
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his property, and between the ar t i san and his t o o l , and f i n a l l y between 
the object and i t s natura l place. Between the souls thea?e exists a 
gradation as t o t h e i r capacity of apprehension. Some of the souls 
have more capacity than the others. The role of the body i s to det-
ermine the object at any given instant the soul perceives and the tem-
poral order of i t s perceptions, i t s e l f being determined by i t s organsi 
the place i t occupies, i t s motion and rest . The body sees that which 
i s before i t s eye, hears that which i s as near as i s possible f o r i t to 
. hear and has the sensation of touch of that which i t touches. I t i s so 
wi th other perceptiQns. I n t h i s yespect, the soul i s where the body i s . 
The body i s f o r the soul what nest i s f o r a b i r d and house f o r him who 
inhabits i t (mutadayyir). I f there was no body, the soul would not 
have received these determinations; i t v/ould not perform one th ing 
rather than another among the multitude of those which co-exist i n time 
and place. Each organ of the body supplies the soul w i t h a category 
•1 
of a c t i v i t i e s . Therefore i n answering the question why the soul does 
not know a l l that which ex is t s , he resorts to the senses which at once 
l i m i t and render possible the perception. The func t ion of the body and 
the corporeal organs are indispensible, because of the l im i t ed character 
of the f a c u l t y of apprehension and perception of the human soul . The 
soul can only have one perception at a time because of the nature of the 
1. Ibid.,vol.11,pp.344*!-346. 
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the bodi ly functions and i s brought in to contact w i th others which have 
been perceived before and w i l l be perceived l a t e r . I n the absence of 
these bodi ly func t ions j the soul, when placed before the multitude 
of events, could not make the choice necessary f o r perceiving at least 
one part and f o r act ing. Therefore, to employ 3. Pines' expression, 
the body and the sense-organs provide f o r the soul the condit ion req-
ui red f o r an ordered experience. But a soul endowed wi th a f a c u l t y of 
i n f i n i t e perceptions and capable of apprehending as f a r as possible the 
t o t a l i t y of events'would have no need of these conditions. 
Abu'1-Barakat distinguishes two kinds of a c t i v i t i e s : (a) the 
voMive, which i s closely l inked wi th our conscious a c t i v i t i e s , and 
(b) the natural and in s t i nc t ive which are c l a s s i f i e d as unconscious 
a c t i v i t i e s , f o r example, search f o r the female by the male, protect ion 
of the young i n beasts, and weeping of an i n f a n t , and the things which 
we do i n our sleep. These are more int imately l inked wi th the soul than 
the v o l t i v e a c t i v i t i e s . This i s the kind of r e l a t i on the souls have t o 
the body. 
The problem of the unconscious has far-reaching consequences 
i n Abu'1-Barakat's explanations of the doctrine of Memory. How can the 
forms apprehended remain i n the memory without being remembered i n 
order to r ise again to consciousness when they are remembered^ To answer 
t h i s question he resorts to the notion of a t tent ion ( i l t i f a t ) . He d i s t -
inguishes between the natural a t tent ion which i s insttlaaotive (i lhamx). 
8g. 
f o r example, an infan t avoids what f r ightens and hurts him, and 
comes near to what pleases him, and the voluntary a t ten t ion , f o r 
example, we drink repugnant mixtures because they have a benef ic ia l 
1 
e f f e c t , and we confront fa t igue i n the hope of pleasure. 
As has already been mentioned, the human soul cannot a i l at 
once d i rec t i t s a t ten t ion to many things, the f a c t being that thos6 
which i t sees d i s t r ac t i t from that which i t hears, those which reach 
i t through the external senses from those which the in te rna l senses 
br ing to i t . On the other hand, when i t i s turned towards i t s e l f , i t 
i s not occupied wi th the res t . 
Recollection of the ideas preserved i n the memory takes place i n 
two wayst:^ i s e i ther the resul t of a conscious process i n which under-
standing and v o l i t i o n play an important role, or of an unconscious pro-
cess. I n the second case ideas or the preserved forms appear to our mind 
spontaneously. I n t h i s , resemblance and cont igui ty i s of service to the 
mind. For example, we recol lec t a man i n consequence of the f ac t that 
we have recollected another who i s i n some way l i k e him, or we remember 
a verse i n consequence of the f a c t that we have remembered the preceding 
2 
verse. 
We see here the evidences of an associationist theory. 
A l l the forms are preserved i n the soul because of t h e i r 
immater ia l i ty . But what i s the r e l a t i on of these forms to the body? 
1. I b i d . , vo l . 11 . , p.351 
2. I b i d . , vo l . 11 . , p.352. 
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This i s the r e l a t i o n s imi la r to tha t whioh subsists between the 
eye and the object of s i ^ t . The forms come in to contact w i t h a 
"eertain ven t r i c l e of the b ra in , which i s the middle ven t r i c l e , when 
we desire to recol lec t them, or i t takes place spontaneously through 
the association of ideas. 
I s there any difference between the forms perceived and the 
forms preserved i n the mind? Does there exist a f a c u l t y correspon-
ding t o each category of forms? 
I n t r a d i t i o n a l A r i s t o t e l i a n psychology i n t e l l e c t i o n stands 
out prominently among other mental act ivi t ies .The .Mash^f?ites,. 
speak of the material which i s also cal led potent ia l or passive, habitual 
and actual i n t e l l e c t s . These three are the d i f f e r e n t pheises of the 
e n t i t y ca l led the Rational Soul. The forms apprehended by the i n t e l l -
ect ^cs i n d i v i s i b l e , whereas those whidi axe apprehended by the Psychical 
f acu l t i e s are not . Their argument i s t h i s ! i f the i n t e l l e c t were to 
apprehend a d i v i s i b l e form, t h i s would e n t a i l the d iv i s i on of the 
i n t e l l e c t i n question which i s absurd. According to Abu'1-Barakat, 
t h i s consequence does not necessarily fo l l ow . There i s nothing to 
oppose the argument that an i n d i v i s i b l e ipse i ty apprehends an object 
which i s not so. Besides we know by an evident knowledge that i t i s 
the same subject which apprehends i n t e l l i g i b l e and sensible forms 
and representations (mutafawwirat) subsisting i n the mind. This subject 
i s the i p se i t y of man. The i n t e l l i g i b l e s can be cal led the mental forms 
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to which no sensible object corresponds, f o r example, ignorance, 
love, hatred and sto on. The others can be ca l led sensible or 
imaginative forms. But t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s i n no way implies that 
i n t e l l i g i b l e f o m s alone are to be universal . Because forms such as 
whiteness, redness, heat and cold are also universal forms, and they 
correspond to a multitude of objects, f o r example, snow, camphor and 
1 
cotton are white . 
The fol lowers of the t r a d i t i o n a l psychology also argued that 
the subject which apprehends sensibles i s other than that which app-
rehends i n t e l l i g i b l e s . Therefore the subject whida apprehends sensibles 
floes not apprehend i n t e l l i g i b l e s and vice-versa. But the contrary i s 
more l i k e l y . The subject which apprehends what i s l o f t y , exalted and 
general also apprehends less l o f t y , less exalted and more par t icu lar ized . 
How could i t be otherwise since the mind attains to universals from what 
i s pa r t i cu la r i zed . Consequently, the subject which apprehends universals 
2 
and i n t e l l i g i b l e s also apprehends sensibles and par t i cu la r s . 
Abu'l-BarakSt's theory concerning the apprehesasion of pa r t -
icu la rs i s in t imate ly l i nked w i t h God's knowledge of par t i cu la rs . We 
sha l l deal wi th t h i s theory l a t e r . 
1. Ib id . ,vo l . I I ,pp , 400-404 and 41 Of. 
2, I b i d . , v o l , I I , p . 4 l 6 . 
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Are humsin souls one i n respect to speoies and quiddity 
and d i f f e r i n g from one another only accidental states? Or does 
every soul d i f f e r individually from one another i n essence and species? 
Or are souls grouped, as i t were, by s p i r i t u a l families constituting 
so many different species i n respect to a conmon genus? The majority 
of philosophers contributed to the f i r s t . The second was hardly held 
by anyone. I t i s the t h i r d hypothesis that Abu'1-Barakat i s i n favour of. 
This i s manifested i n t h e i r natures, t h e i r principles, t h e i r modes of 
being and acting. Therefore the substantial diffei-ences between human 
souls may only be due to many causes not to one cause which i s the Active 
In t e l l i g e n c e as Aristotelians say. But there remains one other d i f f -
i c u l t y : Does each human soul have a s u i generis cause, or does a certain 
group of them have one and the same cause through which they exist? 
According to Abu' 1-Barakat there e x i s t s for the soul a guide or an 
instructor, and one teacher does not suffice for the execution of the 
psychical functions of a l l the himan souls. Therefore i t must be con-
ceded that a number of teachers, causes or i n t e l l e c t s from which souls 
2 
proceed i s needed. For each individual soul, or perhaps for a number 
of souls with the same nature and a f f i n i t y , there i s a being of the 
1. H.Oorbin,Avicenna and the Visionary Recital,tr.by W.R.Trask, 
(Tennessee, 1960) ,pp,88f. ;K.al-Mu'=tabar,op.cit,,vol.11 ,pp,38lf f.and 
vol.III,pp .152H53. 
2, M, «=Ali AbT Rayyan,Naqd Abi al-Barakat al-Ba^dadi l i - f a l s a f a h Ibn 
S l n i j i n the B u l l e t i n of the F a c u l t y of Arts of the University of 
Alexandria, v o l . X I I I , 0956) ,P«39. 
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s p i r i t u a l world who throughout t h e i r existence adopts a speoial 
solicitude and tenderness tov/ards that soul or group of souls; i t 
i s he who i n i t i a t e s them into knowledge, protects, guides, defends, 
comforts, brings them to f i n a l victory. I t i s t h i s being whom the 
ancient^sages c a l l the Perfect Nature (Tiba" al-Tamm), I t i s this friend, 
t h i s defender and protector, who i n religious language i s c a l l e d The 
1 
Angel, He also considers that the number of these angels are equal 
to that of the t e r r e s t r i a l , mineral, vegetable and animal species. 
2 
Each angel watches over one of these species. 
Differences between souls and t h e i r excellency i n the scale 
of perfection depends upon the n o b i l i t y of t h e i r causes and t h e i r 
position i n the higher world. I t follows, therefore, that human souls 
Join t h e i r causes a f t e r death. Certain human souls can, owing to imm-
ediate perception or illumination perceive the higher lights clearly.. 
The perfect soul which i s the highest i n the scale of existence perceives 
and evidences the l i g j i t of lights (niur al-anwar). For soul i s a sub-
stance whose nature i t i s to separate from the body when i t has reached 
a higjher degree of perfection, since the i d e a l l i f e can only be found 
i n the highest world among the angels and the s p i r i t u a l personage, where 
i t l i v e s i n comfort and luxury by witnessing God and knowing divine 
e n t i t i e s . ^ ] 
1, H.Corbin,op.cit.,p.90;K.al-Mu""tabar,op.cit.,vol.II,p.391. 
2. M.RayyShj op. o i t . ,p. 39;K. al^Iuftabar, op. c i t . , v o l . I l l , p . 213.This w i l l 
l a t e r be c a l l e d the "Lord of'the Species" by Suhrawar(33:,the I_^raqite 
philosopher.See (feuvres Philosophiques de Shihabaddin Yahya Suhraward3f, 
, (!^aris-Teherafl.,;195.2i,pp.2f2ff,; ij^i ed.by Klirban,p.l44; 
K.al-Mutarahat ,ed,in. Opera Vm^t&vWScoa. et Mystica by H.Oorbin, 
(lstanbiIl,l9i»-5),P.'t50; , 77! 77 ^ .e-
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Like Avicenna, Abu• 1-Baralcat does not believe i n Metcsra-
pbyohosis. I t i s an ojnorous and natural linlc that attaches the soul 
to the body. I t does not impose i t s e l f upon the bocly by force. After 
death, -bho soul cannot vdsh to assume i t again. 
Metaphysios (.tlahiyyat). 
¥/e have already seerj in treating of Abu'1-Barakat's c l a s s -
i f i c a t i o n of sciences,that he differentia-tes three kinds of sciences: 
(a) the sciences of existing things (al-mawjudat), (b) the sciences 
of oognita ( i n t e l l i g i b l e objects), and (c) the science of sciences or 
the highest science. The f i r s t i s treated i n Physics and i n Metaphysics, 
the second i n Psychology, and the third i n the section concerning 
Logic, ^ 
I n another context he divides the sciences into the sciences 
of existing objects and into the sciences of mentally related forms 
which subsist only i n the mind. In the formei' are included the 
i % y s i c d and the Metaphysics. Ihe l a t t e r corresponds to the science 
of the soul (*ilm a l - n a f s ) , i . e . to Psychology, However, he 
sometimes deviates from h i s position regarding Metaphysics v/hich 
1. K,alHMuetabar,opi.eiti,vol,Ii:.,pp.i+43f. 
2, Ibid,,vol,III,pp . 2 l 4 f , 
3 .Ibid,,vol,III,pp.1 f . 
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he includes i n the sciences of existing things and rsgfirding 
Psychology which studies mental representations, i . e . mentally 
rel a t e d forms. According to the l a t t e r position he assigns the 
study of universal natures (taba*i al-kuUi.) to Metaphysics, follov/-
ing Ibn Sina on th i s point, and regards Psychology which treats of 
mental representations (rautasawtvirat) as part of the sciences of 
existi n g objects. This inconsistency on his part may be accounted 
for either by the overv/helming ini'luence of the tr a d i t i o n a l Aviccnnian 
philosophyj or by his indifference towards the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 
sciences, since he says on th i s point that any c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of sciences 
2 
i s unnecessary except f o r educational purposes. 
Whatever the reason f o r t h i s discrepancy may; bf:j.judging 
from h i s treo-traent of universals, essence and existence, the former 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s better suited to h i s philosophy than the l a t t e r . 
According to Avicenna, a universal notion ,jque.,, nature i s 
one thing, and qua general or particular, one or many - whether t h i s 
pertains to i t actually or potentially - i s another. For example, 
'man' qua 'man', i . e . taken i n i t s e l f i s neither one nor many, neither 
1. Ibid.,vol.Ill,pp. 7 - 8 . 
2.Ibid.,vol.,III,p . 5 . 
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one nor many, neither universal nor particular. Therefore, univ-
e r s a l i t y and pai'ticularity are conditions or accidents which happen 
to man or any other esaence. When humanity exi s t s i n individuals, 
t h i s i s called the potential universality. But when i t exi s t s in 
iscna-va, t h i s i s called tha actual universality. The oorollaxy 
of t h i s statement i s that the univers£ility exists i n individuals 
of external r e a l i t y potentially andi;h'.genera in the i n t e l l e c t act-
u a l l y . This amounts to saying that the universals exist i n re as 
well as i n i n t e l l e c t u . I n the l a s t analysis, the universals exist 
i n the mind of &od, vrho i s the creator of everything. 
In Abu'l-Barakat, the balance i s t i l t e d i n favour of 
nominalism, or more correctly of oonceptualism. He id e n t i f i e s the 
universals with the mental forms. These mental forms do not exist 
i n external r e a l i t y . But t h i s does not mean that thcjy are non-
existent as i n the case of extreme nominalism, rather they subsist 
i i : mind. 
Now, what i s the rela t i o n of the mental foims to the things 
existing i n external r e a l i t y ? According to him, the cognita (al-ma^ 
lumat) subsisting i n the minds (adhhan) have mental a t t r i b u t e s ( s i f a t ) 
1. Avioennajal-Najlh,(Cairo,1357/1938),pp.220-221 ; a l - ^ i f a ? , v o l . 1 1 , 
(Teheran,l303/1886) ,p.Z,.83. 
2. Avicenna.al-SMfa? .op.oit..vol,II.p,488;3ee Avicenna on the Universals, 
F,Rahman,Essence and Existence i n Avicenna,in Medieval and Renaisanoe 
.Stupes,vol,I \ r , ( 1958),pp.9-11;E,Gilson,History of C h r i s t i a n Philosophy 
i n the Middle Ages,(London, 1955) ,p.209. 
and modes (ahwal), pointing especially to them i n thei r mental 
existence, although, i n the l a s t analysis, they are dependent on 
the things of external r e a l i t y . I n other vrords, they are univer-
sal,, single one of v/hich i s an attribute to many things existing 
i n external r e a l i t y , as vjell as to many things represented i n the 
mind: . Therefore, a. mental thought content (raa*na _ ^ i h n i ) can be 
an attribute to another thought content, and a thought content re-
resenting a thing existent i n external i-eality. The mental forms 
are derived from the things existing i n the concrete. This i s similar 
to the f a c t that, the t h i n ^ represented in a mirror derives from the 
things.which are v i s i b l e , liilhat i s represented i n the soul and knovm 
by the soul primarily i s the mental form representing the thing 
existing i n external r e a l i t y . Then the soul directs i t s e l f tov/ards 
t h i s mental form or Icnowledge acquired from the things of external 
r e a l i t y , and acquires another mental form or Icnowledge, t h i s operation 
being multiplied i n the soul indefinitely. Betv/een the mental form 
and what e x i s t s i n external r e a l i t y there i s a one-to-one relation. 
I f the instances similar to that one thing i s multiplied, then this 
mental form, i n reference to i t s relation to th i s m u l t i p l i c i t y , i s 
called universal. For example, the human form i n i t s relation to 
Zaydl. and % o r and the animal form i n i t s r e l a t i o n to man and horse. 
1. I adopted t h i s translation fromS. Pines;of .S. Pines,Studies i n 
. Abu'1-Barakat's Poetics and Metaphysics,in S c r i p t a Hierosolymitana. 
vol.VI,(Jerusalem,1960). 
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However, the multiple instances of similar things are not a 
hecessary condition for the existence of a universal. Even i f we 
have only one instance such as the sun, we can s t i l l represent many 
1 
likenesses i n the mind so as to fonn a universal notion of the sun. 
Universals d i f f e r i n t h e i r degree of generalization and 
par t i c u l a r i z a t i o n . For example, one can begin a series with Zayd 
and *Amr, then go on to man, and again proceed from man and horse 
to animal; from animal and plant to a thing that grows or that i s 
endowed with a soul, from a thing that i s endowed with a soul and 
a mineral, to body and soul to substance; from stibstance and accident 
2 
to existent and f i n a l l y from existent and non-existent to thing. 
Universality and p a r t i c u l a r i t y , according to him, are 
superadded, i n the mind, to the mental forms i n , t h e i r relations 
with things existent i n external r e a l i t y , and they may belong to 
objects perceived by the senses as well as to those that are not, 
For example, whiteness i s apprehended by the senses, whereas hiim-
3 
anity, understanding and knowledge are not. 
The fac t that the universals exist i n the mind becomes 
1. K,al-4IuHabar,op,cit,,vol,III,pp ,12-14;see Abu'l-Barakat on the 
Universals,S. Pihes,Studies,.,op,cit,,pp,138-147. 
2. K. al-MuHabar, op. c i t , , v o l , I I I , p , 14, 
3. Ibid,,vol,II,p,410, 
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more vi v i d , i f we turn our attention to his differentiation •;r 
of the existents into two categories; they either exist i n external 
r e a l i t y , m u l t i p l i c i t y of perceptions having no effect on the i r iden-
t i t y , ot they e x i s t i n the minds, and are multiplied by the multip-
l i c i t y of persons v/ho perceive them. For exojnple, i f a man imagines 
i n h i s mind a form and communicates this i n words to someone else, 
the representation the l a t t e r w i l l have i n his mind w i l l not be 
i d e n t i c a l vrith that of the former. 
So f a r we have explained his doctrine of mental forms or 
mentfil existents, or universals, but what of the existents of exter-
nal r e a l i t y , where do they f i t into i n his ontology. 
The question of essence and existence, and the nature of 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n to each other had been a moot point i n . Medieval 
Philosophy. I t i s largely due to Avicenna and to the translation of 
h i s works i n Medieval Europe that the Christian philosophers of 
Europe applied themselves to the solution of this problem. ^ 
In jilristotle vie encounter very few references as to the 
nature of the r e l a t i o n betvreen essence and existence. According to 
him, before acquiring knovfledge of a thing, we must f i r s t ask whether 
1. Ibid.,vol.Ill,pp.2 1 - 2 2 . 
2. F.Rahman,op.oit.,p.l6. 
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i t e x i s t s ; i f i t does, then we must ask what i t s essence i s . 
A r i s t o t l e i s , however, more e x p l i c i t i n another context about the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and existence. For hijn, what man i s , 
i s one thing and that he exis t s i s another. Being i s not a genus, 
nor i s i t the essence of anything. Being carmot be dssoribod as 
Bomething constituting the essence of a thln^^, but i t i s the Giost 
2 
u n i v e r s a l predicate applying to everything. Speaking of the 
re l a t i o n between existence and essence, he says that existence 
belongs to the essence of everything and i s not accidental to i t . 
Therefore, by describing something as existent we do not attribute 
to i t some property over and above i t s essence. ^ 
As i t i s natural i n the evolution of ideas, Avicenna borrows 
the mainly l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between essence and existence, and 
modifies and explains i t i n i t s ovm way. 
According to him, 'existence^, 'thing' and 'one' are the 
4 
primary notions v/e represent iln the mind before everything else. 
Being cannot be explained otherwise than by the name 'being', because 
1. Aristotle,Anal, Post,,92b,8-11;see also F.Rahman,op.cit.,p. 1; 
S, Af nan, op. c i t , ,p, 118 ;E. Gilson, op. c i t . ,pp, 190-191. 
2. Aristotle,Met.,988b,17. 
3. Ibid.,IV,2 . 
4. Avicenna,K.al-^ifa*,op.oit.,vol.II,p.291. 
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i t i s the principle of a l l explanations , and because there i s 
. nothing more general than i t i n order to give a satisfactor'y des-
cription of i t . I t i s for t h i s reason that he c r i t i c i z e d those vho 
2 
define 'being' as that which either acts or suffers. I t i s not 
obtained from abstraction, therefore i t cannot be the highest genus 
under which we subsuiue a l l categories, but i s an immediate and prajtiiary 
notion whidi renders the application of the categories to r e a l i t y 
possible,"^ although i t s division into substance and accident resem-
bles the d i v i s i o n according to differentia and species.^'" 
Not a l l that which exists are perceived by the senses, there 
are existents which cannot bo perceived by the senses and -whose 
existence i n the concrete we cannot doubt. '.Chis i s the case with 
5 
a l l universals. 
?out universals, according to him, characterize neither the 
essence i n i t s e l f , nor the individuals, but universality i s super-
added to the essence (nature) when i t i s conceived in the mind. ^ 
1. Avioenna,K.al-Najah,op.cit.,pp.199-200. 
2. Avicenna,K.al-Shifa'*,op.cit.,vol.II,p .292, • 
3. Ibid.,vol .11,p.291. 
4. Avicenna,K.al-NaJah,op.cit. ,pp.199-200;al-Ghazalx,Maqa5id al-F a l a s i f a h , 
vol.II,(Cairo,1355/1936),p.7. 
5. Avicenna,K.al-Shifa* ,op.cit.,vol.II,pp.296-297. 
6. Ibid.,vol.II,p.491 . 
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Essence i s described by him as vdiat i s asserted by an answer to 
the question 'what i s i t ' and i t d.oes not t e l l anything about exis-
tence. Bulb'iVwithla3LV.fir'1s one of the constituents of the quiddity.'' 
iixlstence i s a part i c u l a r kind of accident which i s superadded to the 
essence of a thing. This i s i n l i n e with h i s theory of creation 
which .is opjposed to the creation ^x^^nihij-o held by the Mutalcalliraun, 
'•The difference between Abu'l-Barakat and Avicenna l i e s i n 
the fact: that i n Abu'1-Barakat's theory of oxistence. Psychology 
plays a more important role than i n Avicenna's. 
Abu'l-Barakat f i r s t attempts to se t t l e the oatological 
status of the things existing i n the concrete, V/hen a man apprehends 
something with one of h i s senses, he has knowledge of i t and of his 
apprehending i t . Only then i s he certain of "bhe fact that something 
e x i s t s . But th i s should not be taken to mean the fact of i t s being 
apprehended, rather to mean the fa c t of i t s being l i a b l e to be appre-
hended. For the thing i s , i n i t s e l f , l i a b l e to be apprehended before 
and a-fter he apprehended i t , and i t also exists at the time of his 
apprehending i t . Therefore i t i s th i s state of i t s being l i a b l e to 
be apprehended- that i s called existence. Apprehension i s not a 
1, Avicenna,K,al-NajSh,op.cit,,pp,7-8;K.al-IshSi^t wa'l-tanbihat, 
ed.by Forget,(Leyden,1892) ,p,11. 
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condition for existence, rtither existence i s a condition for 
apprehension. This i s how we get to loiow the existence of an 
existent and not the definition of existence. For existence and 
existent cannot bo defined. Their moaning i s apprehended through a 
..priori. Icnpwledge (bi-awa-»il al-ma*arif) and does not require a def-
1 
i n i t i o n , 
Existence, therefore, forms one of our primary apper-
cej>tions together with the soul's apperception of i t s own s e l f and 
that of time. Existence i s not coni'ined only to the things perceived 
by the senses. The things which are not perceived by the senses are 
2 
also said to e x i s t . Existence i n the mind confers some kind of 
existence upon the things existing i n the mind alone because of the 
mind's existing i n external r e a l i t y . In this sense, i n contradiction 
to Avicenna, non-existent may be taken as having some kind of exis-
tence i n external r e a l i t y . ^ 
Here, a problem crops up i n his stucly of existence. ¥e 
have already seen that his position as to the soul's self-av/areness 
1. K.al-JvIuHabar,op.oit.,vol.Ill,pp.20-21. 
2. Ibid.,vol.Ill,p. 3 9 . 
3. Ibid.,vol.III,pp.62-63 . 
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of i t s existence even though i t i s shut off from the external 
v/orld and devoid of al]. i t s bodily relations i s unijiistakeably 
evident. But i n such a case, i s i t s t i l l aware of the existence 
of the external vrorld? This question i s l e f t unsettled i n the 
context of his philoso[jhy. However, there are indications that he 
uses the evident character of the existence of the soul as a safe-
guard for being i n general. 
On the question of quiddities or essences (dhat) he i s not 
sp e c i f i c . Contrary to Avicenna, he does not specify t h e i r oDjaLtologioal 
status, i . e . whether they e x i s t apart from existence. According to 
him, an existent e x i s t s i n virtue of existence and the existence of 
th i s existence also e x i s t s i n virtue of existence (bi-v/ujudin). This 
does not go on ad infinitum and the series ends i n the existent per se, 
not i n the existent existing i n virtue of existence. Therefore, the 
quiddity (dhat) and the existence are identical i n the f i r s t essence, 
as i n the case of a white colour, and not of white body. For white 
colour i s white by i t s e l f , vAiereas white body i s white i n virtus of 
2 
a colour, naaoH^ '', whiteness. 
I t i s very milikely that he ide n t i f i e s essence with -'dis 
mentsil forms since coloyir, according to him, i s an attribute subsis-
1. Ibid.,vol.Ill,p. 6 3 . 
2. Ibid.,vol.III,pp.64-65 . 
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ting i n the mind. I f x'rom t h i s i s inferred the fact that quidd-
i t i e s have no place i n Abu' 1-Barakat • s ^jhilosophy, how could the 
d i v i s i o n of oxistence into necessary, contingent and impossible be 
explained? 
1 
Avioenna's division of 'being' into nocessaxy, contingent, 
(murakin) and impossible, i s in keeping with the. general trend of 
h i s philosophy. This division stems from the fac t that non-existence 
does not e x i s t i n any way; therefore, there must be something to v/hich 
existence may be superadded. 
Under the strong influence of Avicenna,-Abu'l-Barakat accepts 
t h i s d i v i s i o n of being i n i t s entirety, although i t i s very d i f f i c u l t 
to f i t them into his system for the reasons already mentioned. Accord-
ing to him, as according to Avicenna, things existing i n external 
r e a l i t y may either e x i s t by, or i n virtue of themselves (bi-dhatihi 
*an dhatihi), or they e x i s t through something other than themselves. 
These l a t t e r kind of existents may, i n turn, be either contingent or 
impossible (mumtani*). Impossible per ae (bi-dhatihi) does not poss-
i b l y e x i s t through something e l s e . Otherv/ise, that would involve an 
1. Avicenna,K.al-Najah,op,cit,,pp,224-225;of,al-Ghazali,Maqasid a l -
F a l a s i f ah,op. o i t . , vol.11 ,pp.53-54;Avicenna,Isharat ,op. c i t ! , pp. 140-141; 
see also E,Fackenheim,The P o s s i b i l i t y of the Universe i n al-Farabi, 
Ibn Sina,and Maimonides, i n American Academy f o r Jewish Research, 
(New York,1947),Pp,39-70;G.Smith,Avicenna and the Possibles,in 
New Scholastioism.vol.XVII.d 943) .pa.5i..0-^S7. 
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i n t e r n a l contradiction. For the existence of an impossible i s 
only possible by the annihilation of i t s essence, and t h i s would 
mean i t s non-existence and the combination of two contraries. 
I f those things vfhich e x i s t through another i s neither 
impossible nor necessary, they are called contingent. Every con-
tingent being depends for i t s existence upon another preceding i t i n 
existence. But the actualization of one contingent being from another 
does not go on ad infinitum. Therefore they must end i n the necess-
a r i l y existent. A l l contingent beings point to the existence of the 
neoessaiy being, j u s t as the things produced i n time point to the ex-
istenoe of the E t e r n a l . 
The principle of our notions of cause ( ^ i l l a h ) and effect 
(ma*lul), agent ( f a ' ^ i l ) and product (maf *ul) i s the sensible objeolBi 
When, for example, a f i r e bornes into contact with something inflamm-
able, i t burns. The former i s said to be the agent or the cause and 
the l a t t e r i t s product or i t s effect. According to certain d i s t i n -
guished philosophers, although every agent i s a cause, every cause i s 
not an agent. For i t i s commonly knovm that every act of the agent 
must necessarily involve motion and time, whereas t h i s i s not the case 
with the production of an effect from the cause. Arid again, the £:.gent 
acts by deliberation depending either on nature or on vol i t i o n . They 
1. .K.al-i!,iu*^tabar,op.oit.,vol.Ill,pp.22-23. 
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distinguish four kinds of causes (a) the Material cause (maddah), 
(b) the Forma-l cause (Surah), ( c ) the E f f i c i e n t cause ( * i l l a h fa'' 
i l i y y a h ) and (d) the F i n a l cause ' ( ' i l l a h ^ ha^iyyah).' 
liffects may either subsist by their causes and are a n n i h i l -
ated with the annihilation of the i r causes, or they survive the ann-
i h i l a t i o n of the i r causes. For exaJiiple, heat transmitted to v/ater, 
2 
subsists i n water af t e r the f i r e was extinguished. 
As every moveable has a cause other than i t s e l f , so the 
transitory objects, a f t e r being non-existent, are brought into being 
by something other than themselves. Every generated being (mu^jdath) 
has a generator (muhdith). But are the eternal objects which we 
have loiown not to ex i s t i n time caused or generated? According to 
Abu'l-Barakat, from the fact that everything generated i n time i s 
caused, i t does not f ollov/ that everything caused i s generated i n 
time, j u s t as from the f a c t that every man i s animal, i t does not 
follow that every animal i s man. I t i s loiov/n as a general rule that 
the causes or the effects, whether they are temporal or eternal, end 
up with a cause having no cause for i t s e l f ( l a * i l l a t a n lahu). This 
cause i s not other than the necessary existent per se, ^ Like Avicenna 
1, Ibid.,vol,III,pp.48-49 . 
2, Ibid.,vol,III,pp , 4 9 - 5 0 . 
3, Ibid.,vol.III,pp,54-56 . 
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Abu'l-Barakat gives God such names as the F i r s t Cause, the F i r s t 
Agent, and the Ultimate End, He i s the ult imate end f o r a l l his 
creatures. 
I n the above resume, Avioenna's influence is unmistakeable. 
The causal series v/hich end i n the F i r s t Cause i s also Avicennian, 
Every cause and every e f f e c t , though between the F i r s t cause and the 
l a s t e f f e c t (al-ma*lul a l - akh i r ) there exist;; many causes and many 
e f f e c t s , d e p e n d - i d i r e c t l y on the F i r s t Cause, As we sha l l l a t e r 
see, contrary to Avicenm's doctrine, God's e f f i c a o i t y does not end 
i n the F i r s t Caused ( a l liiia * l u l al-av/wal), rather i t i s fel if i i n every 
cause. 
The r e l a t i o n between the agenit; and product, the cause and 
e f f e c t , possible and necessary presupposes the procession from God. 
Before proceeding wi th Abu'l-Barakat 's theory of creation (khalq) , 
we must knov/ something about the nature of his God. 
According to the Hutakallimun, everything besides God i s 
possible, meaning thereby the opposite of djnpossible. God has 
absolute freedom of povfer over the possible. He cannot do the i^poss-
2 
i b l e . They a f f i r m of God a l l the r ea l :".incorporeal a t t r ibutes such 
1. Avicenna,al-Najah,op,ci t . ,p .235jIsharat ,op.oi t . ,p .14l and 141-142. 
2, M,Fakhry,Islamio Occasionalism,(London,1958),p.62. 
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as l i f e , Icnowlsdge, power, etc, Shough they make a d i s t i n c t i o n 
betvjeen t h e i r meaning vhen they ,are a t t r ibu ted to men and v/hen 
they are a t t r ibu ted to God. Therefore, there exis ts , f o r them, 
a cer ta in equivocali ty over the application of th jse terms, to two 
d i f f e r e n t realms.^ 
Avioenna, influenced i n a l l p robab i l i ty , by certain Mu^az i l i t e s 
2 
and the Neo~Platonists , negates a l l the essential a t t r ibu tes of God 
i n order to save His absolute oneness. By doing so, he creates a gap 
betv/een God and th i s world and f i l l s t h i s gap with intermediary beings. 
Avicenna regards God's a t t r ibutes ei ther as relat ions or as 
negations, existence being the f i r s t a t t r ibu te of God. When i t i s 
said that He i s a substance, i t means that He does not inhere i n a 
substratum. V/hen He i s said to be One, th i s mQana tlvix Hs i s ilndiv-
i s i b l e i n anj' \vay. When i t i « said that TID i s an in te l l igence , i n t e l l i g e n t 
and i n t e l l i g i b l e , t h i s s i g n i f i e s tha t His existence does not mix wi th 
3 
matter and material attachments , etc. He has no genus, no d i f f e r e n t i a , 
no d e f i n i t i o n . No categories of being apply to Him. He cannot be dem-
1. H.A.V/olfson,Maimonides on Negative A t t r i b u t e s . i n Louis Ginzberg 
Jubilee Volume,English Section,(New York, 19455,PP.4^0-Jt4l ;Shahrastani, 
K . a l - M i l a i wa' 1-Nihal , ed. by W.Oureton, (London ,m2^6) ,p.67. 
2. H.A.'ffolfson,Philosophical Implications of the Problem of Divine 




onstratedj He dempnsti-ates or manifests everything. 
A l l these statements amount to saying that God's essence 
i s unlmov/able, therefore no posi t ive a t t r ibu te can be predicated of 
Him, 
I n his treatment;- of God's a t t r ibu tes , Abu'l-Barakat drav/s 
upon the Mutalcallimun. Ibn TayBiij?yah, the Orthodox theologian, i s 
therefore r i g h t i n saying that as Ibn Sina, i n his negation of God's 
attributes!,! was influenced by the Bat ini tos among whom he was brought 
up, so Abu'l-Barakat, i n h is a f f i rma t ion of God's a t t r ibu tes , was 
- - 2 
influenced by the Mutalcallimun of Ba_^dad, where he l i v e d , 
Abu'l-Baralcat sets o-i himself the task of proving the 
fundamental tenet of Islamj the u n i c i t y of God. I n th i s he uses the 
argument Avicenna had already used. Something may be one, ei ther 
i n d i v i d u a l l y , or i n species, or i n genus. I n t h i s sense i t i s one i n 
one respect and mul t ip le i n another. From another -goxnt of view, 
something may be one ei ther i n essence or by accident. For example, 
the un i ty of a group of soldiers is accidental, v/hereas the uni ty i n 
the sun i s essent ia l . The r ea l un i ty , or the rea l one i s that i n 
which there i s no m u l t i p l i c i t y whatever. ^ 
1, Avicenna, al-Shife? , op, o i t , , v o l . I I , p . 585. 
2, Ibn Taymij^ahjMinhaj al-Sunnah.,op,oit . ,vol.I ,p.98. 
3 , K .a l -Mu ' t aba r ,op ,o i t , , vo l , I I I ,pp .58-59 . 
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I n the l i g h t of these prel iminaiy remarks, a f t e r a 
long discussion, ho proves tha t the f i r s t Principle (al-mabda* 
al-aww£il) cannot be mul t ip le vlth respect to place, nor as a result 
of i t s essential and accidental a t t r ibu tes . Nor can there be compos-
i t i o n i n the i i ' i r s t P r inc ip le . ' He i s one i n so f a r as His essence 
(dJhat), r e a l i t y and quiddi ty (mahiyyah) i s concerned. He i s one (v/ahid) 
i n so f a r as there i s no m u l t i p l i c i t y in Him, unlike the u n i t y of a 
group of ind iv idua l soldier's; He is singular ( fa rd) i n so f a r as he has 
no associate or equal (nidd); He has absolute s imp l i c i t y (samad) i n so 
f a r as He i s not composite, each pci-fecting the other i n turn ( f a s l 
mutammiin). 
I n v/liat category should God's e f f i c i e n t causality be put? Should 
i t be subsumed under the category of nature as j j i the case of the 
ascending motion of f i r e , and thk- descending motion of a stone, or 
under the category of vfi3-l as i n the case of our a c t i v i t i e s , which 
depend upon del ibera t ion and thought, or under the category of both 
3 
together, i . e . nature and w i l l together. 
There i s no doubt thixt the e f f i c i e n t causality ( f a ^ i l i y y a h ) 
of the F i r s t Ec'inciple i s neither accidental, nor as a resu l t of 
1. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p p . 5 9 f f . 
2. I b i d , , v o l . I I I , p . 6 l , 
3. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p , 6 6 . 
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compulsion. For both re fe r hack, to an essential agent ( f a « i l 
b i " l - t o a t ) preceding them. Since p r i o r to the F i r s t i - r inciple there 
cannot be ancbhor p r inc ip l e , i t can neither be accidental or as a 
resul t of compulsion. ' 
Nov;, the F i r s t Pr inciple cannot be a natural cause ( f a * i l 
b i ' l - t ab*^) , f o r the natural cause i s res t r i c ted to a certain a c t i v i t y , 
i . e . from one point to another, v/hereas the F i r s t Principle i s the 
pr inc ip le of various a c t i v i t i e s ixi various dii 'cctions and wi th 
various ends and i s the p r inc ip le of various ent i t ies (al-dhawat). 
And, s i m i l a r l y , since i t i s not aware of i t s own act ion, th i s action does 
not proceed from i t by v / i l l or del iberat ion ( l a yaqsuidiihuo. wa La, 
yuriduhm). But i t i s evident that the e n t i t i e s , actions, movements, 
and ends which proceed from the F i r s t Principle poD.nt to an harmonj'-
and orderly arrangement. How could therefore such an orderly arrange-
Blent and hamony be caused by a natural force v/hich has neither apper-
ception, nor de l ibera t ion . Therefore, the F i r s t Principle executes 
2 
His actions by v / i l l and del ibera t ion, as we l l as f o r a purpose. 
Here the question arises: Is the end of His actions external 
to His essence, or iden t i ca l wi th His essence. Like Avicenna, A b u ' l -
Barakat accepts the second a l t e rna t ive . This resembles the f a c t of a 
1, Ibidem. 
2. I b i d . , v o l . I l l , p p , 6 6 - 6 7 , 
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physician's curing himself vfith the exception that to the F i r s t 
Principle occurs no Imperfection ouch as i l l nes s etc. Therefore, 
the e i ' f i c l en t cause and the f i n a l cause correspond In His essence. 
I n so fi.r as He i s the l?irst Agent, He Is cal led the F i r s t (al-avnval) 
and with respect to H:is being the end. He i s called the l a s t ('aldiar). 
Hovfover, Abu' 1-Barakat d i f f e r s from Avioenna i n that the essential 
a t t r ibu tes of God such as w i l l , generosity, knowledge rest vdth the 
essence of God, i n other words they are the pi'operties of God's 
essence. According to him, God can didTferentiate betv/eon the state 
of being generous and non-generous. As a resul t of th i s d i f f e r e n -
t i a t i o n he prefers generosity to non-generosity. Thei'efore, i t i s 
not true to say that there i s no difference betv/een God's being 
generous and not generous. The end of a l l His actions i s , i n the 
l a s t analysis, h is generosity, ( j u d ) . His generosity i s the source 
of a l l existents. He creates.> as a result of His generosity, not 
that He i s generous because he creates. Generosity is one of His 
essential a t t r ibu tes . He rejoices i n His generosity which pertains 
•feS SlS'- s'Slgncc, and t h i s joy does not como to Him from something 
2 
other than His essence. 
Abu'l-Barakat i s more spec i f i c about the nature of the 
essential a t t r ibutes of God i n another context. There he divides 
beings in to three categories?(a) Essences vAiich are actualized by 
1. I b i d . , v o l . I l l , p . 6 7 . 
2. I b i d . , vo l . I I I , pp .67-69 . 
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possessing a primary existence (v/ujuduha hasilun lidhnwa.^iKi;. 
husulan aTmaliyyan), (b) acts vdriich proceed from these essences, 
(c) modes and a t t r ibu tes vjiiich subsist i n the essences exist ing 
i n external r e a l i t y . Their existence, however, does not pertain 
to the essences i n t h e i i ' essences. For exampH ,^ heat i n the f i r e , 
cold i n the snow, generosity i n the generous, ai-e the a t t r ibutes of 
-1 
t h i s k i n d . 
These three kinds of existents, since they are not necessary 
per se, must necessarily end i n a necessary existent per se. Thdse 
a t t r ibu tes which pr-oceod from the essence, having no other cause 
than t h i s essenco^are cal led natural a t t r ibu tes , or spec i f ic prop-
er t ies (khassiyyat) . He considers God's a t t r ibutes to be of th i s 
k ind . As f o r the atti-'ibutes c l a s s i f i ed as accidental, f o r example, 
heat i n the water, a r c , i n the l a s t analysis, indicat ive of the 
essential a t t r ibu tes Y/hich cannot be separated from the essence of 
the th ing to v/hich they belong. 
1 . I b i d , , v o l , I I I , p , 1 0 0 , 
2. He explains i n t h i s context the meaning of 'nature' as the emanation 
from the essence through the medium of the essence i t s e l f . I n t h i s 
respect there i s no doubt that he' fol lows certain Mu^ taz i l i t e s , e .g . , 
A M tJashim,who regarded God's a t t r ibutes as the modes of His essence. 
Of ,Shahrastara,K.al-Milal . . ,op.oi t . ,p ,56;foj7 the M u H a z i l i t e view see 
H.A.Wolfson,art icle i n J.A.O.S. j O p . o i t . ,pp.73"79 and a r t i c l e i n Louis 
Ginzberc; Jubilee Volume, op. c i t . , pp .415f f . 
3 . K .a lHVIu^ taba r ,op .c i t . , vo l . I l l , p .101 . 
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A l l a t t r ibu tes exis t ing i n th i s vjorld must, i n the l a s t 
resort , be refer red to God, He being the or ig ina t ive pr inc ip le of 
a l l a t t r ibu tes : Just as the F i r s t Existent i s the pr inc ip le of 
every existent , the F i r s t Knowledge, i . e . the loiovflodge of the Fir-st 
i s the p r inc ip le of every knowledge, and the F i r s t lYlsdoi;!, i . e . , the 
vdsdom of the F i r s t i s the pr inc ip le of oveiy wisdom, and the F i r s t 
¥111, i . e . the w i l l of the F i r s t i s the p r inc ip le of every w i l l . ' 
There exis ts , according to him, betv/een the a t t r ibutes of the 
created things and those of God a cer tain s i m i l a r i t y , l ^ i s especially 
stands out i n h i s theory of God's knowledge vihloh i v l l l be explained 
presently. 
I n A r i s t o t l e , there exists a dichotomy between God whose 
knowledge has I t s e l f f o r i t s object and the world which exists 
2 
external ly to and separately from God. I t may, therefore, be said 
that A r i s t o t l e ' s God i s inact ive wi th respect to the thing outside 
Himself, whose sole aciSivity being s e l f - i n t e l l e c t i o n . Hov/ever, the 
subsequent va'ltcrs f e l t the d i f f i c u l t y i n i so la t ing God from the 
world, and t r i e d to render th i s conception of God's knowledge more 
acceptable. Among these v/rlters may be c i t ed Avicenna, A r i s t o t l e ' s 
1. I b i d . , v o l . I l l , p . 1 0 4 . 
2. See D.Ross,Aristotle,(London,l966),p.183;i. Brehler,The His tory of 
Philosophy,(the Hel lenic Age) , t r .by J.Thoraas,(Ghioago-London,1963) 
p.203. 
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theory of God's Imov/ledgo £.uid i t s more tolerable version prop-
osed by Avicenna are detemined to a large extent by the i r doc-
t r ines of i f i i t e l l ec t ion (ta*aqqul). For both A r i s t o t l e and Avicenna 
the highest k ind of psychic a c t i v i t y i s i n t e l l e c t i o n . I n the 
i n t e l l e c t alone, i n t e l l e c t i o n and the object of t h i s i n t e l l e c t i o n 
become one. For i t i s the i n t e l l e c t v/hich has knowledge of i t s e l f , 
and of other thn'jigs as abstracted from a l l material attach3Tients, 
quant i ty , qua l i ty , place and t ime. I n th is respect, i n t e l l e c t d i f f e r s 
from a l l psychic f a c u l t i e s v/hich have, i n one way or another, connec-
t i o n v/ith matter and v/ith pa r t i cu la r circumstances, 
I n h is v/atered dov/n vertsion, Avicenna ,though fo l lowing 
A r i s t o t l e i n the laain, concludes from the f a c t that God i s the 
pr inc ip le of every existent , that God knov/s the cause and t h e i r 
2 
corresponding e f f e c t s . He c l a r i f i e s his posi t ion by saying that 
God knov/s the par t iculars i n a universal v/ay (•'ala nahv/in k u l l i y y i n ) 
or i n as much as they are universal (min hayttiu hiya ku l l i yyah ) , ' ' 
God's ioiov/ledgc i s not of an i n f e r e n t i a l k ind . I t occurs inatan-
tfineously (daf*atan). ^ Everything proceeds from Him as the 
1. Avicenna,al-Na3ah,op,cit.,pp,l65 and 178ff. 
2. I b id , , pp , 247 -248 ; a l - ^ i f a -» ,op .o i t , , vo l , I I , p , 590 . 
3. Avicenna,al-Naj'ah,op,cit, ,p ,247. 
4. Avioenna,al-Shifa ' , o p . c i t , , v o l , I I , p , 5 9 1 ; c f .M,E,Mamura,Some aspects 
of Avicenna's theory of God's knowledge of P a r t i c u l a r s , i n J.A.O.S. 
vol.LXXXII , ( l962) ,p .303. 
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consequences proceed from a premise, since the consequence is 
not conceived i n t ime. Avicenna at tains t h i s f a c t dravfing an 
analogy betvireen the human i n t e l l e c t ahd the Divine i n t e l l e c t . 
As i n Avioenna, Abu'l-Barakat 's theory of God's Icnowledge 
v/as determined by his psychology. But the difference betv/een them 
l i e s i n the extent of t he i r appl icat ion of the Psychological theories 
to the Metaphysical ones. 
As vie have already seen, he divides existents into essences, 
and actii shich az-e consequent upon and concomitant of essences. And 
•t;he nobT-l i ty of acts proceeds from the n o b i l i t y of essences. God, 
being the most noble of essences, does not reach perfect ion by means 
of apprehensions, rather He apprehends -iiie objects of apprehension 
because He i s the pei^cct being. Therefore i t i s absurd to say vdth 
A r i s t o t l e that God's i n t e l l e c t i o n of something other than His essence 
2 
implies an imperfection i n God. Nor is Avicenna r i g h t i n saying 
that God's I n t e l l e c t i o n of external things (ashya*) necessitates the 
f a c t of His being consti tuted by the things he i n t e l l e c t s . For 
i n t e l l e c t i o n i s one of the a c t i v i t i e s of the i n t e l l e c t . A c t i v i t y 
fo l lov/ ing upon the essence from v/hich i t proceeds, how could something 
1, Marmura,op.cit. ,p.303. 
2. K .a l -Mu*tabar ,op .c i t . ,vo l . I l l ,pp .75-76 . 
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be const i tuted by that which fo l lows from i t i n time and i n 
1 
essence. 
But the fundamenttil d i f ference between Abu'l-Barakat and 
Avicenna stems from Abu'l-Barakat 's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a l l psychic 
f a c u l t i e s v/ith an immaterial substance v/hich i s the soul i t s e l f . 
This i s piroven by the f a c t of the evident knov/ledge provided by 
self-awareness. I t i s precisely h is appeal to the self-evident 
t ru ths that plays havoc v/ith the en t i re i i x i s t o t c l i a n theory of d i f f -
erent psychic f a c u l t i e s and u l t ima te ly the i d e n t i t y between the 
i n t e l l e c t and the object of i n t e l l e c t i o n i n God, 
Does m u l t i p l i c i t y of things apprehended cause a change i n 
the subject v/ho apprehends? Abu'l-Barakat's ansv/er to t h i s question 
i s 'No ' , According to him, m u l t i p l i c i l y doeu not occur i n the 
essence i t s e l f , but i n the re la t ions and connections botv/een the 
2 
things perceived and the subject who pe^^ceives, " But the relat ions 
between the subject and the object i s not the same as that obtaining 
between matter and fonn . For example, f i r e v/hich has i n r e a l i t y the 
qua l i ty of burning and snow v/hich has i n i t s e l f the qual i ty of f reezing, 
v/hen included i n our knowledge, have no such qua l i t i e s . Here, as i t 
1, I b i d , , v o l , I I I , p p , 7 2 - 7 3 . 
2, I b i d , , v o l . I l l , p p . 7 6 - 7 7 and 83. 
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seems, ho dravis a.n a,nalogy, as he does elsev/here, between our 
laiowledgO: and God's. This i s proven also by the f a c t that our 
knov/ledge of WS'.'self i s a stage i n acquiring the knowledge of God. 
(wa suUam a l -ma ' r l f ah l i ' l - i n s a n b i rabbih i hdya ma'^rifatuhu b i -
n a f s i h l ) . 
On the other hand, the perfect ion of the F i r s t Prihciple 
&Qes not mean -tiiat He apprehends every object of apprehension, but 
that he has the pov/er to apprehend every existent object of appre-
hension. I f the object of apprehension does not exis t , and the F i r s t 
Principle does not apprehend i t as a resul t , t h i s should not be taken 
to mean that He i s not capable of apprehension. I t i s , i n f a c t , 
necessary f o r him not to apprehend i t . For, i n th i s case the imper-
f e c t i o n i s not i n the F i r s t Pr inciple Himself', but i n the non-existent 
th ing . This i s also the case wi th our apprehensions. Our perfection 
does not depend on the things vie appi-ehend, but on our capacity to 
2 
apprehend. The difference between our apprehension and God's i s 
one of degree, God's apprehension',/, having no l i m i t a t i o n . 
He sums up his personaJ. re f lec t ions on the subject i n a 
special chapter, ^ v;here ho, again, divides the objects of our 
1. I b id . , vo l . I I I , pp . 98 - .99 . 
2. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p . 7 5 . 
3. I b i d , v o l . I I I , T r e a t i s e I,Chapter XVII,pp.88-93 
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apprehensions in to (a) those v/hich exist i n the concrete and 
in to (b) those v/hich exist i n the minds (adhhan). He again 
proceeds to draw an analogy between our knowledge and God's. He 
says, ''the s p i r i t u a l beings which v/o are not able to perceive v/ith 
our sensory organs ( a l a t ) may be perceived and laiov/n by us by means 
of an i n f e r e n t i a l laiov/ledge as i f we see and loiow them wi th our eyes. 
And there i s no harm i n i n f e r r i n g from this that God Icnows a l l 
existents i n a s imi la r v/ay'. 
Mental forms which are included i n the second category men-
tioned above, a,reoalso divided in to tv/o categories: (a) those v/hich 
are caused by the existents i n external r e a l i t y , and (b) those that 
are causes of external objects. I n t h i s category i s , f o r example, the 
mental f o m of an anl<iet vidiich i s i n the soul of a goldsmith, vdio i s 
the cause of the existence of the anklet i n the concrete. The forms 
ex i s t ing i n the Divine world are of th i s k ind. I t is f o r th i s reason 
tha t Plato a f f i rms of the ideas and the moulds. Why should i t not be 
so, since they are the true pi-'ototypes. And God's knowledge should bo 
2 
conceived i n th i s connectiSn, 
1 . I b i d , , v o l , I I I , p , 8 8 . 
2. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p , 9 3 . 
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Having establ ished Abu' 1-Barakat's theory of God's knov/-
lodge, wo can nov/ proceed v/ith h i s theory of creation ( idialq) , both 
being inseparable from each other. 
I n Avicenna, the d iv i s ion of beings into possible and 
necessary ends up v/lth the r e l a t i o n betv/eon these two concepts, 
which i s c a l l e d creat ion. Follovjing i n the footsteps of A r i s t o t l e , 
he contributes to the viev/ that nothing comes out of nothing and 
that there must therefore be something exist ing i n a l l e ternity f o r 
the necessary existent to vrork on. This something i s matter i n pot-
e n t i a l i t y , ^ God i s the Giver of Forms (v/ahib al-suv/ar)'. 'thixjugh the . 
_ 2 
interjnediacy of the act ive ajitell igence ( a l - ' a q l ; ^ - f a ^ ^ a l ) . Mthough 
potent ia l i ty precedes a c t u a l i t y i n t h i s world of corruption and 
generation (al-kawn wa' l - fa sad) , i n r e l a t i o n to the i n t e l l i g i b l s 
wcrld which i s alv/ays i n actu, i t i s posterioi- to actuali-ty. 
Therefore, in the hierarchy of being, matt^-r comes l a s t . ^ God, f i r s t , 
originated the i n t e l l i g i b l e world, and then,through the instrumentality 
of t h i s world He originated the v;orld of generation and corruption. 
1. Avicenna,al -Najah,op.oi t . ,p .252. 
2. I b i d , , p . 2 8 3 . 
3. I b i d . , p . 220; a l - ^ i f S » , op. c i t . ,vo l . I I ,pp .477- i ) .79 . 
4. Avicenna,al-NaJ"Sh,op.cit. ,p.208. 
5. Ib id . ,pp .280-284;a l -6hi fa^,op .c i t . ,vo l . I I ,pp .624-625 . 
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Creation i s expJxiined by Avicenna i n teiins of a necessaiy proc-
ession from God i n various stages. God, Himself being one i n every 
respect, originates d i r e c t l y only one being which i s possible i n i t s e l f , 
and necessary through the F i r s t . I t i s i n t h i s stage that m u l t i p l i c -
i t y begins. Contemplating God through which i t is necessaiy, i t 
or iginates another being v/hich i s called in te l l igence as i n the case 
of the F i r s t Caused (a l - raa ' lu l a l -avAval) . Contemplating i t s essence 
T/hich i s possible i n i t s e l f , i t originates tv/o things; the matter of 
the highest ce l e s t i a l sphere and the soul of th i s sphere. This t r i -
p a r t i t e procession goes on t i l l i t ends i n the l a s t of ten i n t e l l i -
gences, vdiioh i s ca l led the Active In te l l igence . The number of i n t e l l -
igences i s l i j n i t e d to ten because the i n t e l l i g i b l e world :iis formed of 
ton ce les t i a l spheres, ^ 
Abu'l-Barakat's f i r s t task i s to eliminate the Weo-Platonian 
notion of amanation. His c r i t i c i s m of this viev/ consists (a) of 
j i r i s t o t e l i a n s ' deviation from the fundamental pr inc ip le that from 
one, one can only proceed, since, according to them, from the F i r s t 
In te l l igence not one, but three proceeds and (b) of t he i r confining 
the c e l e s t i a l in te l l igences to some d-ofinite number such as ten ^ , and 
1, Ibid,,pp.276-280, 
2, K , a l - M u ' t a b a r , o p . c i t , , v o l , I I I , p . 1 5 6 , 
3, I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p . 1 5 8 
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(c) of t h e i r disregard f o r the natura l , animal and vegetable 
elements, and (d) of whether the revelat ion or a transmitted 
t r a d i t i o n was t h e i r source, and f i n a l l y (e) of the r e c t i l -
2 
inear scheme of emanation pi-oposed by the Ar i s to te l i ans . 
Having mentioned the A r i s t o t e l i a n theory of emanation, 
Abu'l-Barakat wonders v/hy they (Ar is to te l ians) do not say that God 
i s generous, therefore He had knowledge rjad as a resu l t of th i s knov/-
ledge He created, and i n consequence of H.ls creation he had Icnovdedge. 
I f they held t h i s viev/, there vrould be no need f o r a second cause, 
and m u l t i p l i c i t y of existents v/ould proceed from God's essence i n 
v i r tue of His essence, and consequently they v/ould avoid confining 
God's ci'eation to one being alone. 
God has w i l l e d , i n a general way, the actual izat ion of every 
possible th ing subsisting i n a mental representation, and i n pre-
determination according to His predetermining and accomplishing i t . 
Ho has w i l l e d 'the eternal f o r the sake of the eternal , temporal f o r 
the sake of the temporal, p r i o r f o r the sake of the posteS'ior, the 
ind iv idua l f o r the sake of the preservation of the species, ancl. the 
species f o r the sa,ke of the ind iv idua l I n orderc that the l a t t e r may 
1. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p . l 5 8 . 
2. I b i d . , v o l . I l l , p p . 1 6 1 - 1 6 3 . 
3 . I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p . 1 5 9 . 
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exist actually. l?rom some of the oxistents emanates other things 
Yvhose agemt i s G-od in virtue of His essence. And He makes things 
created by Him servo as i f thoy were instruments and cause either 
v/ith regard to those things proceading fi-om Him or with regard to 
their being required by His vdsdom. A l l this i s ordered according 
to His F i r s t \ J i l l ( iradatihi al-ula) and always particularized (bi~ 
t a f s i l i n ) by many volitions in accordance with many requirements 
and time. I t does not follovj from this th;.t one can only proceed 
-I 
from the One, 
The emanation from G-od i s , for him, l ike the rays pi'occoding 
2 
from the sun. I t i s in every direction, not as the Aristotelians 
say in one direction, that is recti l inear. Tho very same comparison 
i s made by Plato and Plfitinus^ in their explanation of the Ultimate 
G-ood and the Absolute One respectively. 
I t appears that Abu'l-Barakat's position was partly deter-
mined by the fact that there exists indefinite number of beings in 
the world, none of which being the cause of one another. For example, 
1. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p . l 6 0 . 
2. I b i d . , v o l , I I I , p . 1 6 3 . 
3. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, 
ed.by A.H.Aimstrong,(London, 1967) ,p,240. 
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man cannot bo the cause of horse. This cannot be explained by 
the series of causes and eiTfects proceoding in one direction from 
•1 
the S'irst 1-Yincipie. But the most njiiportant factor detewnining 
his position i s that ho trtmsfers his huraan psjrchology into the 
domain of Metaphysics. He arrives, as we htive alreacl;^ ;- seon, at this 
position by dravdng an analogy between man and God. By doing so, he 
gives G-od. an extensive freedom of action such as causing the winds to 
blov/, resuscitating one individual and causing the death of another, 
2 
responding to a prayer and rodr-essing a wrong. Taking this 
statement at i t s face value, can we say that G-od has an absolute 
freedom of action as the Theologians assert? But before settling 
this question, we must say something about the nature of creation. 
I s i t an eternal creo/bion or a temporal one? 
The problem of the eternity of the v/orld i s given a lafeg© 
space in KitSbMu*tabar, this being, to a great extent, due to the 
popularity of the problem among the Falasifah a,nd the Mutakallimun. 
Abu'l-Barakat cites the arguments and the counter-arguments, in so far 
as the eternity and temporal production of the world i s concerned. Yet 
he refrains from giving his personal opinions on the subject. This i s 
understandable in view of the fact tliat those philosophers vfho affirmed 
1. K.al-Mu*tabar,op.oit. ,vol.III,p,151. 
2. Ibid . ,vol . IH. ,pp. 159-160 
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of the eternity ot the world f.:;Uied the charge of irrel igion from 
the orthodox circles in Islam, Howevsr, there ar& strong i n d i c -
ations th.o/c he believQd in the otei-niby of the \K>|'ld, Insteivd of 
g i v i n g a fu.ll details of the argujaiKnts and the oountGr-arguments on 
the question under discussion we shal l confine o u r s e l v e s to the 
: liumeration of these indications. 
1. G-od's generosity i s related to His act of creation by 
Abu'l-Barakat. His creation i s the outcome of His generosi-ty. 
There vjas not a time when G-od was not generous. This point of view, 
v/hen compared with the argument v/ell-known as "Proolus* difficulty" 
i n Islamic philosophy, naJneHy that because the Creator of the world 
exists from a l l eternity, and i s alv/ays all-pov/erful and generous, 
free from impotence and cupidity, possessing neither r iva l to obstruct 
His action, nor associate i n creation, the created world exists sim-
ultaneously with Him, may be cited as one of the clear indications 
pointing to the eternity of the world. 
2, Abu'l-Barakat holds that there exists two kinds of priority; 
(a) temporal priority, and (b) casual priority, or priority in essence 
follovdng the traditional philosophy. This i s also exemplified by the 
distinction he makes betv/een eternal (azaliyyat) and temporal beings. 
1. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p . 2 8 . 
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I t may therefore be inferred that he contributes to the argument 
•] 
that priority of God to the world i s a casual one, 
3) I n treating of natural sciences, v/e have seen that he 
unconventionally accepts the infinity of space. The statement that 
our minds cannot, in i t s veiy nature (bi- f i trat iha) doubt the 
. '• 
2 
eternity of space, i s in keeping v/ith his own view on space. 
4) Between his statement against the Avicennian doctrine of 
God's knov/ledge that i f God does not knov/ the particular things, 
because this entails the fact of His being the substratum for these 
things, in a sdjnilar manner, God cannot know His essence for fear that 
He might be a substratum for His essence, and the statement of 6hose 
who believe in the eternity of the world, namely, that the remotion 
of Gradittmra. being a substratum for derivative wills (lahiq) entails 
also H4s reraotion from being a substratum for His F i r s t Wil l ^, there 
i s more than a similarity. 
5) liis view on time which he identifies with eternity, also 
points to the theozy of the eternity of the world. That he atti.-'ibutes 
to the believers i a •.tempoa:^ l creation; the view that time, being the 
1. Ib id . ,vo l . I l l ,pp . 49 and 160.2 
2. See our treatment of his doctrine of space:K.al-Mu<^tabar.op.cit.. 
v o l . I I I , p . 4 8 . 
3. Ib id . ,vo l . I I I ,pp , 98 and 45. 
4 . We shal l deal with his theory of Time later. 
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measure of motion, was created simultaneously vrith the world, which 
'I 
viev/ he refutes , may bo cited as another point in favour of His 
belief in the eternity of the v/orld. 
Now le t us revert to the problem concerning God's volition, 
more particularly God's knowledge, since, as we have seen. His 
volition or the volitions in general are determined by knowledge 
resulting from mental representation and apprehension. Abu'l-Barakat 
expatiates on this point, when treating of the problem of qada and 
qadar, 
Abu'l-Barakat starts out by giving the definitions of 
these two terms commonly accepted among the Falasifah and the 
- 2 
Mutalcallimun, Qada i s the jjnmutable decision of G-od v/ith regard 
* 
to events occurring in the world of generation and corruption and 
to v/hat occurs as a result of the movement of the ce lest ia l spheres 
or the stars. In this sense, qada i s the universal decision of God. 
As for qadar, i t i s the pai-ticularization of this decision according 
to particular circumstances, time, place, quantity and quality. 
Tlierefore, qadar i s the detailed account of qada. The definition 
of these two terms along the same lines are found in K. al~Shifa* 
of Avicenna, 
1, K, eil-Mu*tabar, op. o i t , , vol. I l l , p. 3 0. 
2, Ibid. ,vol .III ,p. l80jAviGenna,Isharat,op.oit . ,p. l85. 
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Abu'l-Baralcat cites three factions v/ho are opposed to 
each other on the question of qada and qadar: (a) those viho held 
the view that God's immutable decision and i t s particularization 
comprehends every single event in this world, (b) those who adhered 
to the view that though God's prescience comprises every single 
event, the religious pi-ohibitions and commandments are outside the 
•I 
scope of God's foreknowledge. This is evidently "bhe opinion of 
the Mu'tazilites who assert that man has a free choice as far as these 
commandments and prohibitions are concerned, otherwise they would have 
no meaning at a l l j , ( o ) Those v/ho referred everything to change. This 
group, according to him, did not believe in the existence of God. 
Relating i J his own vievf, Abu'l-Barakat sets l imit , as he 
has already done, to God's Icnov/ledge. According to him i t i s imposs-
ible even for God's knowledge, as for man, to embrace every event which 
happens in i t s particularity nov/, and has already happened in the past 
and v / i l l happen in the future. This in no way entails imperfection 
in God's knov/ledge, nor does i t mean to attribute impotence to Him. 
For the obstacle (mani") to such knowledge i s not found in the knower, 
but in the inf in i ty of things He v/ould have to apprehend, ^ I t 
appears that the analogy that what i s true of man v/ith respecbto his 
1. K.al-Mu^t abar,op.cit. ,vol.Ill ,pp,181-182. 
2. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p . l 8 3 . 
3. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p p . i 8 7 and 193f. 
129. 
soul i s , in an intensified degree, true of God plays an import-
and role in the formulation of this notion as well as of others. 
The events v/hich happen in a unifom manner in a l l times 
and places are knof/n by God with a pre-eternal knov/ledge (*ilraan 
azaliyyan). But i t i s not so vdth matters dependent upon volitions 
(al-*umur a l - iradiyyaia). For they vary according to individuals, 
time and circumstances, in so f a r as motives and deterrents are 
concerned., and these variations cannot be defined or delimited. 
Therefore these matters cannot be knov/n by any one knower ( la 
yuhltu bihi *^ ilm *alim wahid), nor are they subjo.ct to qada and 
qadar. 1 
On the question of w i l l in general, he argues against the 
view that the motion of the spheres are the only cause of volitions., 
lie says other causes such as the loiowledge acquired from particular 
circumstances, the motivating effect of other volitions, and things 
preserved in memory v/hen remembered are in play. In a s:lmilar way, 
he attributes volitions to G-od and to His angels which does not 
2 
correspond exclusively to the motion of the celest ial spheres. 
1. I b i d , , v o l . I I I , p . l 8 7 . 
2, Ib id . ,vo l . I l l ,pp .190f , 
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By arguing thus he may have had in mind the notion that neither 
God, nor man have free-wil l in the absolute sense. 
Chanoe-events or occurrences due to chance are also outside 
the scope of God's amd msji's knov/ledge. Abu'l-Bartikat attempts 
to give a clearly defined notion of chance-events. This i s not new. 
Chance i s treated by Aristotle, bgct in him i t i s not so clearly def-
- - 1 
ined as i n Absr'l-Barakat. According to T. Gompei:;z's formulation, 
for Aristot le , chance s ignif ies , as a rule, the concurrence of two 
events bound by no causal relation, but yet presenting the appear-
ance of such a bond. Aristotle i l lustrates chance by two exajnples: 
(a) a creditor who i s pressing for payment of a debt, but obtains 
i t unexpectedly, and by chance, v/hen, having gone to the market on 
quite other business, he there lights on the debtor with the req-
uis i te sum in his possession, (b) a horse which has lost i t s rider in 
the battle and in the evening of the same day, driven by hunger, thirst 
or inst inct , returns to the camp, and is restored to i t s owner. Such 
statements as this , or i t s Neo-Platonian versions may have be eh Abu 
'1-Barakat's starting point. However, his treatment of the subject i s 
entirely different. Although such chance events attract Aristotle's 
1. Theodor Gomperz,The Greek Thinkers,tr.by G.G. Berry,vol.IV, (London, 
196M, pp. 95-98. 
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attention, he never tends to break with the traditional viev/ 
that nothing happens by chance. I t may therefore bo said that^ 
for wilristotle, chance i s due to a cause unknovm to us. Abu' 1-Barafcat, 
on the other hand, accepts the reality of such events and applies 
himself to finding out the elements underlying the notion of chance. 
He explicit ly states that chance is either duo to a combination of 
some volitional causes v/ith others, or of some volitional causes 
v/ith some natural ones; this combination being determined by no-one. 
For example, 2ayd v/ent out of his house and walked in a definite 
direction. And a scorpion started out fi'om the right in such a 
way that at one point they both would meet i f Zayd walked at a 
moderate gait. Then i t either happens that Zayd treads on the scor-
pion and k i l l s i t , or that the scorpion stings him. Here, neither 
Zayd, nor the scorpion acted deliberate3y or by nature. Nor were 
they set in motion by someone else deliberately so that they both 
v/ould meet. Hov/ever, this can be done by God^ s^ i f , when and as He 
w i l l (sha*a). I f i t i s asked v/hether Godis deliberation i s 
universal and directed to a l l the portions of existence, for 
example, to every encounter of one speck of dust v/ith another. 
1. K. al-*iu H abar., op. c i t . , vol . I l l , pp. 188-189. 
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whenever and wherever this happens, the answer must be 'no', because 
this is impossible in i t se l f and not because of impotency on the 
part of God. 
The encounter of two specks of dust implies a third cause 
for chaniCe-events, i . e . the combination of two independent natural 
causes. 
Such statements as God can cause the encounter of tv/o 
specks of dust i f , when^ tnd as He w i l l , can only be expla-ined 
by God's attention towards, and interest in the events. 
- - 1 
Abu'l-Baralcat's angelology i s closely connected v/ith 
his crit icism of the Active Intelligence. As v/e have seen, the 
Active Intelligence which i s also called the Giver of Forms i s , 
according to Aristotelians, the sole cause of the multitude of 
souls. For Abu'l-Barakat, the diversity betv/een the souls as to 
their substance, species and fundamental nature i s far too obvious 
to allow of only one single existentiating cause ( a l - * i l l a t a l -
2 
mujidaljl. But this must not be taken to mean that there are a 
multitude of existentiating causes, since, according to him, the 
sole existentiating cause of a l l that which comes to be is God. in 
v/hora everything inheres as mental forms, which are identified by h:.im 
1. M.Abx Rayyan,op.Git,,pp.M-^5. 
2, K.a l -Mu«tabar ,op .c i t . , vo l . I I I ,p .152 and vol .II ,p.394. 
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v/ith the Platonian ideas.^ Thera? remains, therefore, the active 
intelligence being the perfecting cause. This i s also inadmissible, . 
according to him, in view of the diversity obtaining between the 
human souls. On this point, Abu'l-Barakat wavers between two 
opinions. In the Physics of the K. al-Mu^tabar, he accepts the 
view that souls can attain perfection by themselves v/ithout the 
2 
help of someone else. Hov/ever, in the Metapliysics he deviates 
from this viev/ and f ina l ly concedes to the view that for every group 
of souls belonging to the same species there must be an instructor 
or a guide. ^ These spir i tual guides or instructors are identified 
by him v/ith 'angels'. These intell igible beings are pure spiritual 
substances, free from m.atter. They dwell in the highest sphere v/hich 
i s called the 'angelic v/orld' or the 'divine v/orld' and are dist in-
guished according to their degree of intensity (shiddah) and spiritual 
perfection, Therefore, i t may be said that, according to him, the 
source of plurality l i e s in the kingdom of spiritual angelic entities. 
I t i s the angels who init iate the human souls into knov/ledge, protects, 
guides, comforts them, brings them into f i n a l victory and who are 
called the Perfect Nature by those who had the gnosis of direct vision, 
(ma^rifat al-mushahadah)^. The number of angels are equal to the 
1. Ib id , ,vo l , I I I ,pp .92 and 144, 
2. Ibid, ,vol .11,p.4l1. 
3. Ibid, ,vol .III ,pp.152-153. 
4. Ib id . , vo l . I I I ,p .155 . 
5. Ib id . ,vo l . I I ,p .391 . 
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number of sensible species ~ be they celest ial or terres tr ia l . 
They are the retainer or the preserver of the forms of these 
species. 
As in the traditional philosophy, he identifies angels 
v/ith -Qie visible and invisible stars and v/ith the perceptible and 
imperceptible spheres, but he does not discard the possibility that 
their number may exceed the number of these stars and spheres in order 
that they may equal the number of the sensible objects - animate, 
inanimate, or vegetable. 
As a result of his ov/n Theory of angelolog>, he reduces 
the role of the angels to the presei^ation of forms and to guidance. 
Therefore, the appellation:. 'The Giver of Forms', given by Ar i s -
totelians to the Active Intelligence has no place in Abu'1-Barakat's 
theology. 
1. I b i d . , v o l . I I I , p . l 6 7 . 




Time, as we use i t i n our everjrday language, i s s e l f -
evident, and no one doubts i t s existence. But when we try to know 
. i t s quiddity and essence, a l l ejcplanations and attempts must f a i l . 
I n this attempt, a l l the paradoxes inherent in the concept of tijne 
manifest themselves. As Sextus Empirious, when cr i t ic i s ing the various 
definitions of time, says, " i f we rely on appearances, time seems to 
be something, but i f we depend on the various arguments about i t , i t 
appears to be unreal." St . Augustine i s aware of the d i f f icul ty i n . 
giving a satisfactory answer to the question 'what i s time?'. He says, 
'TiVhat, then, i s time? I f nobody asks me, I know; but i f I t i y to 
2 
explain i t to one who asks me, I do not know'. I n modem philos-
ophy Whitehead reflects the same dif f iculty when he says, ' I t i s 
impossible to raedjfeite on time and the creative passage of nature without 
an overwhelming emotion at the limitations of human intelligence,' ^ 
Therefore, no attempt i s f i n a l in explaining the nature of time. 
Time i s generally considered as a passage and as something 
ever-renewing i t s e l f , never remaining the same. How, then, does some-
thing constituted of successively fleeting 'nows' which are, in 
1. Sextus Empiricus,Adv. Math. ,X,l69;see also A.H,Chroust,The Meaning 
of Time i n the Ancient World,in the New Scholasticism, (Jan. ,1947) i 
p.50. 
2. St , Augustine,Confessions^ XI,14. 
3. Whitehead,The Concept of Nature,(Cambridge,1920),p.73. 
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themselves, without extension and consequently have no actual 
existence exist? Many seized upon this point in order to prove 
the unreality of time. This and other di f f icul t ies concerning the 
reality and unreality of time were made the subject of a discussion 
1 2 by Avicenna, and later by F a ^ r al-DIn al-RazI. 
D i f f i cu l t i e s concerning: the real ity and unreality of time -
Avioenna, in his systematic treatment of the subject in 
which he mainly follows Aristotle , makes mention of two factions: 
One group, according to him, accepted the unreality of time, though 
others held the contrary view. The former group he further divides 
into those according to whom time has no external existence whatsoever, 
and into those who granted a kind of existence to time, not because i t 
exists in external real i ty in any way, but because i t exists in the 
estimative faculty (»Amr mutawahham) 
Those who denies existence to time are known as the Sceptics 
(4th Century, B . C . ) . The representatives of this philosophical school 
are Pyrrho, Aroesilaus, Carneades, and Sextus Empiricus. They 
questioned the possibil ity of objective knowledge of real ity. As in 
1. Avicenna.al-Shifg .op.oit. .vol.I.pp.67-72. 
2. Fai^r al-Din al-RazT,al-Mabal^itti al-Mashriqiyyah, (Hyderabad, 1343H.), 
v » l . I , p p . 6 4 2 f f . 
3. Avicenna, a l -Sh i f i ? , op. cat . , vol.1,p. 68j of .Aristotle ,Physics,IV, 10,217b. 
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other problems, they set themselves the task of proving the para-
doxical nature of our knowledge of time. The d i f f icul t ies mention-
ed both by Aristotle and Avicenna are indicated by Sextus Empir-
1 
icus who subjects to crit ic ism various views on time propounded 
by different philosophers. The Sceptics found their arguments 
for the unreality of time on the fact that time has no existence 
in the 'now'. They argue that i f time existed i t would either bf 
something divisible or not divis ible . I f i t were indivisible, i t 
would not be possible that years, months, hours, past and future should 
2 
proceed from i t . But i f i t were divisible, i t would either exist 
with a l l i t s parts or with some of them. The f i r s t alternative i s 
absurd, because, then, past and future time would exist simultaneously. 
The second alternative i s also absurd, because no parts of time exist 
actually. Supposing, however, that the 'present' actually exists, then 
i t would either be divisible into past and future which were shown to be 
non-existent, or i t would be indivisible and called 'now' and not time. 
1. Sextus Empiricus,Adv.Math.,X,l69ff.;cf.Chroust,op.cit,,pp.50-57. 
2, Avicenna,al-Shif5?j6p.cit . ,vol.I ,pp.68f. There exist variations 
between Avicenna and P e ^ r al-Dxn al-Razi who says that i f time 
were indivisible,there would be no difference between the time of 
the event which has occurred to-day and that of the event v/hich 
occurred at the time of inundation; and between Avicenna and Aristotle 
who argues that i f what i s before and what i s after are in the same 
'now',things which happened ten thousand years ago would be simulta-
neous with what has happened to-day.There also exists a difference 
between the account of Avioenna and that of Sextus Empiricus,though 
the point they want to make i s substantially the same.al-Razi,op.cit., 
pp.642f. ;Aristotle,Physics,IV,lO,218a,25-30, 
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I n any case i t can not ex i s t ac tua l ly . But i f 'now' ex is ts 
ac tua l ly , i t must e i t h e r endure or become non-existent. I f i t 
endures, then one part of i t i s p r i o r and the other posterior . But 
both together do not constitute the 'now',since past and future 
would then be i n one 'now' which i s absurd. I f i t becomes non-existent, 
t h i s must e i ther happen i n anc'. adjoining now there intervening no time 
between them, or i n a now there intervening a time between them. I f 
the second a l ternat ive i s accepted, there follows the fact that the 
'now' i n time has a duration which we have already disproven. I f i t 
becomes non-existent i n an adjoining now there intervening no 'time' 
between them, one 'now' w i l l follow the other continual ly , but th i s 
i s one of the things which those who affirmed the existence of time 
1 
denied. Consequently there i s no way out of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y . 
Thi s argument i s supported by another argument of a d i f f e r -
ent kind which comes very close to 0. D. Broad's objection to A r i s t o t l e 
because the l a t t e r considered time as a quality of events. Broad says, 
•We can not reduce changes of time to changes i n time, since time would 
2 
then need another time to change i n , and so on ad in f in i tum, ' The 
g i s t of the argument mentioned by Avicenna and A l - R a z i i s t h i s : Eve iy 
motion must have a s p e c i f i c time, as i t has a s p e c i f i c place, Supp-
1, Avice nna, a l - ^ h i f a * , op. c i t , , v o l . I , p p . 68-69 j c f , A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , 
10,218a, 3-30. 
2. O .D .Broad ,Sc i ent i f i c Thou^t,(London,l923) ,p.65. 
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osing that oertetin motions took place at the same time, a l l these 
times would need another time to comprehend them, and so on ad 
in f in i tum. I n th i s case, an i n f i n i t e number of times would imply 
an i n f i n i t e number of motions, time being consequent upon motion; 
an i n f i n i t e number of motions would imply an i n f i n i t e number of movables, 
motion depending upon the movable; and an i n f i n i t e number of movables 
would imply an i n f i n i t e number of p laces , every movable inhering i n a 
p lace . But t h i s i s absurd because an inf ini tude of dimensions i s 
impossible,^ 
Another fac t ion who denied escternal existence to time are 
those who bel ieved that time has existence only i n the estimative 
f a c u l t y . I n holding t h i s view, they were urged by the above mentioned 
d i f f i c u l t i e s on the one hand, and by the necessity that time should have ' 
some kind of existence on the other. As we have seen, according to 
I b n S i n a , t h i s facu l ty perceives the meaning of the p a r t i c u l a r sensible 
objects and helps to d i f f erent ia t e betv;een the right inferences and the 
2 
wrong ones. Our b e l i e f s and judgements are re lated to t h i s facu l ty . 
Judgements fomed by t h i s f a c u l t y are , according to Ibn S i n a , gener-
a l l y u n r e l i a b l e . I t i s , therefore , i n the estimative that the foim of 
1, Avicenna, a l -Sh i fa* , op, c i t , , v o l . I , p , 69; a l - R a z I , op, c i t . , v o l , I , p , 643, 
2. M,Wali-ur^Rahman,The Psychology of Ibn S^na.in I s lamic Gu1,ture^ 
vol ,IX,(Hyderabad, 1935)»p.354;see also S.Pines,Nouvelles E t u d e s , . , 
op.cit.,pp,47-50. 
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the motion which has taken place between the two points i s 
perceived as a whole, and consequently the notion to measure 
1 
t h i s passage i s formed i n t h i s f a c u l t y . 
The d i f f i c u l t y which derives from the grammatical analysis 
of the instant (waqt) i s manifested i n the view that time i s a mere 
aggregate of instants (awqat). When, for example, we say that such 
and such an event w i l l occur two days l a t e r , we mark an instant , 
because i t announces an imagined event by means of a well-known 
event, namely, a f t e r the sun has r i s e n twice. Time i s , then, accor-
ding to t h i s view, the aggregate of such instants determined by the 
2 
r e l a t i o n between two events, one imagined and the other well-known. 
Those who accepted the r e a l i t y of time regarded i t as an 
e ternal substance ex i s t ing necessar i ly (wajib al-wujud). Thi s view 
was held by l iranshahrl and Abu Bakr Zakariyya a l R a z i . As we s h a l l 
deal with t h i s view l a t e r , we s h a l l mention t h e i r argument b r i e f l y . 
According to them, every attempt to. remove time must i n fac t e s t -
abl i sh i t s r e a l i t y , s ince such removal would imply e i ther a p r i o r or 
a poster ior period of t ime. From t h i s they i n f e r that time must be 
eternal and ex i s t neces sar i l y by i t s e l f , without depending on motion, 
1. Avioennaja l -Shi fa? ,op ,c i t . ,vo l , I ,pp .69-70 , 
2. I b i d , , v o l , I , p , 7 0 ; a l - R a z i , o p , c i t , , v o l , I , p , 6 2 j . 7 j s e e also Louis 
Massignon,Time i n Is lamie Thought.in Man and Time.(Papers from 
the Eranos Yearbooks) ,ed,by J,Campbell,(London, 1958) ,p , 111, 
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They, then, go on to d i s t inguish between absolute time (dahr) and 
l imi t ed time. Absolute time i s that which i s abstracted from 
motion, whereas r e l a t i v e time i s that which ex i s t s together with 
motion, i n which respect i t i s the measure of motion. We see 
here a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between two concepts which were sharply d i s t -
inguished by the A r i s t o t e l i a n s . 
Various Untenable Def in i t ions of Time -
Various attempts to give a sa t i s fac tory d e f i n i t i o n of 
time were made i n Antiquity , Avicenna subsumes them under four 
categories: (a) Time i s i d e n t i f i e d with motion, (b) Time i s the 
motion of the c e l e s t i a l sphere (harakat a l - f a l a k ) , ( c ) i t i s one 
complete revolution of the c e l e s t i a l sphere, (d) i t i s the c e l e s t i a l 
2 
sphere i t s e l f . As i t appears, the f i r s t three def in i t ions of time 
are s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same i n that they a l l ident i fy time with 
motion. 
Those who held the f i r s t view argued that among the ex i s t ing 
things around us motion i s the only thing which i s divided into past 
and f u t u r e . That which has t h i s description must be time. They 
1. Avicenna, a l - S h i f S * , op. c i t , , v o l , I , p , 70; a l -Razx, op, c i t , , v o l , I , p p , 651 -
652, 
2, Avi cenna, a l - S h i f a ' , op. c i t , , vo l , I , p, 70; c f , A r i s t o t l e ,Phys i c s , I V , 10, 
2l8b,30f.and 5-20;Sextus Empiricus,Adv. Math., X,170ff.;see also f o r 
Sextus EmpiriGus,Chroust,op.cit . ,pp,50-51. 
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f ur ther s a i d that time ex i s t s only when we perceive motion. When, 
f o r example, we are d i s tressed , we f i n d the time hanging on because 
motion l ingers on i n our memory owing to sudh d i s t r e s s . But i n a 
state of happiness, motion passes away quickly i n our reco l l ec t ion . 
He who i s not aware of motion i s not aware of time. This was j u s t 
the case with the Companions of "tJhe Gave, They had no consciousness 
of the intervening time when they woke up. I n A r i s t o t l e t h i s i s ex-
emplif ied by the fabled sleepers of Sard in ia . Avicenna mentions 
A r i s t o t l e as saying that A r i s t o t l e ' s fabled sleepers are h i s t o r i c a l l y 
before the Companions of the Cave. (Ashab a l - k a h f ) . Avicenna i n 
2 3 
al-WaJah, and A r i s t o t l e i n Physics,-^ c i te t h i s example f o r a d i f f -
erent purpose. T h e i r aim i s to prove the connections between time 
and change, not to i d e n t i f y time with motion. 
Following A r i s t o t l e , Avicenna refutes th i s argument, saying 
that there e x i s t s a di f ference between time and motion. Motion may 
be f a s t or slow, whereas time i s uniform and i t can only be short or 
long. Two motions may occur at the same time, whereas two times can-
not be simultaneous. On the other hand, such expressions as "huwe^a" 
(immediately), "ba^tatan" ( a l l of a sudden), 'now' and 'previously' 
h. 
cannot be r e l a t e d to m^)tion. 
1. A v i c e n n a , a l - S h i f a * , o p . c i t . , v o l . I , p . 7 0 ; c f . a l - R a z i , o p . c i t . , v o l , I , 
p.653. 
2. Avioenna,al-Najah,ed,by Kurd1,(Cairo,1357/l938),p,1l6, 
3. Aristotle,Physics,IV,11,218b,20-25. 
4. Av icenna ,a l -Sh i fa* ,op , c i t . , vo 1.1,p.71;al-f iazi ,op,oit . ,vol ,I ,p.653; 
c f . A r i s t o t l e ,Physios,IV,11,218b,15-20. 
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The second view, according to Simplioius, was wrongly 
a t tr ibuted to Plato by Eudemus, Theophrastus, and Alexander. 
S impl ic ius argues that P la to , l i k e A r i s t o t l e , he ld time to be only 
1 
the measure of motion. Those who he ld that time i s the prime 
motion of the c e l e s t i a l sphere (harakat a l - * u l a a l - f a l a k ) bel ieved 
that i t i s the fa s t e s t of motions, since the highest c e l e s t i a l 
spheres traverses a longer distance than the other c e l e s t i a l spheres 
during the same i n t e r v a l of time. According to Avicenna t h i s s imul-
-t-aneityi,.- indicates something other than the c e l e s t i a l motions. 
Rather i t indicates an en t i ty to which a l l c e l e s t i a l motions are r e l -
ated. This ent i ty , namely time, i s , therefore, e s s e n t i a l l y d i f ferent 
from the c e l e s t i a l motions. 
I n the same ve in , Avicenna eliminates the view that the 
oonourrence of two events, one being well-known and the other imag-
3 
ined, i s indicat ive of and i d e n t i c a l with time. 
The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of time with one complete revolution of 
the c e l e s t i a l sphere i s refuted by Avicenna, as also by A r i s t o t l e , 
by the f a c t that every part of time i s time, whereas a part of the 
revolut ion i s not a revolut ion, 
1. H.A.Wolfson,Crescas' Cr i t ique of Aristotle,op.cit. ,pp.634-635. 
2 , Avi ce nna, a l - S h i f i * , op. c i t . , v o l . I , p. 71. 
3. Ibidem, 
k» Ibidem; c f . A r i s t o t l e ,Physics,IV,10,218b, 1-5. 
Simpl ic ius reports that the Pyfchagore^s held that time 
i s the sphere i t s e l f . He i s also of the opinion that the Pythag-
oreans probably derived t h i s notion from the assert ion of Archytas who 
s a i d that the un iversa l time i s the i n t e r v a l of the nature of the 
1 
universe, A r i s t o t l e holds t h i s view to be too naive to require a 
2 
re futa t ion . L a t e r , the Neo-Platosiist Plotinus of fers a summary '..i" 
re futat ion of t h i s view, saying that th i s can hardly be true i f time 
i s not the motion of the sphere, s ince i t was thought to be the sphere 
on account of the motion.^ Avicenna and a l - R a z l ' s refutat ion i s some-
what d i f f e r e n t . Both argue that t h e i r view depends on the premise that 
everything inheres both i n the sphere and i n time . But t h i s premise 
i s wrong f o r the f a c t that the sphere i t s e l f i s also i n time, whereas 
the sphere i s not i n another sphere,^ 
The above mentioned def in i t ions of time are variously found 
i n Ant iqui ty , Keo-Platonis t s , and i n Muslim and Jewish phi losophical 
l i t e r a t u r e . A r i s t o t l e mentions two untenable views held by the 
e a r l i e r w r i t e r s : (a) Time i s the motion of the whdfe, (b) I t i s the 
sphere i t s e l f . The former view i s generally accepted to be that pf' 
1. H,A.Wolfson,Crescas' C r i t i q u e . . , o p . c i t . , p . 6 3 5 . 
2. A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , 10, 218b,4. 
3. P lo t inus ,Enneads^III ,8 ,20 , 
4. Avicenna, al-Shifa-*, dp. c i t . , v o l . I , p . 71; a l - R a z I , op. c i t . , v o l . I , p . 653. 
5. Ar i s to t l e ,Phys i c s , IV ,10 ,218b , 1, 
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of P l a t o , This i s a controvers ia l point. Since the cosmological 
motive plays an important role i n P la to ' s philosophy both the above 
d e f i n i t i o n and the A r i s t o t e l i a n one are iribfewnt i n h i s philosophy. 
According to him, the c e l e s t i a l movements not only measure time, but 
also ac tua l ly constitute i t , 
2 
The Scept ic , Sextus Empiricus mentions the e a r l i e r views, 
and subjects them to a pungent c r i t i c i s m . He mentions (a) the S to i c 
view that time i s the i n t e r v a l of the motion of the whole, (b) the 
view at tr ibuted by some to P lato that i t i s the axEb.tial motion of the 
universe , (o) the A r i s t o t e l i a n view that i t i s the number of 'before' 
and ' a f t e r S i n motion, (d) the A r i s t o t e l i a n , S trato ' s view that time 
i s the measure of motion and r e s t , (e) the Epicurean view that i t i s a 
contingent product of contingent products, ( f ) Aenesidemus' view 
6hat i t i s corporeal , 
P lot inus mentions three views, namely, that (a) tinae i s 
motion, (b) i t i s that which i s moved, and (c) i t i s something 
pertaining to motion. 
I n the phi losophical encyclopedia of the Ikhwan a l - § a f a , we 
encounter the mention of four views, namely (a) the popular view that 
time i s the passage of years , months, days and hours, (b) i t i s the 
1. P l a t o , Timaeus, 37e, I f f ; 38b, 6ff; 39b,2ff; see also P.Solmsen 
A r i s t o t l e ' s System of the Physical Vorld, (ithaca^iNew York,1960) 
p.l45. 
2. S , Empiricus, Adv,Math., X , I70f f ; see also Ghroust, o p . o i t . , 
pp.50-53. 
3. P lo t inus , Snneads, 111,7,6. 
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number of the repeated motion of the c e l e s t i a l sphere, (c) i t i s 
the duration numbered by the motions of the c e l e s t i a l sphere, and 
1 
(d) time does not belong to the realm of ex i s t ing things. 
The Jewish philosopher a l - T a b r i z l mentions four views: 
(a) time e x i s t s i n i t s e l f , i s nei ther a body nor anything belonging 
to body, but i s something whidi has necessary existence i n v ir tue 
of i t s e l f , (b) i t i s the duration which becomes numerically determined 
by the motion of the c e l e s t i a l sphere, (c) i t i s the body that encom-
passes a l l the bodies of the universe, namely the c e l e s t i a l equator 
(da'irah)mu*addil a l - n a h a r ) , and (d) i t i s the motion of the ce l e s -
2 
t i a l equator. 
Abu'1-Barakat d i f f eren t ia t e s ten views: (a) time i s a term 
without meaning (innahu ism l a ma*na. l a h ) , (b) i t has an e n t i t y 
perceived by the senses, namely motion, (c) i t i s not perceived by 
the senses, but i s conceived i n the mind as the measure of motion 
(miqdar a l -harakah) , (d) i t i s a substance, (e) i t i s an accident, 
( f ) i t i s ne i ther substance nor accident (g) i t e x i s t s , (h) i t does 
not e x i s t , ( i ) i t has a perroanent existence, ( j ) i t has an unendur^ j^ag 
existence ( lahu wujudan ^ a y r qarr) ,^ 
1, R a s a ' i l I'^vfSn a l - Q a f S , ( B e i r u t , 1376/1957),vol.II,p. 17. 
2, ¥^o l f son ,Cresoas ' Crit ique, , ,op.cit . ,pp.635-636. 
3, Abu' 1-Barakat,K. al-MuH abar, op. o i t , , vo l . I l l , p . 36, 
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I , The A r i s t o t e l i a n View of Time 
a) Time and Motion. 
Two motions wi th in the same distance and at the same 
v e l o c i t y take place simultaneously, but vfith a d i f ferent ve loc i ty 
one traverses l e s s and the other longer distance :Ui i n the same 
period of time. Or one may s t a r t e a r l i e r and the other l a t e r at the 
same ve loc i ty ,and the former, then, reaches the terminating point 
before the l a t t e r i n the same period of time. Therefore there ex is ts 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r moving with greater, equal or l e s s ve loc i ty , 
and consequently of t h e i r travers ing longer, equal or l e s s distance. 
Thi s p o s s i b i l i t y has a corresponding measure and i s connected with 
motion. T h i s measure may be that of distance, or that of the movable. 
I t can not be the measure of distance, f or otherwise equal distances 
would always be traversed at the same time. I t can not be the measure 
of the movable e i ther , f o r , otherwise, with the increase and decrease 
oifi t h i s measure, there would be a corresponding increase or decrease 
of the movable. Then i t i s neither the measure of that which i s 
moved nor that of distance. On the other hand, i t i s commonly known 
that t h i s measure i s not the motion i t s e l f , nor i s i t the fastness or 
slowness. S i m i l a r l y i t cannot subs is t by i t s e l f , s ince i t i s l i a b l e to 
1, Yvjr the deta i led analys i s of A r i s t o t l e ' s view of time see J , P , 
Gallahan,Pour Views of Time i n Ancient Philosophy,(Cambridge, 
Massachusattes,1948),pp,38-86, 
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elapse, and everjrbhing v/hioh i s l i a b l e to elapse i s corrup-
t i b l e ( f a s a d ) . Therefore th i s ineasure needs a substratum. We 
have already shown that i t s prime substratum.cannot be the matter 
of the movable. I t must, then, inhere In a substratum through the 
medium of a d i spos i t ion . I t i s not the measure o f a permanent 
d i spos i t ion following matter. I t i s , then, the measure o f an 
uniSnittfiing d ispos i t ion , namely motion. I n t h i s connection 
Avicenna mentions the Companions of the Cave. 
I b n SinS. i s very emphatic on the f a c t that time has no 
connection with r e s t , nor does i t measure i t except acc idental ly 
(* amma al-sukun fa' l-zaman l a yata^allaqu b i h i wa l a yuqaddiru 
• * i l l a b i ' l - ' - a r a d ) . As we have seen, both i n Avicenna and A r i s t o t l e , 
res t i s not the absolute pr ivat ion of motion. • Sons thing i s s a i d to 
be at re s t when i t i s deprived of motion, though i t i s capable of 
motion. I t i s , therefore, t h i s kind of r e s t which i s measured by 
time. 
Motion i s d i v i s i b l e into p r i o r and posterior . P r i o r and 
poster ior are manifested i n distance by means of motion, since pr ior 
and pos ter ior i n motion are irrevers ible , though i t i s not so i n distance. 
1. Avicenna, al-ghifa'*, o p . c i t . , V o l . 1 . , p ,72;cf .a l -Wajah,op,c i t , , 
PP.115-116. 
2, Avicenna, a l - S h i f S ' , o p . c i t . , V o l . I . , p.80; 'Uyun al-Hikmah, ed. by 
A. Badawi, (Ca iro , 1954), p .28 . , c f ; A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s . , I V . , 
12, 221b, 5-20. 
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I n so f a r as motion possesses p r i o r and poster ior , i t i s numer-
able . I t i s t h i s numerable aspect of motion that i s c a l l e d time. 
Therefore time i s the number (^adad) of motion i n so f a r as the 
l a t t e r i s divided into p r i o r and poster ior . Motion and time are , 
according to Ibn S i n a , inseparable; time would not ex is t without, 
motion, and motion without time.'' As in A r i s t o t l e , motion implies 
every k ind of change, I b n S I h a even goes so f a r as to Say that ttie 
natural bodies ( a l - j i s m a l - t a b i ^ i ) are i n time not i n virtue of 
t h e i r essences but because they are i n motion, 
b) Time as Measure and as Number. 
A r i s t o t l e generally uses i n h i s de f in i t i on of time the term 
number' and occas ional ly the word 'measure)^ His use of the term 
'number' v/as made the subject of c r i t i c i s m . His d i s c i p l e , Strato of 
Lampasacus argues that any number as such i s def in i te and f i n i t e 
quantity; time, hov/ever, i s a continuous and, hence indef in i te quan-
t i t y or r e l a t i o n which f o r t h i s very reason cannot be counted i n the 
same manner as we count, f o r instance, f i n i t e and def in i te numbers.-^ 
1. Avice nna, a l - S h i f a * , op, c i t , , v o l . I , p . 73 • 
2. I b i d . , p , 8 0 ; 'Uyun a l -Hikraah ,op ,c i t , ,p ,28 ;c f ,Ar i s to t l e ,Phys ic s , 
IV,12,221b,25-30, 
3. Aristotle,Physics,IV,11,219b,1-2. 
4. Aris tot le ,Physics , IV, l2 ,220b, l5 . 
5. Chroust ,op ,c i t , ,p ,37 . 
150. 
I n Muslim Philosophy, the IMiwan a l - S a f a, among the 
various def in i t ions of time, c i t e the one which conforms to the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n d e f i n i t i o n , namely, that i t i s the number of the motion 
1 
of the c e l e s t i a l sphere. A l - K i n d l has the de f in i t ion that time i s the 
number which numbers motion. He, however, spec i f i e s what he means 
by number i n t h i s context. According to him number has two aspects. 
I t i s known to be e i ther discrete or continuous,(muttasi l) . Time, 
he says , cannot be a discrete quantity, then i t must be a cont in-
uous quantity,^ 
I b n SSria, i n h i s e a r l i e r work, K , a l - ^ i f a * uses both 'number' 
(*adad) and 'measure' (miqdar) i n h i s de f in i t ion of time. However, 
according to him, time i s a continuous quantity. Time numbers motion 
by means of p r i o r and poster ior i n i t . Therefore, time numbers acc-
ording to that which i s numbered, namely,the pr ior and poster ior i n 
motion. Time i s not a number i n the way an abstract number i s , f o r 
example ten ,^ 
The reason f o r c a l l i n g time as the measure or the number 
according to p r i o r and poster ior i s that p r i o r and posterior endows 
time with number or with a measure. P r i o r and posterior are , «tt-*lie 
1. R a s a ' i l IMiwan a l - ^ a f a , o p , c i t . , v o l . I I , p . 3 6 . 
2. R a s ^ i l a l -Kinda a l -Pa lsaf iyyahjed .by Abu R!EjJiij,(Oairo,l955),vol.lS 
p.34. 
3. Avicenna ,a l -Sh i fa> ,op .c i t . , vo l . I ,pp .74 and 78; of . A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , 
IV,12,220b,10-20. 
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on the other hand, determined i n re la t ion to the present 'now'. 
I n t h i s respect 'now' i s considered as the unit which numbers 
1 -
time, Avicenna, i n h i s l a t e r books, suoli as a l -Najah and *Uyun 
2 
al-Hilonah, drops the word 'number* and uses instead 'measure'. 
T h i s i s , I th ink, to show that time i s continuous, and what i s con-
tinuous cannot be numbered, but only measured, 
c) Time and the Uow. 
As we have already indicated, f or Avicenna, as for A r i s t o t l e , 
time, distance and motion are corresponding e n t i t i e s : Continuity i s 
predicated of them. Time, being continuous (muttasi l ) has a l i m i t 
(hadd) perceived i n the imagination. This l i m i t i s c a l l e d 'now'. Does 
the 'now' ac tua l ly e x i s t ? I f i t has no actual existence, i n what sense 
does i t ex i s t? These are the questions to which Avicenna t r i e s to 
answer. According to him, i t has no actual existence, because i f time 
had a l i m i t , the continuity of time would be disrupted, which i s absurd.^ 
I f the 'now' a c t u a l l y ex is ted , the proper place f o r i t 
would e i t h e r be at the beginning or at the end of time. But i t can 
not be at the beginning of t ime, because time would then ex i s t a f t e r 
a non-existent p r i o r ( l a qabla l a h ) , which i s absurd. Therefore i t has 
1, Avicenna ,a l -Najah ,op ,c i t . ,p ,116 , 
2 , Avicenna, ^ y n n al -IJ ikmah,op.c i t . ,p ,28 , 
3, Avicenna, a l - S h i f a * , op. c i t . , v o l . I , p . 74. 
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a p r i o r period with which i t i s continuous (muttasilan b i h i ) . 
This l i m i t , then, does not divide the pr ior and poster ior , rather 
i t connects them. Nor can t h i s l i m i t be at the end of time. I f 
t h i s l i m i t had no posterior period, heither the Necessary Being 
(wajib al-wu-jad), nor the absolute p o s s i b i l i t y would have any e x i s t -
ence. But the f a c t i s that the Necessary Being and the absolute 
p o s s i b i l i t y cannot be removed. Therefore i t must have a posterior 
period. I n t h i s respect 'now' would again be the connecting l i n k , 
and not the dividing p r i n c i p l e . Time, therefore, has no actual 'now', 
but a potent ia l 'now'. Thi s potent ia l i ty of the 'now' i s proximate to 
a c t u a l i t y (al-quwwat a l - q a r i b min a l - f i ' l ) , that i s , tine i s always 
capable of being imagined as having i n i t s e l f a 'now' e i ther ex 
hypothesi, or by means of motion; , l i k e the beginning of sunrise and 
2 
that of sunset, 
'Now', when considered i n r e l a t i o n to time, i s always at a 
beginning and an end, and i t i s i n continuous f l u x , having no beg-
inning. That which i s i n motion, that which i s at re s t , that which 
i s generated or corrupted have no i n i t i a l now i n which to move or to 
be at r e s t , generated or corrupted, f o r time can potent ia l ly be d iv -
ided ad in f in i tum,^ 
1, Ibid,,pp,74-75. 
2, Ib id , ,p .75 . 
3, Ibidem, 
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'Now' i s encompassed by 'past' and ' future' which con-
s t i t u t e time. And time i s l imi ted by 'now'. I n t h i s respect, now 
1 
may be compared to the extremity of a moving body. This extremity 
const i tut ing a point i s imagined to produce by i t s motion a l i n e . I n 
the same way, i t may be sa id that i n time and i n motion there i s some-
thing corresponding to a point which produces time and motion. As 
the extremity of the moving body produces a continuous motion, so the 
'now' produces a continuous time. Therefore, to the extremity of the 
moving body corresponds a point i n distance and a 'now' i n time. 
Since the extremity of the moving body may be thought to be i n d i v i s -
i b l e , the 'now' which we have considered may accordingly be considered 
to be i n d i v i s i b l e . I t i s by means of 'now' that the p r i o r and pos-
t e r i o r i n time can be dist inguished. I n t h i s sense, 'now' i s most 
2 
deserving to be a unit by which to number. 
As we have already seen, the pr ior and posterior are produced 
by motion i n r e l a t i o n to dis tance . Therefore motion numbers time by 
producing the nimiber of time, namely, the pr ior and posterior , and 
time numbers motion because i t i s the number of motion. According 
to I b n S i n a , time numbers motion i n two ways: F i r s t l y i t endows 
motion with a measure, and secondly i t determines more or l e s s the 
quantity of i t s extension (kammiyyat qadriha). S i m i l a r l y , motion 
1. Ib id , ,p .76 . 
2. Ib id , ,p ,77 . 
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measures time i n the way that i t detemines i t s duration i n so f a r 
as i t brings into being i n time the p r i o r and posterior. This i s 
l i k e s i g n i f y i n g the measure with the measured and the ineasured with 
the measure. F o r exairaple, sometimes distance detemines the extent 
of motion and sometimes motion that of distance. This i s the case 
when we say the motion of two parasBngs and the distance of one ramyah 
(the distance of a bow-shot). However, one of them endows the other 
with a measure, that thing being e s sen t ia l l y the measure. Since time 
i s , i n essence,- continuous, i t can be said to. be. long or short, and 
i n so f a r as i t i s the number i n re la t ion to p r i o r and posterior,- i t 
1 
can be s a i d to be much or l i t t l e , 
d) The R e a l i t y of Time -
Leaving aside the theories concerning the unrea l i ty of 
time, we may, now, ask: does time have an existence i n external 
r e a l i t y ? Or does i t only ex i s t i n the mind? A r i s t o t l e attempts to 
compromise these two aspects. According to him, time i s vQ&l because 
i t ex i s t s together with motion, and i t i s conceptual because the soul 
or the mind i s a means of Judging the number of motion. Even when he 
t r i e s to show the r e l a t i o n between the mind and the existence of time, 
he speaks i n terms of change which occur i n our thoughts. For h m , 
such change i n our thoughts i s adequate f o r the perception of time. 
1. I b i d , , v o l . I , p . 7 7 . 
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However, t h i s change i n our thoughts has no better place than the 
change i n general . A r i s t o t l e ' s intention i s , therefore, that 
motion and time are inseparable whether the former occurs i n the 
mind or i n external r e a l i t y . 
Avioenna accentuates the r e a l i t y of time. F o r t h i s he 
resorts to the r e l a t i o n subsis t ing between motion and time. I f time, 
he says , did not ex i s t i n external r e a l i t y , there would ex i s t no 
p o s s i b i l i t y of motion's t ravers ing varying distances at di f ferent 
speeds. This p o s s i b i l i t y has a corresponding measure, namely, tiune. 
Therefore, the existence of time i s not due to the estimative f a c -
2 
u l t y ; i t i s r e a l . 
Time, however, has a weaker existence than motion, because 
i t depends upon motion. I t s existence i s always i n the process of 
becoming, i n the sense that between the two imaginary 'nows' there i s 
something we c a l l time. Therefore, those who considered time as having 
an existence merely i n the 'now' are i n the wrong, since time i n no way 
ex i s t s i n the 'now'.^ Nor does time exist i n time, since there are 
things which do not ex i s t i n place , and things which do not ex i s t 
i n time: time belongs to the second category and place to the f i r s t . 
1. A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , 14,223a,25-30. 
2. Avicenna.a l -Shi fa* . .op.oit . , vol .1 ,p.78. 
3. Ibidem. 
4 . Ibidem. 
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e) The Ultimate Cause of Time -
As we have already seen, Ar i s to t l e and Avicenna agree on 
the f a c t that time i s an accident of motion. What kind of motion i s 
i t of which time i s an accident? Time does not depend f o r i t s e x i s t -
ence on every motion, or e l se eveiy motion would have a time s p e c i f i c to i t 
and consequently there would e x i s t many times. Time, therefore , depends 
f o r i t s existence on that motion which i s uniform and has no l i m i t s . 
2 
By the u n i f o m and unlimited motion Avicenna means c e l e s t i a l motion. 
Avicenna i s w e l l aware of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n accept-
ing the u n i f o m c e l e s t i a l motion as the basis f o r the existence of 
time. Someone may ask, he says, ' i f such a motion did not e x i s t , 
would not time be non-existent?(yafq,idu). Avicenna encounters t h i s 
argument by saying that the c i r c u l a r motion i s due to a round body 
i n v i r tue of whicih direct ions e x i s t . Therefore, the remaining cate-
gories of motion, namely, the r e c t i l i n e a r , natural and violent motions, 
depend f o r t h e i r existence on the c i r c u l a r motion. I f we r e l y , he 
goes on, on the imagination f o r the f a c t that we remove the c i r c u l a r 
motion, i n the imagination and prove the r e a l i t y of a f i n i t e r e c t i l -
inear motion, i n t h i s way w i l l be establ ished the r e a l i t y of the l imi ted 
time (zaman mahdud). However, the data obtained from the imagination 
1, I b i d . , v o l . I , p p . 7 8 - 7 9 . 
2. Avicenna, al-NaJ ah, op. c i t . , p . 118; of .Ar i s to t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , 11+, 223b, 
15-24. 
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are not r e l i a b l e and are contradictory to the f a c t s of external 
r e a l i t y . Therefore, time i s dependent f o r i t s existence on the 
c i r c u l a r motion. I t numbers t h i s motion as we l l as others. 
I s time created or eternal? Like A r i s t o t l e , Avicenna i s 
of the opinion that i t i s e t erna l , and argues from the i n f i n i t e 
d i v i s i b i l i t y of motion and time. Only God precedes them. But God's 
p r i o r i t y to time and motion i s not a temporal p r i o r i t y , rather i t i s 
a p r i o r i t y i n essence. Thi s i s l i k e the e f fus ion of the l ight from 
the sun, and l i k e the movement of the key with the movement of the 
hand. I f time were created i n t m e , i t s creat ion would be a f t e r a 
period of non-existence, namely a f t e r a non-existent before. I t would, 
then, be a f t e r a before and before an af ter ; and what i s so, i s not the 
beginning of before, and what i s not the beginning of before, i s not 
the beginning of t ime. Time, then, has an o r i g i n a l creat ion ( ibda*) , 
nfett preceded by anything except God, This i s the case with motion, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y with the c i r c u l a r motion, 
A r i s t o t l e , sympathising with the Heracl i tean view, makes 
mention of the c y c l i c a l nature of time. According to him, hvmaxi a f f a i r s 
form a c i r c l e , and that there i s a c i r c l e i n other things that have a 
3 
movement according to nature. The same opinions recur i n rotat ion 
1. Avicenna, a l - ^ i f a * , op. c i t . , v o l . I , p. 79. 
2. Avicenna ,a l -Najah ,op .c i t . ,p .117 . 
3 . A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , Hi-, 223b, 2i|.-30. 
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1 among men, not once or twicje or occasional ly but i n f i n i t e l y often. 
The reason why A r i s t o t l e mentions t h i s i s that there i s a close 
connection between time and the c i r c u l a r motion. A r i s t o t l e , therefore , 
d i f f e r s fundamentally from Heraol i tus i n that the l a t t e r i n s i s t s on 
the e t e r n i t y of motion as we l l as the never-ceasing a l ternat ion of a 
c y c l i c destruct ion and regeneration of i n f i n i t e , co-exist ing or succeeding 
worlds or world-periods. The universe i s a l ternate ly bom from f i r e and 
2 
again dissolved into f i r e i n r i g i d l y f i xed periods to a l l e t ern i ty . 
T h i s l a t t e r view was l a t e r incorporated into the I s m a ' i l i a n cosmogony.*^ 
By connecting time with the c i r c u l a r motion, Avicenna, l ike 
A r i s t o t l e , i s under the influence of the older cosmological theories 
derived from Babylonian astrology. 
Avicenna, l i k e A r i s t o t l e , goes on to s t u l t i f y the mythological 
4 
. theories that time i s the great changer and destroyer. This idea i s 
found i n Greek mythology as we l l as i n I r a n i a n philosophico-religious 
systems. I n Greek mythology Ohronos, which i s iden t i f i ed with the 
i n f i n i t e time, devours h i s own chi ldren.^ I n I r a n , Zurvan, the Supreme 
D e i t y , i s i d e n t i c a l with the I n f i n i t e Time who creates Ohrmazd and 
Ahriman. But Zurvanism has a touch of optimism, since OhrmaM, whocj. 
1. Ar i s to t l e ,Metaphys ics , I ,3 ,339b ,28f f . 
2. Ghrous t ,op . c i t . ,pp .4 -5 . 
3 . H .Gorbin ,CyGl ica l Time i n Mazdaism and I smai l i sm, in Man and Time. 
(Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks), ed.by,J.0ampbell, (London, 1958), 
p p . 1 l 5 f f . 
4. A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , 14,222b, 15-25jAvicenna,al-Shifa*,op. c i t . , v o l . I , 
p .81. 
5. C h r o u s t , o p . c i t . , p . 2 . 
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i s the pr inc ip le of Good w i l l re ign i n eternal f u t u r i t y . 
Time, according to I b n S i n a , i s not the cause of anything. 
Since a thing e x i s t s and becomes non-existent despite the subsistence 
of time, and s ince people see no manifest cause f o r i t , they re late 
i t to time. I f that thing i s praiseworthy, they praise timej but i f 
i t i s blameworthy, they blame time. However, things ex is t ing i n 
external r e a l i t y have, i n most cases ( f i akthar a l - ' a m r ) , manifest 
causes (zSQiirat a l - ^ ' i l a l ) , whereas non-existence and destruction have 
hidden causes ( k h a f i a l - * i l l a h ) , I t i s f or t h i s reason that most of the 
things which they re la te to time are t rans i tory things, l i k e , f o r 
example, forgetfulness (h i syan) , ruination, old age, destruction, and 
2 
so ODX. 
1. R. 0. Zaehner, Zurvan, a Zoroastrian Dilemma (Oxford, 1955)» p. 107. 
2, Avicenna, a l - S h i f a ' , o p . c i t . , V o l . 1 , p , 8 l . There ex i s t s a 
s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y between him and a seventeenth century-
philosopher, Gassendi who states that i f time i s not a source 
of destruct ion, i t cannot be a source of f e x i l i t y or a power 
that ripens and reveals e i ther . The most probable reason why 
i n the seventeenth century tims i t s e l f was regarded as a cause 
provoking admiration or horror according as the re su l t s of i t s 
al leged agency were b e n e f i c i a l or harmful was that knowledge of 
the r e a l causes of events was often lacking . See W, von LejrcLen, 
Seventeenth Century Metaphysics (London,19o8), p.239, 
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^ ) Things that are i n Time. 
I n what sense i s a thing i n time? This question i s the 
1 
s t a r t i n g point of both A r i s t o t l e and Avxcenna. According to 
Avioenna, a thing i s i n time i n so f a r as the notions of p r i o r and 
poster ior are predicated of i t . That which possesses the pirior and 
poster ior i s e i ther motion or something involving motion. I f i t i s 
motion, the notions of p r i o r and posterior belong to i t s essence, i f 
i t i s something which possesses motion, i t s being p r i o r and posterior 
i s due to motion. Since sometimes the species , parts and end of a 
thing are s a i d to be i n that th ing, 'pr ior ' and 'pos ter ior ' , 'now', 
'hours' and 'years' arft also s a i d to be i n time. 'Now' i n time i s l i k e 
the uni t i n number, and p r i o r and posterior are l i k e the odd and even 
numbers, and hours and days are l i k e two, three and ten i n number. 
Rest i s also i n time. Avicenna distinguishes two kinds of 
r e s t . F i r s t , i t i s pers i s t en t , enduring and e terna l , and second the 
p r i o r and poster ior occur to i t acc idental ly , because pr ior and pos-
t e r i o r to r e s t ; there ex i s t s motion. I n the l a t t e r sense, rest i s not 
an absolute pr ivat ion of motion, but i s the pr ivat ion of the motion of 
a thing of whose function i t i s to be i n motion. Therefore such rest 
i s more l i k e l y to be i n time acc identa l ly . 
1. A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , l 2 , 2 2 1 a , 5 f f . 
2. Avicenna, a l - S h i f a » , op. c i t . , v o l , I , p . 80; al-NaJah, op. c i t . , p . 118, 
3 . A v i c e n n a , a l - S h i f a » , o p . c i t . , v o l . I , p . 8 0;Gf . A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , l 2 , 2 2 l b , 
5-19. 
161. 
Various kinds of changes which resemble locomotion 
i n that they have a beginning and end are i n time, because they have 
1 
the p r i o r and poster ior . 
The things i n which e x i s t no pr ior and no posterior are not 
i n time, though they co-exist with time, Just as the world i s co-
2 
existent with a mustard-seed (a l -khardalah) , but itt not i n i t . 
A thing may be i n time i n one respect, that i s , i n so f a r as 
i t has p r i o r and poster ior , and not i n time i n another respect, that 
i s , i n so f a r as i t i s an essence or a substance. ^ 
That which i s co-existent with time but not i n time i s sa id 
to be the eternal duration (dahr) . Unchangeable beings subsist i n 
4 
eternal duration. Here, Avicenna, l i k s A r i s t o t l e re lates time to 
e terni ty , as i t has already been done by Plato according to whom time 
i s the moving image of e tern i ty .^ 
The r e l a t i o n subsist ing between the permanent things and t h e i r 
co-existence with each other constitutes a notion above eternal dur-
at ion. I t i s f i t t i n g to c a l l i t sarmad (perpetuity) . I n other words , 
1. Avicenna,al -Shifa* , o p . c i t . , v o l . I , p . 8 o ; o f . A r i s t o t l e , P h y s . , I V , l 4 , 2 2 3 a , 
1-15. 
2. Av icenna .a l -Sh i fa* ,op .c i t . . voa i . I ,p .80 . 
3 . Av icenna ,a l -Sh i fa* ,op . c i t . , v o l . I , p . 8 0 ; c f .a l -Na3ah,op.c i t . , p . 1 l 8 ; 
-^Uyun al-IJikmah, op. c i t . , pp28 . 
4 . Avicenna,al -Shifa* ,op .o i t . , v o l . I , p p . 8 0 - 8 l ; c f . A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , l 2 , 
221b,3-5. 
5. P la to ,T im. ,37d ,6 f . 
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the subsistence of every being without any ohajage and without any 
1 
r e l a t i o n to a time-period i s c a l l e d sarmad, 
f)z The Attr ibutes of Time -
Among the things which are considered to be i n time are the 
at tr ibutes ( a l - a ' r a d ) of time which are represented by c e r t a i n terms. 
By 'now' i s generally understood the term common to both past 
and fu ture . 'Now', according to A r i s t o t l e and Avicenna has two 
aspects: F i r s t i t i s every common dividing l i m i t , though i t inheres i n 
the d iv i s ions of both past and future: Second i t i s the l imi t of tajiie 
without indicat ing a connection ( a l - i ^ t i r a k ) , and i s r ig i i t l y consid-
ered i n the imagination to be the dividing term and not the connecting 
l i n k . Therefore, the dividing and unifying occur i n the same 'now', 
though they are d i f f e r e n t l y defined. I n external r e a l i t y , 'now' i s 
the connecting l i n k . Here Avicenna i s mainly interested i n the 
2 
s tructure of time as a continuous quantity. 
'Now' i s also used i n the sense of a short tione which i s 
most proximate to the present 'now'. Sometimes the duration between 
these two nows are perceptible to the mind. Just as the p r i o r i t y and 
1, A v i c e n n a , a l - S h i f a * , o p , c i t . , v o l . I , p . 8 l ; c f . « U y u n a l -Hikmah,op,c i t , , 
p . 28, 
2, Avicenna,al-Shif ic ' , o p . c i t . , v o l , I , p , 8 l , 
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p o s t e r i o r i t y of two nows to one day or to one hour. And sometimes 
these two 'nows' are so near to each other that the duration between 
them i s imperceptible to the mind. 
' A l l of a sudden' (baghtatan) refers to a time i n which an 
event occurs when i t i s not expected to occur, and i t s duration i s 
2 
so short that i t can not be apprehended. 
' I n no time' (daf^atan) has two meanings: (a) i t re fers to 
tfeeoccurrence of an event i n the 'now', and (b) i t i s the opposite of 
gradually ( q a l i l a n q a l l l a n ) . ^ 
Huwadha (immediately) re fers to a future now i n the proximity 
of the present now. The duration betv/een these two 'nov/s' cannot r e a l l y 
be discerned. ^ 
Qubayl (^ jU'S't) r e f ers to a past 'now' which i s near the present 
'now'. The duration between them can be perceived. Bu^ayd (presently) 
i s the counterpart of qubayl and re fers to the future. 
P r i o r (mutaqaddim) i n the past refers to a past time far ther 
from the present 'now'. Pos ter ior (muta*akha^ir) i n the past i s the 
1. Avioenna, a l - ^ i f a * , op. c i t . , vol .1 ,p . 81; of .Ar i s to t l e ,Phys ics , I V , 13, 
222a,10-24. 
2. Av icenna .a l -Sh i fee* ,op .c i t . , vo l . I .p .81 . 
3 . Ibidem. 
4 . Ibidem. 
5. Ibidem. 
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opposite of the p r i o r i n the pa.st. P r i o r i n the future re fers to 
the part of time which i s proximate to the present ' now', And post-
e r i o r i n the future i s the opposite of the p r i o r i n the future . I n 
the absolute sense, pr ior i s i d e n t i c a l with the past and posterior 
with the future , 
^-Qajdim with respect to time i s that which has a long duration, 
Avicenna uses t h i s term here i n the sense of 'ancient , o l d ' , I n the 
2 
absolute sense, i t i s that f o r whose age there was no beginning, 
g) Tme and Avicenna's Philosophy. 
A r i s t o t l e and Avicenna confine time to the Cosmos, Since 
the world i s e t e r n a l , time and motion must also be e ternal e i ther 
according to essence, or with respect to time. That which i s e ternal 
with respect to essence i s that whose essence has no or ig in from which 
i t e x i s t s . That which i s e terna l with respect to time i s that f o r whose 
age there i s no beginning. He also d i f ferent iates between the two 
d i s t i n c t meanings of the word ' created' . F i r s t l y , i t i s that for 
whose essence there was an o r i g i n by which i t e x i s t s , and secondly 
i t i s that f o r whose age there was a beginning, and there was a time 
when i t did not e x i s t . I n other words, there was a p r i o r period 
1. I b i d e m ; c f . A r i s t o t l e , P h y s i c s , I V , l 4 , 2 2 3 a , 4 - l 5 . 
2, Avicenna, a l - S h i f a*, op. c i t . , v o l . I , p, 81. 
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(qabliyyah) during which i t did not e x i s t , and that pr ior period 
was terminated. Everything that came to be i n time must have been 
preceded by time and matter. The existence and the non-existence of 
t h i s th ing cannot be simultaneous. Therefore, i t s existence must be 
preceded by i t s non-existence. TiVhat constitutes th i s period i s e i ther a 
quiddity perta ining to i t s essence which i n t h i s case i s time, or a 
quiddity perta ining to something other than i t s e l f , which i s i t s time. 
I n both oases i t i s a proof of the existence of time. He does not 
mean by non-existence absolute pr ivat ion , rather i t i s that which i s 
capable of existence. Avioenna gives an ontologioal meaning to the 
l o g i c a l terms such as poss ib le , necessary, and impossible. The p o s s i b i l i t y 
of existence inheres i n a substratum. This substratum i s the F i r s t 
Matter ( h y l e ) . Matter i s the rec ip ient of forms. That which i s not 
preceded by the existence of a recipient (wujad a l -qab i l ) cannot come 
to be. Therefore, matter, together with motion and time, i s e t erna l . 
They are not preceded by anything except by God. God precedes matter, 
motion, and time, not i n time, but i n essence. By creation i t must be 
understood the o r i g i n a l creat ion (al-ibda*^). I n such creation time has 
no place . Separate inte l l igences are not i n time; they precede each 
1. Avicenna,al-Najah,op.Git. ,pp.2l8-219. 
2. Ibid. ,pp.219-220. 
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other only i n rank and order, one being more to be preferred 
than the other. Even i n substant ia l things, the element of time 
i s to be b e l i t t l e d , s ince change i n substance occurs i n nb time. 
I I . Reaction against the A r i s t o t e l i a n View of Time -
The predominant element i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n view of time, 
as we have seen, i s i t s r e l a t i o n a l nature. Time stands i n a spec ia l 
r e l a t i o n to motion, but i s d i f ferent from i t . We can not . conceive 
time except with motion. Therefore, according to the A r i s t o t e l i a n s , 
since empty space i s inconceivable, empty time, f i l l e d with no 
2 
movement i s equally inconceivable, and outside the universe there 
i s neither void nor time. E t e r n i t y of time goes hand i n hand wi-th the 
e t ern i ty of the universe . A r i s t o t l e argues that Just as an i n d i v i d -
u a l ' s l i f e comprehends the ent ire time of h i s existence, so the l i f e 
of the e ternal universe encompasses a l l time and inf ini ty . '^ I n t h i s 
way, A r i s t o t l e re la tes time to e tern i ty . Here e terni ty i s i d e n t i f i e d 
with ' e terna l durat ion' , to use Avicenna's language. According to 
Avicenna, e ternal duration (dahr) , when considered i n re la t ion to 
t rans i tory things, i s c a l l e d time. But when i t i s considered i n 
r e l a t i o n to permanent th ings , i t cannot be c a l l e d time,^ This d iv i s ion 
between time and eterni ty was, I think, brought about by the fac t that 
1, Ib id . ,pp ,277 f . 
2, A r i s t o t l e , P h y s , , V I I I , 1,251 b , 1 0 ; E , Z e l l e r , A r i s t o t l e and the E a r l i e r P e r i -
p a t e t i c s , t r , by B .F .O.Cas te l l oe and J.H.Muirhead,(London,l897),vol.1,p,435. 
3 . Ar i s to t l e ,De Caelo,279a,23-28;P,Solmsen,op.cit , ,p.158, 
4 . See supra. 
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the A r i s t o t e l i a n s i n general connected time with motion, and made i t 
an accident of motion. 
Another aspect of the A r i s t o t e l i a n view of time, as we 
have seen, was that time i s composed of success ively f l e e t i n g 'nows'. 
I t i s the number of motion, i n so f a r as i t i s divided into past and 
future by the 'now', corresponding to the pr ior and poster ior i n 
motion. 
These two aspects propounded by the Ar i s to te l ians with 
respect to time came under severe attacks from various quarters. 
I t i s , as we s h a l l l a t e r show, these attacks and the re-formulation 
of the A r i s t o t e l i a n d e f i n i t i o n of time that prepared the way f o r the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of time with duration and i n t e r v a l . 
Leaving aside the Scept ics who denied our knowledge of 
r e a l i t y , and who, by so doing, readied agnosticism, the f i r s t attack 
1 
came from A r i s t o t l e ' s d i s c i p l e , Strato of Lamp.'fflacus. Although h i s 
c r i t i c i s m i s not altogether J u s t i f i a b l e , i t touches on the fundamen-
t a l weaknesses i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n view of time. He, f i r s t , questions 
the d e f i n i t i o n of time as the number of motion. According to him, 
number i s a discontinuous quantity, whereas time and motion a3re ,co.n-,_^ ,, t 
^el ler ,op .c i t . , vo l . I I ,pp .46 l -464;Anton-HerTnann Ghroust,The Meanins 
of Time xn the Ancient World, in the New Scholasticism .vol . Y Y T , 
^l7ocl^^^'ZfQll^^^^^^ Stoics,(London, 1959), 
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tinuous quant i t i es . Time i s e t erna l l y beginning and ending; with 
number t h i s i s not the case. On the other hand, the parts of any 
number ex i s t simultaneously, whereas the parts of time are always 
' i n success ion' . A r i s t o t l e and the l a t e r philosophers following 
him, e .g . , a l - K i n d i and Avicenna ^ i n fact s t re s s the point that 
by number must be understood the continuous not the discrete number. 
S t r a t o , secondly, objects to re la t ing time raer-ely to motion, f o r , 
according to him, to res t also e a r l i e r and l a t e r apply. Whyif then, 
should i t not measure res t? We are not informed whether rest i s 
taken i n the r e l a t i v e sense or i n the absolute sense. I f he uses i t 
i n the r e l a t i v e sense, t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s not J u s t i f i a b l e , f or the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n s also held that time measures res t only accidental ly , i n 
so f a r as by res t i s understood something capable of motion. I f he 
means by res t absolute r e s t , h i s c r i t i c i s m i s v a l i d . 
Strato defines time as the measure or magnitude inherent i n 
a l l act ion and a c t i v i t y , the measure or magnitude of everything that 
i s i n motion and at r e s t . He, furthermore, dist inguishes between 
time and that which i s i n time. According to him, when we say that 
1, See supra. 
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everjrthing i s i n time, we mean that the measure i s i n conformity 
with everything, v/ith a l l that becomes and a l l that i s . Conse-
quently he refuses to admit that days, months, seasons, or years 
are parts of time: they rather correspond to r e a l and def in i te 
events, while time i s only the duration of these events. I n t h i s 
view i s latent the notion of time flowing without r e l a t i o n to 
anything externa l , but i t i s doubtful that Strato was aware of t h i s . 
1 
Under the influence of Strato the Sto ics introduced into 
t h e i r de f in i t i ons of time ' i n t e r v a l ' v/hioh f i t s better the idea of • 
cont inuity . Thus Zeno defines time as 'the in terva l of movement 
which holds the measure and standard of swiftness and slowness, and 
Chrysippos, as 'the i n t e r v a l of movement i n the sense i n which i t i s 
sometimes c a l l e d the measure of swiftness and slowness', or 'the 
i n t e r v a l proper to the movement of the cosmos, and i t i s i n time that 
everything moves and exists' . Ohrysippos indicates the f in i tude of 
time on the one hand, and the in f in i tude of time on the other. F o r , 
according to the S t o i c s , the universe or the cosmos originates and 
ceases i n c y c l i c periods through a general conflagration. This Her-
ac l i t ean view forms the basis of Ohrysippos' conferring a dual meaning 
1. F o r the S to i c s see Ghroust ,op.c i t . ,pp.39-42;S.Sambursky,op.ci t . ,pp.99-
107. 
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on t ime. I n so f a r as the one cosmic period i n which the universe 
exists i s concerned, time i s f i n i t e ; i n so f a r as the e terna l ly 
recurring periodic or cyc l i c destruction and generation of the world 
i s concerned, i t i s i n f i n i t e . The cyc l i ca l nature of time was em-
phasised by Plato and i n an attenuated sense by A r i s t o t l e . Plato 's 
view is tha t motions of the heavenly bodies give r ise to time, which i s 
nothing else than the duration of t h e i r periods. A complete cosmical 
period, or perfect year has elapsed when a l l the plenatory c i rc les at 
the end of t h e i r revolut ion have reached the same point of the heaven 
of f i x e d s tars , from which they set out. S imi lar views are found i n 
2 
the philosophico-religious systems of the Orient . 
The i n f i n i t u d e of time i s also clear from the statements of 
the Stoics that time i s i n f i n i t e f o r the past as w e l l as f o r the 
future, '^ 
Prom the f a c t tha t time i s a continuum they i n f e r that i t 
i s capable of i n f i n i t e d i v i s i o n . Every part of time i s t ime, jus t as 
every part of earth or sea i s a^ain earth and sea. They believe, i n 
1. P.M.Oornford,Plato's Cosmology,(London,1937),p. 1l6;Plato,Tim.,39d; 
E.Zel ler ,Pla to and the Older Academy,(London,1888),pp.382-383; 
Ghroust, op. c i t . , pp. 27-28; J .P,C allahan, op, c i t . , p . 18. 
2. See R.C.Zaehner,op.cit . ;H.Gorbin,artiole i n Man and Time,op .c i t . , 
pp.120-121. 
3. Ohroust ,op.ci t . ,p .M;Sambursky,op.ci t . ,p . l02. 
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consequenoe, that time oeinnot be w h i t t l e d down to extensionless 
'nows'. Present i s p a r t l y f u t u i ^ and p a r t l y past. I t i s f o r t h i s 
reason tha t the time elapsed oan, according t o them, be measured by 
2 
. an arc of a c i r c l e , 
Plutarch of Chaeronae, who i s an ec lec t ic Pla tonis t ,^ 
in terpreted Plato to the e f f e c t that the world was created out of 
chaotic matter, and time together w i th i t . Time, according to him, 
i s the s ingle , orderly and hannonious motion of the universe accord-
ing t o number. He, therefore , i n accepting the temporal o r i g i n of 
the universe and the f i n i t u d e of time d i f f e r e d from A r i s t o t l e . I n 
Is lam, as we s h a l l l a t e r see.., Abu Bakr ZakariyyS al-HazI ^ fol lowed 
him i n bel ieving i n the temporal o r i g i n of the world . According to 
him, the world was formed from eternal matter. 
Galen, according to a tenth century source, held that motion 
does not produce time f o r us; i t only produces f o r us days, months 
and years. Time, accoiniing to him, exists per se and i s not con-
sequent upon motion. The same source relates on the authori ty of 
Alexander that t h i s was also Pla to ' s view. I t may therefore be 
1, Sarobursky,op,cit.,p ,l02, 
2, Ib id . ,p ,103 . 
3, For Plutarch see Ghroust,op.cit.,p,58;R."#alzer,Greek in to Arabic, 
(Oxford ,1963),p. l87 ;for P la to ' s view see a l -Shahrast i [ni ,K.al -Mila l . , 
op , c i t . , p ,288 . 
4, R,Walzer,op.cit.,p.l87;S,Pines,Some Problems of Islamic Philosophy, 
i n Islamic. Culture, vo l .XI ,no , 1, (Hyderabad, 1937),p.76. 
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i n fe r r ed from t h i s source that the view that time i s iden t i ca l 
w i th duration and absolutely independent of motion was taken over 
by Abu Bakr a l -Razl . 
Plot inus , i n h is criticism:.; of the A r i s t o t e l i a n view, may 
have been inspired by St ra to , and by the Sceptics whose main interest 
l ay i n t h e i r negative a t t i tude towards the r e a l i t y of t ime. Having 
2 
c r i t i c i s e d the views tha t time i s motion and the sphere i t s e l f , 
he considers the A r i s t o t e l i a n d e f i n i t i o n of time as the measure of 
motion according to p r i o r and poster ior . He argues that i f we con-
sider motion as a whole, how can we number i r regula r and non^uniform 
motion? What number or measure w i l l there be, or what w i l l be the 
standard of measurement? I f time i s the number of every kind of 
motion, tha t would be l i k e the number ten counting horses and oxen, 
or some measure f o r l i qu ids and solicls. This does not t e l l us iifliat 
time i s , but only what time measures. I f time i s only a number, how 
does i t d i f f e r from an abstract numberj? I f , however, i t i s a con-
tinuous quanti ty, i t w i l l have some quantity l i k e a cub i t - ru le . I t 
w i l l then be a magnitude j u s t l i k e a l i ne keeping pace wi th motion. 
But how w i l l i t measure the motion wi th which i t i s keeping pace? 
Why should the one of the two be the measure rather than the other? 
1. S.Pines,A Tenth Century Philosophical Correspondence.in the 
Proceedings of the American Academy f o r Jewish Researdh.vol.XXV 
(New York,1955),PP.111-113. ' — ' 
2. Plotinus,Enneads,111,8,1 -20;Gallahan,op. c i t . , p p . 98-102;W.R. Inee, 
The Philosophy of Plotinus,vol.I ,(London,19l8),pp .170-l71. 
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Besides an accompanying measure i s more p lausibly considered as 
a measure of the pa r t i cu l a r movement i t accompanies than of 
movement i n general. Supposing that th i s magnitude accompanying 
motion i s considered not i n connection wi th motion i n general, but 
wi th tha t pa r t i cu la r motion wi th which i t i s keeping pace, t h i s 
motion w i l l have to be continuous and u n i f o m , namely the motion of 
the universe. But s t i l l i t i s hard t o see why one should be the 
measure any more than the other. 
A r i s t o t l e and h is fo l lowers , as we have seen, are aware of 
t h i s c i r c u l a r i t y inherent i n t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n , f o r they say that 'we 
2 
measure motion by time and time by motion' . 
Plotinus goes on to inquire whether time i s independent of 
motion or dependent on i t . I f time i s considered only along wi th the 
measured'jmotion, then motion w i l l be that which i s measured, and some 
kind of magnitude again w i l l do the measuring. This implies three 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s : (a) time w i l l e i ther be the motion considered as meas-
ured by the magnitude, or (b) the magnitude that measures, or (c) that 
which uses the magnitude i n order to measure the quantity of motion. 
The f i r s t p o s s i b i l i t y amounts to the fac t that motion measures i t s e l f , 
1. Plot inus ,Enneads,III ,9,1 -23 j inge , op. c i t , , p , 171, 
2, The Philosophy of Time,ed.by R.M.Gale,(Londo'n,1968),p.3, 
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I n f a c t motion needs a continuous measure by which to be meas-
ured. But t h i s measuring magnitude w i l l then require some kind 
of measure i n order that motion may be measured by a measure that 
has i n i t s e l f a cer ta in quanti ty. Time, being continuous, i s i n -
capable of measuring anything unless something else has provided i t 
w i t h a measure and divided i t s unbroken cont inu i ty . Time then w i l l 
be^not the magnitude accompanying the movement, but that numerical 
value by which both motion and t h i s magnitude accompanying motion 
are estimated. Plot inus wonders how th is abstract number can measure 
the continuous magnitude accompanying the motion i n order to divide i t 
1 
in to uni ts of measure by which motion can be measured. 
Even i f we should discover a way i n which th i s abstract 
number could measure, we should not discover time measuring, but 
only a cer ta in amount of t ime, which i s something d i f f e r e n t from 
2 
t ime. Time i s not a mere func t ion of providing a quantitative measure. 
Someone might say that time i s a number that measures from 
without , l i k e the tens applied to the reckoning of the horses and 
cows without being inherent i n them. But th i s does not t e l l - u s what 
time i s i n i t s e l f before i t measures, i n the same way as we can t e l l 
what the number t e n i s i n i t s own proper nature,'^ 
1, Plotinus,Enneads,III,9,23-43;Callahan,op. c i t . ,pp. 109-111, 
2, Plotinus ,Enneads, I I I , 9»44-46;0allahan, op. c i t . , p , 111, 
3, Plotinus,Enneads,i i i ,9 ,47-51 ;Callahan,op.cit.,pp.111-112, 
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Plot inus , fur ther ,asks , ' i s time that which accompanies 
motion and measures i t according to p r io r and posterior? This i s 
u n l i k e l y , because we are s t i l l l e f t asking what t h i s th ing i s that 
measures according to p r i o r and posterior . On the other hand, that 
which measures according to p r i o r and posterior must measure accord-
ing to t ime . Therefore, t h i s t h i n g that measures motion by p r i o r 
and poster ior must i n some way be attached to time and i n contact 
1 
w i t h i t i n order to.measure. 
The p r i o r , Plotinus goes on, i s time tha t ends upon a 
cer ta in 'now', while the poster ior i s time that begins from a 'now'. 
Therefore the number that measures motion, whether motion i n general 
or regular motion, according to p r i o r and posterior i s other than 
2 
t ime, and we have not yet answered the question what time i s . 
He, then, asks, why should the mere presence of a number give 
us time? I t makes no difference whether the number i s considered 
as measured or as measuring, because i t is e i ther the one or the 
other. To make the number essential t o time i s l i k e saying tha t i a 
magnitude has not i t s f u l l quanti ty unless someone measures t h i s 
quant i ty . To take some por t ion of time and f i n d i t s rjauiberical 
1. Plotinus,Enneads,III ,9,55-60. 
2. Plotinus,Enneads,III ,9,64ff . 
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statement simply means that . t ime existed even before number was 
applied to i t . 
Again, since time i s i n f i n i t e , Plotinus wonders how can 
number apply to i t ? ^ 
Plot inus argues against the Ar is to te l ians by asking why time 
should not exis t before the soul or the mind that measures i t , f o r 
no measurement by anything i s necessary to i t s existence. This would 
only be true i f we mean by i t that time receives i t s o r i g i n from soiil. 
Time, measured or not, has the f u l l extent of i t s being. 
Throughout his c r i t i c i s m , Plotinus stresses the point that 
time i s independent of any kind of number and motion. Time does not 
measure motion, but i s measured by i t . I t i s not subjective, but r e a l . 
P lo t inus , i n h is own theory of time, relates time to e te rn i ty . 
I n t h i s , he mainly fol lows Plato v/ho declares that time i s the moving 
5 
image of e t e r n i t y . I n both Plato and Elotinus i s found the d i d i o t -
omy between the idea l and sensible world. E te rn i ty belongs to the ideal 
world, and i s , therefore , the prototype or the model upon which time i s 
shaped, 
v" 
1, Plotinus,Enneads,III ,9,68ff . 
2 .Plotinus ,Enneads,III ,9,75ff . 
3. Plotinus,Enneads,III ,9,78f . ;Callahan,op,ci t . ,p .115, 
4. Plot inus,Enneads,III ,7 ,11-l2 ; Inge,op,ci t . ,p,17l ;The Philosophy!' 
of T ime ,op ,c i t . , p ,2 . 
5 . Plato ,T i m . , 37d, 6f . ; of .Plotinus ,Enneads, I I I , 1,1. 
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I n h is discussion of e t e r n i t y , he f inds unacceptable the 
view that i d e n t i f i e s i t wi th rest i n the Ideal V/orld, He argues 
against the f i r s t view, saying that the I n t e l l e c t u a l Pr inciple 
contains pa r t i cu l a r things as parts of i t s e l f , whereas e t e rn i ty 
contains them as a u n i f i e d whole. He disposes of the second view 
by arguing that rest as such does not imply the notion of uni ty and 
lack of extension, which are the characterist ics of e t e rn i ty . 
The I n t e l l i g i b l e World, according to P lo t inus , i n a sense 
possesses un i ty , but i n another sense i t i s compacted of d ive r s i ty . 
From the point of view of d i v e r s i t y , we might c a l l i t being., i n so 
f a r as i t i s substrate, motion i n so f a r as i t possesses l i f e , rest 
i n so f a r as these several things form a un i ty . E te rn i ty i s mani-
fes ted i n the uni ty of a l l these diverse elements which forms the 
2 
basis of a connection between the ideal and v i s ib l e worlds, 
Plot inus defines e t e rn i ty as ' the mode of an authentic existence en-
shrouding the being w i t h i n being which i s instantaneous, complete, and 
ever-present t o t a l c o n t i n u i t y i ^ E te rn i ty i s the l i f e of the Ideal 
World which i s forever unchanging and possesses a l l i t s r e a l i t y i n , 
the present. I t i s i n no way accidental to the i n t e l l i g i b l e essence, 
ra ther i t receives i t s o r i g i n from i t and exists i n union wi th i t , ^ 
1, Plotinus,Enneads,III ,2,1ff , ;Callahan,op.ci t . ,pp ,89-90 ;P,V,Pistorius, 
Plot inus and Neo-Platonism,(Gambridge,1952),p,152, 
2 . Callahan, op, c i t , ,pp, 90ff, jP i s to r ius , op. c i t , , p p , 152-153. 
3. Chroust ,op.ci t . ,p ,65 ;Plotinus,Enneads,III ,7 ,3, 
4, Plotinus,Enneads,111,4,1. 
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E t e r n i t y here i s i d e n t i f i e d wi th the Eternal 'now', 
not w i th endlessness. E te rn i ty , according to Plot inus , cannot be 
endless t ime, f o r although time be endless, i t isrevertheness time. 
Plot inus also discusses e te rn i ty from the point of view of 
him who contemplates e t e rn i ty . By contemplating eterni ty ' through an 
eternal p r i n c i p a l w i t h i n oneself, one becomes l i k e i t and eternal . 
This mystical element i n his philosophy might have been the basis of 
l a t e r mysticism i n the Muslim Orient .^ 
E t e r n i t y as unextended present is closely connected wi th 
Plot inus ' theory of emanation which influenced Muslim philosophers 
i n general. I n t h i s theory of emanation time has no place. I n the 
One, who, according t o Plot inus , i s the f i r s t hypostasis, i s centered 
the eternal nature. The i n t e l l i g i b l e essence, which i s the second 
hypostasis between the One and Soul, may be regarded as an unmoving 
c i r c l e whid i has as i t s centre the One. 
Time, according t o Plot inus , makes i t s appearance i n the 
domain of Soul. I t i s , therefore, preceded by the One and I n t e l l e c t ; 
1. Plotinus,Enneads,III ,7,6;Helene vyeiss,An Interpre ta t ive Note on 
a passage i n P lo t inus ' on E t e r n i t y and Time.in the Classical 
Phi lology, v o l .XXXVI. (1941), PP. 230-239 ;P is tor ius . op. c i t . .p . 153. 
2. Blotinus,Enneads,IV,5,.1ff. 
3. For the Myst ic , i n contemplation of the true beauty of God,time i n 
every form disappears.In a state of grace (ihal) the cjhanging instant 
(waqt) i n him becomes consolidated i n the l i f e i n the eternal presence 
of God.See The Kashf al-Mahjub, t r .by Nicholson, (Leyden,1911) ,pp.367ff.; 
see also E.H.Palmer,Oriental Mysticism,(London, 1969),pp.23-24. 
4. P lo t inus ,E nneads, I ? , 4,16; Chroust, op. c i t . , p . 63, 
179. 
but i t s being posterior does not mean that i t had a beginning. 
I t i s l a t e r only because i t pertains to an i n f e r i o r grade of exis-
tence, and. i s dependent on the i n t e l l i g i b l e being. 
Soul, desirous of manifesting the d ive r s i ty i n i t , began 
to move, and time i t s e l f began t o move. I t was i n t h i s way that 
2 
time was fashioned as the image of e t e rn i ty . Just as e te rn i ty i s 
the l i f e of the Supreme, so time i s the l i f e of Soul as i t passes 
from one stage of ac tual iza t ion t o another.-^ Every new thought i n 
Soul produced a constant succession of things ever anew. This exten- , 
s ion of the l i f e of the Soul gave r i se to time; and the constant 
progress of t h i s l i f e has time ever anew. 
From the above account i t must not be understood that the 
l i f e of Soul has succession and i s i n time. Rather the nature of 
Soul i s e ternal , and not i n t ime. There i s succession only i n the 
products of Soul, Accordingly time is the l i f e of Soul, not i n 
i t s e l f , but i n so f a r as i t i s the pr inc ip le o f l i f e and motion f o r 
the universe. Time, i n t h i s sense, subsists between Soul and the 
Universe, being i n d e f i n i t e and i t s cont inui ty unbroken. This i nde f in i t e 
1, Plot inus,Enneads,III ,11,1ff , 
2, Plot inus,Enneads,III ,11,8ff , ,and IV,4,l5 ;Inge,op.cit . ,pp.172-173. 
3. P i s to r iu s ,op . c i t . , pp . l 53 and 155-156;Inge,op.cit.,p,173;Gallahan, 
op. c i t . , p . 12 9 ;P l o t i nus ,E nne ads, I I I , 7,11. 
4. Plot inus ,Enneads,I I I ,7 , l2 ; IV ,4 ,1 ; IV ,4 ,15- l6 ; Inge,op.ci t . ,p ,173; 
G al lahan,op.ci t . ,p ,120, 
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and unbroken cont inui ty of time i s defined by the motion of the 
sphere which manifests best the continuous communication of the 
l i f e of Soul, I n contradis t inc t ion to A r i s t o t l e , Plot inus declares 
that time i s not the measure of motion, but, rather, motion i s the 
1 
measure of, t ime, i t i s not the cause o f the existence of t ime. 
I n P lo t inus ' discussion of e te rn i ty and t ime, metaphysical 
and e th ica l considerations play an important r o l e . E te rn i ty , being 
the l i f e of I n t e l l e c t , belongs to a higher grade of existence than 
t ime, which i s the l i f e of Soul, and yftiich, i n i t s continuous f l u x , 
resembles e t e r n i t y . This d i s t i n c t i o n between time and e t e rn i ty isolates 
h is view from the l a t e r doctrines, proposed by Abu-Bakr Zdkariyya a l -
Razl, Abujbl-Barakat i n Muslim Philosophy, and Grescas i n Jewish 
philosophy. 
However, i n P lo t inus ' view of time we f i n d important elem-
ents which, together wi th other sources, may have been the s ta r t ing 
point of the above-mentioned philosophers. As we have seen, Plotinus 
separated time from motion. Time, f o r him, i s ' a kind to i t s e l f , 
' a th ing w i t h i n i t s e l f . I t only inc iden ta l ly ejfhibi ts the magnitudes 
2 
of motion. I t i s i n d e f i n i t e i n so f a r as i t i s the extent of the l i f e 
of Soul and not defined by the motion of the universe. Time, therefore, 
1, PlotinusjEnneads,III,7,11-12;H.A.Wolfson,Grescas' C r i t i q u e . , , o p , c i t . , 
pp ,654-655;inge,op,cit.,p .173, 
2, Plot inus,Enneads,III , l2 ,52f. 
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i s measured by the regular and uniform motion inc iden ta l ly , and 
i n that way manifested t o us by such motion of the ce les t i a l sphere. 
Even thougJi the motion of the ce les t i a l sphere comes to rest , t h i s 
rest i s measured by a n o t ^ r kind of motion, namely the a c t i v i t y of 
•I 
the soul . As i n A r i s t o t l e , rest i s used here i n the re la t ive sense. 
The extent of res t , according to Plotinus i s less capable of leading 
2 
us to a perception of time than that of motion. On the other hand, 
by coupling the a c t i v i t y of souL which is a kind of raotion.with tdjne, 
Plot inus does not d i f f e r fundamentally from A r i s t o t l e . I n f a c t , th i s 
shows that he i s s t i l l very much under the influence of A r i s t o t l e . 
As we. have seen, i n h is c r i t i c i sm of A r i s t o t l e , time i s not 
subjective f o r Plot inus i n the sense that i t s existence depends on 
our knowing i t . According to him, we possess a duration i n the l i f e 
of our souls even when we are unaware of i t . On the other hand, time 
i s manifested to us by the regular motion of the ce les t i a l sphere. 
lamblious'^, fo l lowing mainly Plot inus, considers Soul as 
the o r i g i n of t ime, or i n other words, as the pro jec t ion of the 
s p i r i t u a l world onto the physical being which changes from one state 
in to another. Time i s tha t which measures the process of becoming 
1. P lo t inus ,Enneads , I I I , l2 ,1 f f . 
2. Plot inus ,Enneads , I I I , l3 ,1ff . 
3. Por lajnblicus see Chroust,op.cit. ,pp.67-68. 
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and i s , i n t h i s respect, re la ted to motion, jus t as being i s 
re la ted to becoming. He distinguishes two kinds of tinae, namely 
'time derived from the universe' and 'physical t i m e ' , i n other words, 
abstract and concrete t ime. The abstract time pertains to the world 
of absolute being, whereas the physical or the concrete time proceeds 
from the abstract time as the measure of motion i n the sensible world 
of becoming. 
I I I . Time as Duration -
One of the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n view of 
time was tha t time i s i n f i n i t e , composed o f f i n i t e times. On the 
other- hand, although the Ar i s to te l ians admitted the i n f i n i t ude of 
time and motion, they denied i t to space and the corporeal body. 
Sudh f l ag ran t contradict ion drew the at tent ion of an early Muslim 
philosbpher a l -K ind i (c . 185/8OI-C. 26o/873). His a t t i tude against 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n view, as i t appears, was determined by his M u ' t a z i l i t e 
1 — tendency. Following the Mutakallimun of his t ime, he held that time, 
together w i t h motion and space i s f i n i t e , and contrary to the A r i s t o t -
e l ians , he founded h i s arguments f o r the temporal production of the 
2 
world, on the f i n i t u d e of t ime, space and motion. He also d i f f e r s 
1. For the Mu*tazilism of a l -Kind i see R.Y/alzer,op.cit.,pp,176-l87. 
2. Likffi! the Mu"^azili tes,he believes i n the creation ex n i h i l o ( ibda") . 
He argues that the actions of God cannot be compared wi th those of man, 
because there i s nothing equal to the Omnipotence of God i n the l i m i t e d 
and r e s t r i c t e d power of human beings.God does not need any length of 
time (muddah) to create the world.He creates from nothing ( ja*a la huv;a 
min l a huwa),forHe has the power create from nothing.But man cannot 
act i n the absence of matter (tihah).Rase? i l al-Kindx" al-Palsaf iyyah, 
o p . c i t . , v o l . I , ( : l 9 | 0 ) , p . l 6 5 . 
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from the Mutakallimun i n not accepting the atomicity of matter, 
1 
space and t ime. 
According to him, matter, form, space, movement, and time 
2 
are the f i v e substances i n every physical body. Time, body (^ i rm) , 
and movement are a l l interconnected and interdependent, and one does 
not precede the other. Time i s the duration of the existence of the 
corporeal body, since i t has no independent existence. S imi la r ly 
motion pertains to the corporeal body, and has no independent exis-
tence. By motion he means a l l the categories of motion including the 
substantial motion i n the form of generation and corruption. The 
corporeal body i n t h i s world i s subject to change according to one of 
the species of change (tabaddul), Since every motion indicates the 
number of the durat ion of the corporeal body, i t oan only exist i n 
v i r tue of that which possesses t ime. Therefore motion must necessarily 
exis t together w i th the existence of the Corporeal body, f o r the cor-
poreal body cannot move a f t e r having been at rest,'^ There exis t two 
al ternat ives: the body of the world i s e i ther created i n time or eter-
n a l . l f i t i s created i n time, then i t s existence from non-existence i s 
'becoming'. But 'becoming' i s one of the species of motion. I t then 
1. R,Walzer ,op,oi t . ,p , l84, 
2. Rasa*il a l -K ind l a l - F a l s a f i y y a h , o p , c i t , , v o l , I I , p , 1 4 . 
3. I b id . , vo l , I , pp , 117 -1 l8 . 
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fo l lows frorii t h i s tha t the temporal production of the body of the 
world i s motion, since the temporal production and motion are two 
necessary concomitants. But i f the body of the world were e ternal ly 
at res t , i t would be possible f o r i t t o move. This would then 
amount to saying that the pre-eternal th ing changed. But the eternal 
1 
can not possibly change. The corporeal body therefore cannot be 
without motion, which i s , i n t u r n , the fundamental condition f o r the 
existence of t ime. Time i s the duration determined numerically by 
motion, and i t i s the number of motion. The time of the corporeal body 
i s i d e n t i c a l wi th the duration of i t s existence. As al-KindS asserts, 
time i s the duration i n which the corporeal body i s a being (huwiyyah, anniyy-
2 
ah). The necessary consequence;- of a l l t h i s i s that the corporeal body, 
motion and time exis t simultaneously and none of them precedes the other, 
A l - K i n d l argues f o r the temporal creation of the world from the f ac t 
that time cannot be i n f i n i t e , and consequently the duration of the ex-
istence of the world i s f i n i t e . 
Prom the above account i t i s manifest that the main difference 
between A r i s t o t l e and a l - K i n d l l i e s i n the f a c t that al-Kind± i d e n t i f i e s 
1, I b i d , , v o l . I , p p , 11,3-114 and 118-119. 
2. I b i d , , v o l , I , p p . 1 1 9 and 205. 
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1 
'becoming' w i t h motion, whereas A r i s t o t l e denies t h i s by saying 
that becoming i s not moti6n. 
For the f i n i t u d e of time, al-KincE argues tha t i n f i n i t y 
cannot be real ized ac tua l ly , but only po ten t i a l ly . I f i n f i n i t y ex-
i s t ed ac tua l ly , we could never reach an imagined t i«ie-point proceed-
2 
ing from i n f i n i t y . The las t argument is found i n a more ref ined 
form i n al-Ghazall 's TahSfut al-FalasMjaljL'.,-^ and was perhaps taken 
by both a l -Kind i and al-G^azalx from the Alexandrian philosopher 
John Philoponus,^ < 
A r i s t o t l e and h is fo l lowers , as we have seen, considered 
time as the number of motion. A l - K i n d i agrees on t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , 
5 
holding the number to mean not discrete but a continuous quantity. 
Time i s , on the other hand, the duration of the existence of a th ing 
as long as i t ex i s t s . I f the existence of t h i s th ing i s removed, i t s 
time w i l l also be removed. I t i s because t h i s duration is measured by 
motion that we c a l l time the number of motion.^ 
1 . Aristotle,Physics,IV,225a,20-32. 
2. Rasa ' i l a l - K i n d i . . , o p . c i t . , v o l . I , p p , l 2 1 f f . 
3. Averroes,Tahafut a l - ^aha fu t , t r . by S.van den Bergt i ,vol . I , (Oxford, 1954), 
Introduction,pp.XIX-XX. 
4 . Ibidem;for the connection between J.Philoponus and al-Kind1 see R. 
Walzer,op.cit. ,pp.190-196. 
5. R a ^ * i l a l - K i n d i . . , o p . c i t . , v o l . I I , p . 3 2 . 
6. I b i d . , v o l , I , p p . 1 2 0 f , , a n d 205f.,and 167. 
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I t i s striking to note that al-Kindi, by identifying time 
with the duration of the existence of a thing, oame closer to Abu'l-
Barakat's view than any other Muslim philosopher, as we shal l see 
la ter . 
I n the later Muslim ^Mlosophical l iterature, the definition 
of time as duration or extension established i t s e l f . As we have 
— - 1 
already seen among the definitions given by the Ildiwan al-Safa, 
i s the one according to which time i s the duration counted by the 
movements of the sphere (muddat ta^dduha harakat a l - fa lak) . I n a l -
Muqabasat, al-Tawhidl ^ mentions the definition that time i s an 
ejcbension. I n the Keys of the Sciences, al-Khuwarizml gives the 
definition that time is a duration whicda is counted, i . e . measured, by 
movements, as by the motion of the Spheres of heaven and other things 
i n motion. ^ F ina l ly al-Ghazall , i n his Maqasid al-Palasif ah mentions 
i n the name of the Aristotelians the definition that time i s a terra 
signifying the duration of motion, namely, the extension of motion 
(Idh al-aaman " i^barat 'an rauddat al-harakah ayy ^an imtidad a l -
harakah). ^ A similar definition i s attributed to Avicenna by 
1. Rasa*il IHiwan al-^afa, op.ci t . , VoloII . , p.l7 
2. al-JJ?awhidI, MuqSbasat, (Cairo, 1929), p.278. 
3. al-IQiuwarizmi, MafStih al-«ulum, ed. by van Vloten, (Leyden,l895), 
pp.137-138. 
4. al-:Ghazall, Maqasid al-PalSsifah, op.cit . , V o l . I I I . , p.l06. 
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al-Sh^B5astan5; in his summaiy of Avicenna's philosophy: 'And so 
there i s here a measure for motions, corresponding to them, and 
everything corresponding to motions is something having duration, 
which duration implies a continual renewal of i t s e l f . I t i s this 
• I 
that we c a l l time. ' The Jewish philosopher Narboni, in his comm-
entary on the Kawanot, distinguishes Avioenna's view from that of 
Aristot le . He says, ' al-Ghaziill and Avicenna, however, do not take 
the terni 'number' used by Aristotle in the sense of the parts of 
motion, but as the number of duration whidi is the nature of a primary 
enteledhy. He thus says that the essence of duration i s the essence 
of time, that i s to say, they have a generic identity without imply-
ing a common subject ( i . e . motion); and this follows as_.a consequence 
from the view that the nature of time differs from that of motion both 
i n definition and subject. Though motion bears some relation to time, 
2 
i t i s not part of itv' Indeed, there i s a strong internal evidence 
both in al-Najah and al-Shifa* in favour of this interpretation, 
Avicenna asserts that the spatial continuity ( i t t i s S l ) , in so far as i t 
pertains to motion, i s the cause of the existence of time which is 
1. a l -Shahrast^l ,K.al -Mila l wa'1-Nihal,op.oit.,p.401 ;cf.Avicenna, 
'.. a l-Najiai , o p . c i t . , p p . l i 5 - 1 l 6 . 
2. Wolfson,Note on Crescas' Definition of Time,in Jewish Quarterly 
Review, vol ,X, (1919-1920), pp. 14-15. ~ ~ 
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continuous by i t s e l f or the continuity i t s e l f , and i t i s not the 
cause of time's being continuous. Therefore, according to him, 
continuity i s the essence of time. 
2 
The Mutakallimun reduced the Aristotelian categories to 
two: substance and accident. The categories of quantity, place, 
time and so on are nothing but the relative characteristics that 
exist i n the mind of the knower. They identify substance with the 
atom (Jawhar a l - f ard). Since substance i s inseparable from i t s 
aocidenbs, i t has, l ike the accident, a momentary existence. They not 
only accept the atomicity of matter, but also the atomicity of space, 
motion and time. .According to Maimonides, they inferred this view from 
Aristotle' s argument i n the Physics that space, time and motion are 
correlative notions and consequently have a certain correspondence to 
one another. Al -Kindi , as we have seen, using the same inference, 
concluded that space, time and motion axe f in i t e , aM consequently, the 
world i s created in time. According to the Mutakallimun, the atom 
endures simply through the supervention upon i t of the accident of 
•ffimiation (baqa*) whicsh, l ike the rest of the accidents, cannot endure 
for two instants. I n accordance with this view is tlrie d e f j . n i t i o i i of 
1. Avicenna,al-Shifa*,op,cit,,p,80, 
2, See for the views of the MutakallinlCIn M.B''akhry,Islamic Occasionalism, 
(London, 1958) jMairaonides,The Guide for the Perplexed,tr.by S.Pines, 
(Chicago-London, 19^3), oh, 75,PP. 196ff. ;D.B .Mac Donald,Continuous 
Re-creation and Atomic Time in Muslim Scholastic Thology,in I s i s , 
vol.IX,(Camb.,Mass.,1925),pp.326ff. 
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time as the instant which signifies the concurrence of two events, 
one imagined and the other well-known. This definition i s cited 
i n Avicenna's a l - ^ i f a*, Qushayri's ( d.i».65/l 072) Risalah, 
al-Marzuql's Kitab al-a^minah wa'1-amkinah, ^ ajid in al -Jurjanl 's 
K. a l -Ta'rxfat . ^ 
The Mu'tazilite Abu' l-^udhayl a l 4 l l a f , holding the 
theoiy that some accidents are susceptible of duration, defines time 
as the interval (farq or mala*)- between the separate acts (a f 'a l ) .^ 
This view i s in confoitnity with that of the Stoics. ^1-Marzuqi finds 
Abu» 1-Huahayl's view veiy close to that of Alexander (probably Alex-
ander of Aphrodisias), He reports on the authority of Hunayn b.Isli.aq 
that Alexander defines time as the duration which is prior to the 
motion of the sphere. I t is the motion by which time numbers. Time is 
one in reality, not multiple. I t i s multiple only in the imagination, 
6 
since time possesses multiplicity only potentially. 
1. See supra. 
2. L . Massignon's ar t i c le , op.c i t . , p.111, 
3. al-Marzuqx (d.42l/l030), K.al-azminah wa'1-amkinah, Vol.1. 
(Hyderabad, 1332H.), p.l39. 
4. al-Curjanx, K.al-Ta'h^ifat, ed. by G, Flttgel,(l845), p.119. 
5. al-Ash*ari, Ma-qalat al-Isl5miyyln, ed, byH. Hitter (Istanbul, 1930) . 
p.443; al-MarzCtql, op,oit,, Vol .1 , , pp.139 and 141. 
6. al-Marzuqx, op.ci t . , V o l . I . , pp,l40-l4l. 
190. 
Al-Ghazall , defending the stand-point of the Mutakalliraun 
i n his Tahafut al-Falasifah, seems to stress the subjectivity of 
1 
time. He argues that future and past are relative to us. Similar 
views are found i n Hellenist ic philosophy. Proolus i n a passage of 
his ooimientary on Plato's Timeaus says that the Stoics and many 
2 
Peripatetics assert that time i s a mere product of thought. One of 
the strongest expressions of the subjectivity of tine i s found i n 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. According to him, man is the creator of 
3 
time. Ai-tGhazalx's theory of the subjectivity of time, as in 
Hellenistio philosophy, must be treated with caution because i n 
places he asserts that time i s generated and created, and before i t 
4 
there was no time at a l l . Such a view presupposes the reality of time, 
and the creation, of time with the creation of the v/orld. According to 
him, the world was created i n time and time with i t . Like space, time 
i s f in i t e , and has a beginning. He attributes the infinitude of time 
to the inabi l i ty of our imagination to imagine the beginning of a thing 
without something preceding i t . 
With Averroes ^, we return again to Aristotle's position. 
1. For the subjectivity of Time in al-Ghazalx,see Averroes,op.cit., 
vol.I,pp.13 and 41. 
2. Averroes,op.cit. ,vol.II,Notes,p.31. 
3. The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Ear ly Medieval Philosophy, 
ed.by Armstrong,(Cambridge, 1967) ,p,116, 
4. Averroes,op.cit.,vol.I,pp38. 
5. Ibid.,vol.I,pp.41-ih2. 
6. For Averroes' view see Hana al-Fakhurx and IQialll al-Jarr,Ta*rIMi 
a l - falsafat al-fArabiyyah,vol.II,"(Beirut,l958),p.420. 
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According to him, motion can take place in time. When we imagine 
a movement, we f ind with i t an extension, which measures i t . Time 
cannot be understood without motion. The dependence of time on 
motion i s much l ike the dependence of number on the thing numbered. 
Just as number does not become individualized through the individ-
ualization of the thing numbered, nor pluralized through i t s plur-
a l i ty , so i t stands with the relation between time and motion. Tine, 
therefore, i s unique for a l l movement and for each thing moving, and 
exists everywhere, so that i f we should suppose people confined from 
youth i n a cave in the earth, s t i l l we should be sure that they wou]d 
perceive time, even i f they did not perceive any of the movements 
which are perceived i n the world. The dubious point whidi we have 
already met i n al-Ghazall and others, namely,the subjectivity of 
time, crops up again in Ibn Rushd. What he means here i s that time 
i s something the souls construct in movement, or that i t i s nothing 
except what the mind perceives of the extension (imtidad) inherent in 
motion. I t i s for this reason, he says, that Aristotle thought that 
the existence of movements in time i s much like the existence of the 
things numbered i n number. 
Time has no position, nor does i t form a simultaneous whole. 
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Those things which are subject to motion cannot be separated 
from time. Time i s only abolished in those things which are not 
1 
subject to motion. Neither God, nor His Acts can be comprehended 
in time and measured by a limited duration. God exists only in 
timeless eternity (dahr). 
Ibn Ru^d defines 'now' as the present which necessarily 
i s the middle between the past and the future. 01? ii^ the end of the 
past and the beginning of the future. I t i s absurd to represent a 
present which i s not preceded by a past. Furthermore, nothing can 
become i n the 'now', so i t s privatioh must be in another now than 
that in which i t i t s e l f exists , and there i s time between each pair 
of instants, because 'now' i s not continuous with 'nowi Therefore 
before the 'now' i n whidi the movement occurs, there must necessarily 
be a time, because, when we represent two 'nov/s' in reality, there 
5 
must necessarily be time between them. ' I n this vein, he proves the 
infinitude of time and motion and consequently the eternity of the 
world. 
I n the above account we have seen that with al-Kindl the 
1. Averroes,op.cit . ,vol.I,pp.42ff. 
2. Ibid. ,vol .1,p.70. 
3. Ib id . ,vo l . I ,p .44 . 
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perceptual time as a correlative or measure of motion starts to 
give place to the conceptual time as a duration measured by but 
independent of motion. ^1-Shahrastanl, al-Gha^alt, and his Jewish 
commentator Narboni f ind traces of a conceptual time in Ibn Slna. 
Although Ibn Sxna asserts i n places that the continuity or duration 
forms the essence of time, i n his neatly formulated definition he i s 
closely attadied:. to Aristotle' S view. On the other hand, i n the 
Mutakallimun we find a purely subjective view of time and the iden-
t i f i c a t i o n of time with the indivisible 'now'. By doing so, they have 
broken the continuity of motion, .time and space. This led them to 
the denial of causality in-the world, and consequently they established 
God as the Absolute Sovereign of the whole universe. 
W.-Ghazalx, without attaching himself to the atomic theory 
of the Mutakalldjnun, from the correlation of space, time and motion, 
inferred that time has a f in i te duration and i s created. I n his 
objections to the Aristotelians he availed himself of the subjective 
view of time. With Ibn Ru^d, the Aristotelian theory was restored, 
IV. Absolute and Limited Time -
I n dealing with the di f f icul t ies involved i n the conception 
of time, Avicenna, as v/e have seen, mentions the view that time i s a 
substance existing necessarily by i t s e l f . This view goes back to a l -
194 
I r a n ^ a h r i and his disciple Abu Bakr Zakariyya al-Razi . ' As we 
know from a ninth century source, this view was held i n Hellen-
i s t i c philosophy by Galen. Again i n this source, and i n later 
1 
Muslim philosophical l iterature i t i s curiously attributed to Plato. 
A l - I r a r ^ a h r i and Abu Bakr al-Razi held the eternity of 
2 t f ive substances, namely God, the Universal Soul, F i r s t Matter (hyle). 
Absolute Space and Absolute Tioae, Ibn Hazm and Ibn Taymiyyah^ bring 
out a relation between this view and that of the Iranian Magians. 
According to them, the Magians also affirm of the five principles 
which are Ohrmazd, Ahriman, matter, time and space. Indeed ther^ is 
a certain connection between al-RSzl and the Magians, though the l i s t 
of the eternals does not altogether ta l l y with each other. The five 
eternals are the Creator, Ohrtna^d, wisdom of the religion; space on 
which matter is dependent; and time which i s the etenity of Ohrmazd. 
I t i s striking that, l ike al-Razx, they distinguished between Zurvan 
Kanarakomand (Limited time) and Zurvan akanarak ( inf inite tijne). ^ At a 
1. S. Pines, A Tenth Century Philosophical CorrespoMence, op.oit., 
p.112; Opera Philosophica, ed. by P. Kraus, Vol .1 . , (Cairx),1939), p.278. 
2. For this view see Opera Philosophica, op.cit . , Vol .1 . , pp,l90-2-l6; 
al-^hahrast5nl (d.548H), K.a l -Mi la l wa'l-Kii;ial,op.cit,, ^.?M; S.Pines, 
Beitrg..':;e zur Islamischen Atomenlehre,(Berlin, 193^),pp.48 and 60-62. 
3. Ibn Taymiyyah, MirihaJ al-Sunnah, op.cit . . V o l , I . , p.97; for Ibn Hazm's 
account see Opera Philosophica, op.cit . , Vol .1 . , pp.l83 f , 
4. R. 0. Zaehner, op.c i t . , pp.l06 f f ; H. Corbin's art ic le , op ,c i t . , 
pp.117 f f . 
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given mowj^Jitiiifinite time came into existence out of infinite 
time, and moves in a c irc le unt i l i t returns to i t s beginning, and 
then merges into inf inite time. 
Both al-Iransharx and al-Razx identify time with duration 
which i s undeireraiined and has no connection with motion. But in so 
far as the number applies to i t i n virtue of motion, i t i s limited. 
Out of the five eternals, two' are l iving and acting: God and Soiil; 
one is passive and not l iving: Matter from which a l l bodies are made; 
and two are neither l iv ing and acting, nor passive: Vacuum and Duration 
2. ^ 
or time. I t was reported that this view was held by the Sabians of 
Harran to whom al-Razx was attacshed,^ 
Tims i s an eternal substance that flows (jawhar yajrx) , 
A l - Irar^ahrx and al-RazI cr i t i c i ze those ( i . e . the Aristotelians) 
who connected time with motion. They argue that i f time were the 
number of motion i t would not have been possible for two moving things 
to move in one time by two different numbers. 
According to al-Iranshahrx, time, eternal duration and 
duration are only the names which iMicate one and the same substance. 
He considers five eternal substances from a theological point of view. 
1, Opera: Philosophica,op,cit.,vol.1,p.195;see also A History of Muslim 
Philosophy,ed.by M.M.Sharif,vol.I, (Wiesbaden, 19^3) ,pp,4!4-1-ii45jS.Pines, 
Some Problems of Islamic Philosophy,op.cit,,p.75. 
2, al-Marzuqx,op.cit. ,vol.I,p.l44. 
3, Opera Philosophica,op.cit. ,vol.I ,p,213, 
4, Ibid,,p.266, 
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For him, time i s the proof of God's knowledge Just as space i s 
the proof of God's omnipotence, movement of His action, and oor-
1 poreal body of His power. Each of these are infinite and eternal, 
hatey, Ibn al-*Arabx held that eternity (dahr). i s one of the 
attributes of God, I n Islam, one of the traditions of the Prophet, 
namely, 'do not speak i l l of dahr because God Himself i s dahr', 
might have had some bearing on this view. 
Similar views are found in the seventeenth century metaphysics, 
For example, H. M^ r^e spiritualizes the nature of space; and the divine 
nature of tine v/as put forward by the Belgian Mystic, J . B. voSi 
Helmont. ^ Newton considered absolute space and time to be the sen-
4 
sossium of God and His in4ispenaable attributes. 
F a ^ r al-Dxn al-RazI, attributing the view that time i s a 
self-subsistent substance to a certain ancients, relates their argu-
ments against objections. Objection: time i s sonething ever-flowing 
and ever-changing, i n so far as i t s existence is concerned, if/hat i s so, 
therefore, can not possibly be a self-subsistent substance. Answer: 
time, in i t s essence and quiddity, cannot be conceded to be in f lux, 
1. Ibid.,pp.266ff. 
2. A .E .Aff i f i ,The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din Ibn ul-«Arab1, 
(Lahore, 1964),p.44. 
3. W.von Leyden,Seventeenth Century Metaphysics,(London, 1968),pp.229f. 
4. Ibid. ,p.241. 
5. Opera Philosophica,op.cit. ,vol.I,p.278. 
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ever-changing, and coming to an end. VJh.y.u i s i t not permissible 
that i t should be a substance subsisting pftst eternally and pre-
eternalljr? In fact , continuous flux and change do not occur in the 
essence or substance of time, they occur only in so far as time is 
related to successive events. 
The partisans of the substantiality of time further argue 
that time has no conneotioni>\ either i n i t se l f or i n i t s existence, 
with the ce le s t ia l sphere and motion. The celest ial sphere, by i t s 
motion, measures only i t s parts, just as a sand-glass measures, in 
virtue of i t s various states, parts of the day and night. I f in this 
substance which subsists by i t s e l f a kind of motion i s realized, and 
the extension of i t s duration i s measured by this motion, i t i s called 
time. Bgrt i f i t has no connection with motion, and in i t occurs no 
change i t i s named dahr, azal and sarmad. 
This last division which corresponds in Abu Bakr al-Razx to 
Absolute and Iiiraited time i s found in Avicenna. According to him," 
time, dahr and sarmad pertain to different domains of existence, Dahr 
1§8. 
i s above time, and sarmad is above dahr. 
1 
Avicenna rejects the view according to which dahr i s 
the duration of immobility, or a time not numbered by movement. 
The fac t , he says, i s that duration and time cannot be conceived 
without i n their essence inhering before and after. I f before and 
after inheres in i t , then i t heis a continuous change of states and i t 
w i l l not be devoid of motion. And i n rest also exist prior and posterior. 
' For Avicenna, eternal duration co-exists with and encom-
passes time, but i t i s not time. . I t i s related to every unchangeable 
being. Eternal duration, therefore, has a semblance of time, but i s 
not real time. 
Avicenna defines eternal duration in another context asthe 
motion which i s perceived by the intellect of the relation obtaining 
between the durable things and the Soul, namely, the Universal Soul, 
2 
at a l l time. Soul., ( i . e . The Universal Soul) i s the cause of the 
existence of tine .'^  This notion taken from Plotinus and with some 
modification3 from the K.al-khayr al-mahd (Liber de Oausis) which 
1. Avicenna,al -^ifa*,op.c i t . ,vol . I ,p .81. 
2. Avicenna,Ri^lah fl^l~guaud,in T i s * Rasa*il.(Egypt.1526/1908^^.92. 
3. Avicenna,"^Uyun al-gikmah,op.cit.,p.29. 
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1 
contains extracts from Proclus' Elements of Theology i s generally 
accepted in Muslim philosophy, 
Nas ir- i Khusraw, when citing the view of those who assumed 
that time i s a substance, eternal, and self-subsistent, relates that 
the eternal duration i s not time; i t i s on the contrary, the l i f e of 
the l iving immortal, just as time is the l i f e of the living mortal. 
2 
The term 'time' cannot, therefore, be attributed to spiritual entities. 
This view had a considerable influence in the formation of the Isma'il ite 
cosmogony.^  
The distinctioh between dahr and zaman is also treated in a 
treatise called "wrhat is the difference between 'dahr' and 'time'," 
(ma a l - f a s l bayn al-dahr wa'l-zaman): 'Dahr i s the number of perm-
anent things, and time that of temporal objects. Both numbers oaunt 
only the things, namely, the l i f e and motion. Everything vi/hich 
numbers, numbers either one part after another, or the whole at once. 
Consequently we say that the thing which numbers the whole i s dahr, and 
the thing which numbers the parts, one after the other, is time. I t is 
then evident and true that ilumber i s of tvro kinds. One numbers the per-
manent spir i tual things, and is called dahr; and the other numbers the 
1, Proclus puts time above Soul,and eternity above the Pure Intel lect , 
According to him,as eternity i s more than raind,v/hiGh i t contains, 
so time i s more than soul,See Proclus,The Elements of Theology,ed, 
and t r , by E,R,Dodds,(Oxford,1963),props,52-55,PP.5l-55;see also 
T.Whittaker,The Neo-Platonists,(Cambridge,1928),p.283. 
2. Opera Philosophica,op.cit.,vol,I,p.270, 
3 ,H .Oorbin's article,op.cit. ,pp.144f. 
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particular things which are subject to time, and i s the number 
1 — 
of the motions of the ce l e s t ia l sphere. Al-^urjanl i n his 
Kitab al-Ta*rifat ^ gives the definition that 'dahr i s the 
extension of the divine presence; i t i s the basis of time and enfolds 
i n i t s e l f eternity and perpetuity.' Such views taken from the Weo-
Platonic sources played an important role in the development of the 
later mysticism in Islam, 
According to a l - I ranshahri and al-Razi, such clear-cut 
distinctions are superf ic ial , and irrelevant to the essence of time. 
Time, duration and eternity a l l indicate one and the same substance, 
namely, absolute time. 
Another point whidi i s of considerable importance to our 
treatment of Abu* 1-Barakat' s conception of time i s al-RazI's view that 
the knowledge we have of time is self-evident and needs no demonstrative 
proof. Common people and the learned alike know time a pr ior i .^ 
1. Opera Philosophica,op.cit. ,vol.I,p.270. 
2. a l -JurJari i ,op.c i t . , p . l l l . 
3. Opera Philosophica,op.cit.,pp.264 and 272f. ;al-*IarzuqI,op.cit.,p.148. 
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Abu'l-Barakat's Theory of Time. -
Abu' 1-Barakat treats of time both i n his Physios and 
in his Metaphysics, In the Physics the problem of time is only 
• introduced for the sake of the problem of raotioita. He says at the 
leginniiBig of the section on time that 'simce motion takes place 
in space ajmd in time, having already discussed space, we, now 
proceed to explain time'. Therefore, accordiimg to this view, we 
must kraow the problem of space, time, and various other problems 
such as matter, prianciples amd causes before proceediimg with the 
problem of motion. This i s the very method the Aristotelians 
have already used. But, unlike the Aristotelians, Abu'1-Barakat 
carries the problem of time over to the domain of Metaphysics. In 
the Metaphysics he answers ths questions l e f t i n suspense i n the 
Physics. I t may, therefore, be said that, according to him, the 
problem of time, in so far as i t i s supposed to be connected with 
motion, belongs to the Physics, but in so far as i t s real solution 
i s concerned, i t belongs to the Metaphysics. I t is in virtue of 
the solution given in the Metaphysics to the problem of time that 
the close l ink between the physical and the metaphysical domains 
i s , as vie shal l see, established. 
1, K, al-Mu*tabar, op.oit. . V o l , I I . , p,69 
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Time, Abu'1-Barak5t argues, is self-evident in common 
'UB;;age and according to the f i r s t mode of knowledge, intelligent 
men have of time, but in so far ajs the perfect logical and i n t e l l -
ectual definition of time is concerned, i t i s obscure, ambiguous and 
hidden. This i s the reason wliy time i s variously defined by the 
intelligent men. This point was already stressed by Plotinus and 
others. According to Plotinus, we derive our knowledge of time from 
two sources; (a) Everyone thinks that he knows what time i s , at 
least unti l he tr ies to give an explanation of i t . This common knov/-
ledge of time is something we must consider, and any detailed exam-
ination of time mpst not be out of harmony with i t . This conviction 
of men must be a common ground of a l l philosophical explajiations. 
(b) Philosophical investigation carried on according to a definite 
2 
method, that i s , to relate time to i t s natural predecessor, eternity. 
Indeed, our self-evident knowledge of tine forms the backbone of Abu' 1-
Barakat's own theory, as in Abu BaJcr Zakariyya al-Raql. 
a) I s Time Conneoted with Motion? 
According to Abu'1-Barakat, common people believe that time 
is a function of movement. I n common usage ( f l ' l - 'o ir f al-^amml). 
1. Ibid , Vol. I I , p.69, a n d V o l . I I I , p.36 
2. Plotinus, Enneads, I I I , 7, 10 f . 
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time is a thing in whicjh motions take place, and agree or differ 
as to simultaneity, priority and posteriority. I t is in relation 
to time that their fastness and slowness axe detemined. They 
• divide time into past, present and future, and into parts called 
days, hours, years and months. They determine i t s parts with 
reference to motions, as, for example, days are determined by the 
sunrise and sunset, months by the revolutions of the moon, years by 
the revolutions of the sun. Or they determine i t s parts with ref-
erence to certain temporal conditions (bi halat min al-halat al-zam-
aniyyah), l ike cold and hot seasons. They have an a priori knowledge 
that there exists a thing, namely time, and that i t s existence comes 
to an end and arises anew in such a way as to correspond to the 
passage of motion. They similarly know that the parts of tins are 
irreversible: the past time cannot subsist with the future time, 
nor one day with another day and so on. 
The learned men, Abu'1-Barakat continues, enquired whether time i s 
an object of perception. They realized that they could not perceive i t 
i n virtue of essence, since i t was not a colour so that the;, eye could 
perceive, and i t was not a sound so that the ear could hear, nor was i t 
K, al-Mu^tabar, op.cit . , Vol.11., pp.69-70. 
2 0+, 
the quality of hardness or softness to be sensed by touch. 
Furthemore, they could not perceive i t in virtue of accident, which 
accompanies primarily that which i s perceived by i t s e l f , as in the 
case of transparency, in so far as the visible things are concerned, 
and as in the case of a void in so far as the things perceived by 
touch are concerned. Although we do not perceive 'trarisparency' and 
'void' according to essence, we perceive them according to accident. 
Time, therefore, cannot be perceived in any of these ways. 
Having considered intellectually the questions what time 
i s , how i t exists, and whence i t comes about, they concluded that 
time pertains to motion l ike a measure which measures distances (fa 
wajaduhu l i ' l -harakat ka'l-miqdar al-muqaddir l i ' l -masafat) . The 
prior and posterior in motion and time cofrespohds to the prior and 
posterior i n distance; while distetrice remains as i t i s before and 
after the motion of that whitsh moves in i t , time does not endure, and 
i s always in process, whether a moving object is in motion in time or is 
at rest . Unlike i n distance, prior and posterior in time are irrevejT-
sible . On the other hand, a number of motions taking place at a certain 
time i n various distances participate i n one and the same time. There-
fore, priority and posteriority (aljrqabliyyah wa'1-ba'diyyah), passage 
1. K. al-Mu<^tabar, op.c i t . . Vol. I I . , p.70. 
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(al-tasarrum), and continuous change (ta^addud), pertain to time 
essentially (bi'l-dhat) and to motion accidentally. They further 
said that motion i s in time and not that time is in motion. The 
multiplicity of motions taking place in time i s much like the 
multiplicity of movables inhering in one and the same distance (fx'1-
masafat al-wahidah). ^ 
Prom the fact that time exists together with motion as well 
as with rest , and from the fact that the fastness and slowness of 
motion i s determined by time, they inferred that the knowledge of 
time occurs to our minds prior to the knowledge of motion. Therefore, 
according to them, time i s prior to motion i n existence just as distance 
(space) i s prior to motion. For motion cannot be conceived by him who 
cannot conceive of time, just as i t cannot be perceived by him who 
cannot conceive of space. Time, however, can be conceived without 
motion taking place i n i t , since motion i s only possible in time, i . e . , 
motion i s capable of taking place i n i t . Time is that in which motions 
can take place, or in which they actually exist, agree or di f fer as to 
simultaneity, priority and posteriority. Time i s other than distance, 
because two moving objects agree in time, but differ in distance, or differ in 
time but agree in distance. Time i s also other than the i n i t i a l and 
1. I b i d . , p.71. 
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f i n a l points, because two movables agree in time, but di f fer i n 
their i n i t i a l and f i n a l points. Time is other than motSion (ghavr 
al-harakah) because many motions different in themselves, possess-
ing many movables, distances and directions take place in one and 
-1 
the same time. 
I t is not right to say that tiire i s identical with one of the 
motions, namely the miotion of the inhere of the celest ial equator 
(falak mu'addil al-nahar), because i t i s the fastest of motions, I t 
being so, i t partakes of the same quiddity as the other motions do, 
but i t differs from them in virtue of the external concomitant accidents 
(bi-^awarid lazimah Idiari^iyyah). Fastness, and slowness are the 
accidents accompanying the motions taking place i n various distances 
and times. The fast motion i s that which traverses a longer distance 
than the slow one does in one and the aame time, or i t traverses the 
same distance i n a shorter time than the latter . This argument i s 
2 
substantially the same as the one cited by Plotinus against the 
identification of time with the motion of the celestial sphere, and 
implies that this very motion i s also in time. He who has gnosis 
( a l - ' a r i f ) , knows that time is other than motionjj) movable and distance 
1. Ibid, pp.71-72. 
2. Plotinus, Enneads, I I I , 8, 1f. 
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i n i t s absolute being (bi-anniyatihi al-rautlaqah), while he does 
not know i t s abstract quiddity. Therefore the definition of tine 
consists in explaining the term 'time'. Tioae i s , partly, explained 
as that in whicsh the motion of that which i s at rest i s possible, 
or the motion of the movable actually takes place, and as that whose 
existence can not be suppressed in the minds. This exposition of the 
tenn 'time' i s i n keeping with our knowledge, for the primaiy knov/-
ledge of time is acquired by the soul i tse l f whether the motions and 
the movables are supposed to exist or not and whether we are aware 
1 
of them or not. 
As we have already seen, the Aristotelians held that time 
ceoinot be conceived except with motion, and cited as an example the 
sleepers of Sardinia in the case of Aristotle and the Companions of 
2 
the Cave i n the case of Avicenna. Abu' 1-Barakat argues that the 
Companions of the Gave were not aware of time just as they were not 
aware of other things. For he who i s asleep cannot have consciousness 
of other things, whether i t be motion or time. But i f they were awake 
i n the cave in the dark, there would not pass an hour of which they 
could not be aware. Therefore, according to him, we perceive time 
1. K. al-Mu'tabar, opioit . , pp.72-73. 
2, See Supra. 
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1 
even though we do not perceive any motion whatsoever. 
He also argues that he who i s aware of motion i s aware 
of the prior and posterior i n distance, without there being any 
combination between the prior and posterior. They are, rather, 
combined i n the mind. This.kind of prior and posterior represent 
time. I t can, therefore, only be said that motion cannot be conceived 
2 
except with time. This i s i n complete contrast with the Aristotelian 
viev/, 
Aristot le's definition of time as the measure of motion 
does not escape Abu'1-Barakat' s crit icism. Here he takes up the 
cudgels against this definition. According to him, the Aristotelians 
argue that time exists i n motion like the measure pertaining to 
distance. I n fact , Abu'1-Barakat asserts, time subsists despite the 
removal of a l l motion. This j^ s not the case with the measure of 
distance, for this measure cannot be abstracted from distance. Measure, 
i n customary usage ( f l ' l - ' u r f ) , i s said only of a part of the v/hob by 
which the whole i s measured. According to them, motion i s measured by 
time and time by motion. But none of them is more f i t t ing to measure 
1. K. al-Mu«tabar, op.c i t . , Vol.11. , p.73 
2. I b i d . , Vol.11., p.73. 
209. 
than the other (laysa ahaduhuma bi-taqdir al-^ gfehaSJ awla min al-»-
1 
^akhar bi-taqdxrihi). 
So far I have followed Abu'1-Barakat's account in the 
Physics of the K. al4viu'tabar. I n the Metaphysics v/e find Aba'l-
Barakat more concise and to the point. Moreover, i t reflects Abu'l-
Barakat's personal reflections and originality. 
According to our primary knowledge of time, time is conn-
ected with motion. I t measures motion. Just as i t i s measured by i t . 
However, motion, apart from time, i s also connected with (a) the 
i n i t i a l point, (b) the f i n a l point, (c) distance, (d) mover, (e) that 
2 
which i s moved. Time i s none of these things. 
To prove his case, Abu'1-Barakat imagines three balls equal 
in magnitude, moved by three different men at the same time at various 
speeds. Supposing that the fastest and slowest moving balls has stopped 
at the same time, the former having completed two revolutions, and the 
lat ter one. The third bal l which has an intermediary speed would then 
stop before both after having completed one revolution. In the former 
case, the fastest and slowest moving balls agree in the duration of their 
motions, but di f fer i n distance, since the fastest traversed twice the 
1. I b i d . , Vol, I I . , p.76 
2. I b i d . , V o l . I I I , , p.36 
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distance. The same difference in distance i s also found between 
the fastest moving ba l l and the one which has an intermediary 
speed. As for the ba l l which has an intennediary speed, although 
i t traversed the same distance as the slowest one, i t differed from 
i t in the duration of i t s motion. Time i s , therefore, independent of 
a l l these factors, namely distance, fastness and slowness, the movable 
and motion. 
Having reflected mentally on time and duration (al-muddah wa'l-
-^zaman) in respect of motion, let us now suppose, Abu'1-Barakat con-
tinues, one of these balls to be at rest. This w i l l not affect in any 
way the duration of the motions of the two other bal ls . Therefore, 
time and duration persists i n existence (mustamirrah fi'l-wu^ud) together with 
the motions of those things which move as well as with those things which 
are at rest and with the removal of any motion whq.tsoever. I f , onu the 
other hand, the slowest moving bal l mentioned above came to rest as 
soon as the fastest moving ba l l started i ts motion, and stayed at rest 
as long as the lat ter was in motion, then the alternating motion and 
rest W o u l d agree i n duration, nor would there be any change in duration. 
Even i n the case of a l l the movables coming to rest and a l l that i s at 
rest starting to move our notion of daration does not undergo any change 
1. I b i d . , V o l . I I I . , p.37 
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whatsoever, either in the mind or i n existence. A definite 
duration i s conceived in the mind (ma*qi3lah) as existing with the 
motion of a l l that i s in motion and with the immobility of a l l that 
i s at rest . Indded i t i s i n this duration that a l l these take 
place. The existence of motion i s connected with time and duration, 
whereas the existence of duration and time has no connection with motion, 
nor with rest . Therefore, the notion of time, in existence and in i t s 
intel l igible nature, i s prior .to every motion and every rest. By the 
removal of any of these, time cannot be affected. Time persists in 
existence apart from motion and rest, but without time and duration, 
1 
motion and rest cannot persist , 
b) Time and Existence. 
As we have already seen, together with time and soul we have an 
apriori conception of existence. Our consciousness of our being i s the 
proof of existence i n general. Time, existing apa^ from motion and 
rest and everything that exists in i t , comes very close to the concept 
of existence and is eonjioined with i t in conception ( f I ' 1-tasawwur), 
The mind does not conceive of existence as one of the sensible things, 
rather i t conceives of the sensible and insensible things as being in i t . 
1, I b i d . , v o l . I I I , , p.39 
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I n a mental supposition ( f l ' l - f a r d al-dhihnl), the sensation of 
an individual endowed with a sensitive faculty can be suppressed, 
but the existence of an existent cannot be suppressed in virtue of this . 
The mind, prior to i t s apperception of other things,, conceives and has 
apperception of existence together with the apperception of i t s own 
se l f . I t has also a similar apperception of time. Therefore i t i s 
more f i t t ing to define time as the measure of being than to define i t 
as the measure of motion. Not only i s motion determined by time, but 
also rest i s determined by i t , and both equally partake of existence,'' 
V, .©tlifci.iramediate knowledge of time, existence, and soul i s 
stressed throughout Abu'l-Barakit' s ¥ietaphysios. We have, according 
to him, an equal degree of consciousness of our soul, existence and 
time. I t i s in virtue of this theory of consciousness that Abu'l-
Barakat i s able to dispose of the view that makes time ss a function of 
motion. He argues in connection with his theory of existence in this 
vein: 'some of the things which are not perceived by the senses are 
more obscure for the intel lect and more remote for us than others in so 
far as the degree of knowledge we have of them i s concerned. On the 
other hand, there are other things which are better known and more 
manifest to.the mind with respect to their quiddity and substance 
1. I b i d . , V o l . I I I . , p.39 
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despite their being f a r from being perceived by the senses. These 
things are time and existence. Existence i s more manifest than 
any other hidden thing, because he who is aware of his own self is 
also aware of his own existence. Similarly he v/ho i s aware of his 
own action i s also aware of his own self that i s acting and of the 
existence of his own self as well as of that which i s produced by • 
i t and results from i t s axstion. Therefore he who i s aware of his own 
self i s aware of existence, namely, the existence of his own se l f . And 
he who i s aware of his own action i s aware of i t and of the agent. 
Neither the e l i te nor the common people doubt the existence of the agent. 
Similarly every man or most men are in general aware of time; of today, 
yesterday and tomorrow, and of past and future, remote and near time, 
even thou^ they have no^  knowledge of i ts substance and quiddity. They 
are s imilarly aware of the fact that existence i s , even i f they are not 
aware of i t s quiddity. According to hiin, every existent exists either 
i n external rea l i ty or i n the minds or in both. He curiously goes on to 
say that what i s existent i n the minds i s also existent i n external reality 
because the minds exist in external reality. 
As we have already seen, Abu'1-Barakat modifies the Avicennian 
view that existence i s superadded to the essences, and that essences 
1. K. al-Mu^tabar, V o l . I I I , pp.62-63. 
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would not exist without the superimposition of existence upon 
them. Although Abu'1-Barakat sometimes identifies essences with 
mere mental forms, they have no real ontological status i n his 
philosophy. According to him, existence is superadded to existents. 
Existents exist in virtue of existence and similarly existence 
exists in virtue of existence. This existence ends in an existence 
that is existent in virtue of i t s e l f and not in virtue of existence 
that i s i t s attribute. Abu'l-Barakat cal ls this existence an existent 
existence. Therefore, existent and existence are identified by him 
i n God. Only God i s the true existence. This theory obviously 
begirs the traces of the mystical pantheism which i s exemplified in 
the theory of the 'unity of existence". 
To-be or not-to-be can beither be predicated of existence, 
nor of time. Such predications belong only to existents.^ There-
fore, according to him, existence and time has an extra-mental real ity. 
Existents are transcended by the notions of existence and time. 
Abu' 1-Barakat's definition i s reproduced by Pakhr al-Din a l -
RazI in his Kitab al-*latalib al-aliyyah, where he finds this definition. 
1. See supra, pp.99 - 101)-. 
2. K. al-Mu<"tabar, V o l . I l l , p.40. 
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obscure and ambiguous, and amplifies i t to the effect that 
. time is the measure of the duration of existence. Leaving aside 
his Aristotelianism, al-Kindl, by defining time as the duration of 
the existence of a thing , so long as i t exists^, comes dose to Abu'l-
Barakat's notion, and the latter might have been influenced by the 
former i n this respect, S, Pines i n his Nouvelles Etudes tr ies to 
establish s imilarit ies between the doctrines of Saadia (892-9if2) and 
Abraham bar Hiyya ( f i r s t half of the 12th Century) and that of Abu'1-
Barakat) I n fact the view of both Saadi^and Abraham bar Hiyya goes 
1 back to that of al-Kindl , I t can, therefore, rightly be said al-Kindl's 
1 
view might have been the starting point of Abu'l-BaraJcat, 
Having put time and existence on equal footing, AbO.'1-Barakat 
tr ies to exjJlain the concept of measure. According to him, the meas-
' ure of a corporeal body i s not external to the body i t s e l f . The mag-
nitude of a big body with respect to the magnitude of a smaller body 
i s determined by corporeity, not by quantity. (bi-Jismiyyah wa l a b i -
karamiyyah). Quantity i s what i s conceived of this surplus in relation 
to the magnitude lacking i n the smaller body. For quantity i s the 
1. Opera Philosophica, op.ci t . , p.278 
2, S, Pines, Nouvelles Etudes sur Awhad al-zaman. Abu'1-Barakat 
(Paris, 1955), PP.67 f f . * . 
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knowledge of the relation obtaining between the bigger and 
smaller bodies i n the case of continuous quantities, and between the 
less and the more in the case of discrete quantities. Quantityj i s , 
therefore, a mentally conceived relation (fa'1-kammiyyah mu'tabarah 
fx* 1-adhhan). What exists in external reality i s not the magnitude 
but the big objects, and similarly not the number but the things 
numbered. I t i s in this way that time measures being, not as an 
accident subsisting- i n the latter but as a mentally conceived relation between 
that which has more of being and that whicsh has less . People, in their 
customary usage, speak of permanent and impermanent existence, long ajid 
short existence, i , e . , with respect to i ts duration, just as i t i s said 
of a body to be long or short, i . e . with respect to i t s measure ( a l -
raiqdar). Therefore, according to him, the same relation as exists 
between the measure and the measured exists also between time and 
existence. Just as we cannot conceive of the annihilation of existence 
i n the minds, so we cannot conceive of the annihilation of time. 
When someone by way of prayer ( f l du'^Sihi) says to someone, 
'may God prolong your l i f e ' , he means the prolongation of his existence, 
not his time. For time pertains only tb-ilfhat which exists by virtue 
of i t s existence persisting in i t ( i . e . time). On the other hand. 
1. K.al-Muttabar, op.c i t . , V o l . I I I . , pp.39-40. 
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time can be neither long, nor short, i t always persists. Only 
the existence of that which exists more or less persists together 
with the persistence of time. Therefore, i t i s more appropriate for 
time to be the measure of existence than that of motion. 
o) Time^ , God and. Creation. 
Abu'1-Barakat inserts the section on time in his Mstaphysios, 
into the section on the eternity and temporal creation of the world. 
This i s because, Abu'1-Barakat says, a profound study of these opp-
2 
osing views requires a profound study into the nature of time. We 
have already mentioned that there are strong indications in favour of 
the eternity of the world i n Abu'1-Barakat's philosophy. One of these 
indications, perhaps the strongest one is found i n his theory of time. 
According to him, those who believed that time had a beginning, 
because i t has no separate existence, nor subsisting by i t s e l f , should 
also believe in the temporal production of existence. How, then, 
could i t be said that prior to the temporal production of the world 
there existed no time? This i s an assertion that the mind does not 
admit. For i t has been established by a theoretical investigation(ngizar) 
1. :.vlbid,, V o l , i n , , p,40 
2. I b i d , , V o l , I I I . , p.35, 
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thkt t ime cannot be a n n i h i l a t e d except w i t h the a n n i h i l a t i o n o f 
ex i s t ence . Exis tence cannot.be non-ex i s t en t , nor can i t be ex-
i s t e n t . There fore i t cannot be s a i d o f existence t h a t i t e x i s t s , 
o r t h a t i t does not e x i s t . Non-existence can on ly be p red i ca t ed o f 
t h a t whict i e x i s t s . Time, being on equal f o o t i n g w i t h ex i s tence , the 
above argument i s also v a l i d f o r t i m e . This i s obv ious ly the p roof 
o f A b u ' l - B a r a k a t f o r the r e a l i t y ' o f t i m e . But how i s h i s statement t h a t <Lvi 
n e i t h e r exis tence nor non-existence can be p r ed i ca t ed o f t ime and existence 
t o be explained? According t o h im existence and non-existence can o n l y 
be p r e d i c a t e d o f the e x i s t i n g thingsji^^^aking ' ex i s t ence ' i n the absolute 
sense, t h a t i s , as/ an a t t r i b u t e which i s superadded t o the a c t u a l l y 
e x i s t i n g o b j e c t s , i t does not have ' ex i s tence ' o r 'non-exis tence ' as 
i t s a t t r i b u t e s . Otherwise, we c o u l d never d i f f e r e n t i a t e between 
exis tence and the e x i s t i n g t h i n g s , AbQ'1-Barakat, endowing ' ex i s t ance ' 
w i t h an ex t r a -men ta l r e a l i t y , t r i e s t o save the e f f i c i e n t c a u s a l i t y o f 
God, Eve tybhing e x i s t i n g i n e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y owes i t s exis tence t o the 
e f f i c i e n t c a u s a l i t y o f God who i s 'pure e x i s t e n c e ' . Time, be ing insep-
arable f r o m ex is tence , has the same o n t o l o g i o a l s t a tus i n A b u ' l - B a r a k a t ' s 
v i ew. J u s t as exis tence i s b e t t e r known than t h ings which e x i s t i n 
e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , so t ime i s b e t t e r known t h a n th^-se t h i n g s , which co-
e x i s t w i t h i t . According t o our f i r s t mode o f knowledge, which i s 
1, I b i d , , V o l . I I I , , p.40 
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d e f i c i e n t and i m p e r f e c t , as w e l l as according t o our second mode o f 
knowledge which i s p e r f e c t , t i m e , l i k e existence i s a n t e r i o r t o 
eve ry th ing i n the i n t e l l e c t . Man-can conceive a t ime p r i o r t o every 
beginning which i s conceived by the mind and i n t e l l e c t . He can not 
conceive a t ime which was the beginning and p r i o r t o which t h e r e had not 
been t i m e . Conceptua l ly t ime cannot be suppressed. 
By conjroi t t ing t ime w i t h exis tence , and by accept ing t h e i r 
e t e r n i t y , Abu' 1-Barakat solves the d i f f i c u l t y which l e d the A r i s t o t -
e l i a n s t o make v e i y sub t l e d i s t i n c t i o n s between t i m e , e t e r n a l d u r a t i o n 
and p e r p e t u i t y t o preserve t h d didhotomy between the m a t e r i a l and s p i r -
i t u a l w o r l d s . According t o h im, the mind cannot conceive o f existence 
w i t h o u t d u r a t i o n and t i m e , whether i t be t h a t o f t h e Crea to r , o r t h a t 
o f the c rea ted . 
I t i s o n l y those who d e f i n e d t ime as the measure o f mot ion 
t h a t abs t rac ted the existence o f God from t i m e . Since they be l i eved 
t h a t the Crea tor does not move, they were compelled t o say t h a t He i s 
not i n t i m e . They s a i d t h a t God e x i s t s i n e t e r n i t y (dahr) and da 
p e r p e t u i t y (sarmad). They even went so f a r as t o say t h a t the existence 
o f God i s the e t e r n i t y and p e r p e t u i t y . I f i t i s asked what dahr and 
.saimad i s , they would answer, say ing t h a t i t i s the peimanent d u r a t i o n 
1, I b i d , , Y o l , I I I . , p.40 
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(al-baqa? a l -da*im) and not accompanied by mot ion . I n f a c t peim-
anenoe i s one o f the a t t r i b u t e s o f d u r a t i o n and t i m e . Therefore 
they have o n l y s u b s t i t u t e d o the r terms such as dahr and sarmadefor 
t i m e . L i k e Abu Bakr Zaka r iyya al-Razx, but i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n s , Abp'1-Barakat does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e these terms. 
F o r h i m , they have one and the same meaning. 
CL ) The R e a l i t y o f Time. 
Accord ing t o Abu '1-Barakat , our knowledge o f t h ings are 
not a l l i n the same degree. Our f i r s t mode o f knowledge i s simple 
and d e f i c i e n t , whereas the second and the t h i r d modes o f knowledge are 
complex and p e r f e c t . The d e f i c i e n c y of our f i r s t mode o f knowledge i s 
due t o our i n a b i l i t y t o r i s e above the knowledge o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n 
o rder t o p e r f e c t i t by the knowledge o f species and genas. The second 
and t h i r d modes o f knowledge, i n t u r n , a t t a i n t h e i r p e r f e c t i o n by 
comprehending such knowledge. The knowledge o f knowledge ( m a * r i f a t a l -
m a ' ' r i f ah ) , the h ighes t knowledge belongs t o t h i s second category. We 
p e r f e c t our imper fec t and d e f i c i e n t knowledge, p e r t a i n i n g t o sensible 
t h i n g s e i t h e r by our second mode o f knowledge p e r t a i n i n g again t o 
sens ib le t h i n g s , o r by t h a t p e r t a i n i n g t o what i s conceived by the 
mind . F o r example, we perceive a body composed o f smal l p a r t i c l e s o f 
1. I b i d . , V o l . I I I . , p.41 
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d i f f e r e n t co lours ais i f i t had a u n i f i e d colour.: but when we look 
at i t a t t e n t i v e l y , we see t h a t i t i s composed o f var ious co lou r s . 
Again we see the sun smal l by the sense o f s i g h t , but having r e f -
l e c t e d on t h i s according t o an i n t e l l e c t u a l in fe rence ( b i ' l - q i y a s 
a l - ^ a q l x ) we know t h a t i t i s o f iminense magnitude. 
V/e, on the o the r hand, p e r f e c t our knowledge p e r t a i n i n g t o 
i n t e l l i g i b l e t h i n g s by t h a t p e r t a i n i n g again t o i n t e l l i g i b l e t h i n g s . 
Our knowledge o f t ime i s o f t h i s k i n d . Time cannot be perce ived a 
p r i o r i by the senses, r a t h e r i t i s apprehended by the mind . Everybody 
knows t ime a p r i o r i w i t h o u t any r e f l e c t i o n whatsoever. I t i s when we 
t r y t o p e r f e c t our knowledge o f t ime tha t d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n occur. 
Th i s i s the case w i t h the i n t e l l i g e n t man who h e l d opposing views on 
t i m e . 
On another occasion, he says t h a t time i s a m e n t a l l y conceived 
r e l a t i o n between the d i f f e r e n t du ra t ions . However, we must not be 
m i s l e d by such statements t h a t , according t o A b u ' l - B a r a k a t , t ime i s 
p u r e l y men ta l . He, i n f a c t , holds the'- c o n t r a i y view. He considers 
mind as an ins t rument by means o f which t ime i s known. By saying t h a t 
t ime i s a m e n t a l l y conceived r e l a t i o n , he means t h a t w i thou t the 
mind we can have no appercept ion o f t h i s r e l a t i o n . ^ 
1. I b i d . , V o l . I I I . , pp.35-36, 
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Abu'1-Barakat s t resses t h e r e a l i t y o f t ime on var ious 
occasions. Argu ing against the view tha t t ime i s p u r e l y mental , 
he says t h a t i f i t were p u r e l y menta l , i t would be devoid o f the 
judgements be longing t o t h a t which e x i s t s i n e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y . 
The mind has a p r imary appercept ion o f i t s exis tence and o f i t s being 
determined according t o a p o s i t e d measure corresponding t o t h a t which 
e x i s t s i n e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y . As i n t h e case o f the e x i s t e n t o b j e c t s , we 
caj i assert o f t ime t h a t i t s p a r t i s not equal t o i t s whole . Indeed 
no man endowed w i t h reason can say t h a t an hour i s equal t o a day, o r 
a day t o a month. There fo re how cou ld something which cannot be sep-
ara ted f r o m t h a t which e x i s t s , and which i s d e f i n e d and determined t o g -
IP 
e the r w i t h t h a t which e x i s t s be considered as non-ex i s t en t . 
Aba' 1-Barakat argues i n the Physics o f the K. al-Mu^tabar 
t h a t i f t ime were an accident e x i s t i n g i n the minds, i t would e i t h e r 
subs i s t i n the mind as an accident p e r t a i n i n g t o the t h ings e x i s t i n g 
i n the mind, l i k e the no t ions o f u n i v e r s a l , p a r t i c u l a r , genus and 
species . What i s , t h e n , the t h i n g i n which tims inheres as an accident . 
We do not know anyth ing whose removal i n the mind would imply the removal 
o f t i m e . Or t i n e would be an accident i n h e r i n g i n the mind p r i m a r i l y , 
1. I b i d . , V o l . I I I . , pp .37-38. 
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and hav ing no connect ion w i t h any o the r t h i n g . T h i s i s absurd, 
because t h a t which e x i s t s i n the mind wi thou t e x i s t i n g i n e x t e r n a l 
1 
r e a l i t y can o n l y be a meaningless nonsense. 
T h e r e f o r e , according t o A b u ' l - B a r a k a t , t ime i s r e a l i n the 
sense t h a t i t i s inseparable f r o m ex is tence . I t i s a m e n t a l l y con-
ce ived r e l a t i o n i n so f a r as we determine d i f f e r e n t dura t ions pe r -
t a i n i n g t o exis tence i n the mind. Mind i s o n l y an instrument t o 
b r i n g out t h i s r e l a t i o n . 
e) Time and A b u ' l - B a r a k a t ' s Phi losophy. 
Time has a s p e c i a l p lace i n A b u ' l - B a r a k a t ' s ph i losophy. 
Time and ex i s t ence , being inseparable and p r i o r t o eve ry th ing i n 
our consciousness, are the most iniportant cons t i t uen t s o f the m a t e r i a l 
as w e l l as the s p i r i t u a l w o r l d s . I t i s because of the close connection 
between t ime and existence t h a t the unbroken c o n t i n u i t y between the two 
worlds i s e s t a b l i s h e d . Even God i s not devoid o f temporal r e l a t i o n s . 
T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y man i fes t i n h i s t heo ry of God's knowledge o f 
p a r t i c u l a r s and i n h i s t heo ry o f God's v o l i t i o n . H i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t 
i n both t h e o r i e s i s the analogy he es tabl ishes between God's knowledge 
and v o l i t i o n , and men's knowledge and v o l i t i o n . 
1. I b i d , , V o l . 1 1 , , p.76 
222+.. 
Abu'1-Baraka t , i n h i s human psychology, deals w i t h the 
l i m i t e d nature o f our pe rcep t ions . According t o h im , pe rcep t ion 
( M r S k ) i s a s t a t e o f re la t iona l p e r t a i n i n g p r i m a r i l y and essen-
t i a l l y t o the t h i n g which perceives w i t h regard t o the t h i n g 
pe rce ived . Wi thou t these two terms, t h i s s t a t e o f r e l a t i o n cannot 
e x i s t . There i s , t h e r e f o r e , no pe rcep t ion o f any s o r t o f a non-
e x i s t e n t t h i n g . Supposing t h a t there i s , t hen t h i s i s not the case 
o f t r u e nothingness . We know t h a t the exis tence o f a p e r c e i v i n g 
sub jec t and a perce ived o b j e c t i s not s u f f i c i e n t f o r a pe rcep t ion t o 
e x i s t . For i f i t were so, the human sou l would perceive a l l the 
e x i s t e n t s i t was t o p e r c e i v e . Thus, t he re would be no th ing t h a t was 
hidden t o i t . But i n f a c t what i t does not know exceeds by f a r what 
i t knows. The re fo re , i t i s i n need o f a mode (ha l ) which i s super-
added t o i t s exis tence and t o t h a t of p e r c e p t i b l e th ings i n order t o 
a t t a i n knowledge and p e r c e p t i o n o f what i t a c t u a l l y perce ives . Our 
percept ions are l i m i t e d by the need o f a mode s u b s i s t i n g between them 
and the p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s . This i s made c l e a r also i n ahother con-
t e x t where he says: Between the souls there e x i s t s a g r ada t ion as t o 
t h e i r c apac i t y o f apprehending t h i n g s . Some o f the souls have more 
capac i ty than o the r s . The Isole o f the body i s t o determine the ob jec t 
1, K . a l -Mu« ' t abar , V o l , I I , , p.323 
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which the s o u l perceives a t any given i n s t a n t , and the temporal 
order o f i t s pe rcep t ions , because the body i t s e l f i s determined 
by i t s organs, by the place i t occupies and by i t s mot ion and r e s t . 
We see t h a t whicjh i s be fore our eyes and hear t h a t which i s as near 
as i s poss ib le f o r us t o hear , and have the sensa t ion o f touch o f tha t 
which we touch . I t i s so w i t h o ther percep t ions . I n t h i s respect the 
s o u l i s where the body i s . The body i s f o r the s o u l what nest i s f o r a 
b i r d and house f o r h im who i n h a b i t s i t . I f t he re had been no body, the 
s o u l would not have rece ived these d j s t e m i n a t i o n s ; i t would not p e r f o m 
one t h i n g r a t h e r than another amon-'g the m u l t i t u d e o f those t h i n g s which 
c o - e x i s t i n t ime and p l a c e . Each organ of the body s^upplies the sou l 
w i t h a ca tegory o f a c t i v i t i e s . There fo re , i n answering the quest ion 
why the soulddoes not know a l l t h a t whicdi e x i s t s , he resorfcs to the 
senses which a t once l i m i t and render poss ib le the pe rcep t ion . The 
f u n c t i o n o f the body and the co rporea l organs are i n d i s p e n s i b l e , 
because o f the l i m i t e d charac te r o f the f a c u l t y o f apprehension and 
pe rcep t ion o f the human s o u l . The sou l can o n l y have one pe rcep t ion 
at a t ime because o f the nature o f the b o d i l y f u n c t i o n and i s brought 
i n t o contact w i t h others which have been perce ived before ahd w i l l be 
perce ived l a t e r . I n the absence o f these b o d i l y f u n c t i o n s , the s o u l , 
when p laced before the m u l t i t u d e o f events, c o u l d not make the choice 
necessary f o r p e r c e i v i n g a t l e a s t one pa r t and f o r a c t i n g , ^ There fo re , 
1. K. a l - M u « t a b a r , V o l , I I , , pp.345 f f . 
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t he body and the sense organs p rov ide f o r the s o u l the c o n d i t i o n 
necessary f o r an ordered exper ience. But a sou l endowed w i t h a 
f a c u l t y o f i n f i n i t e percept ions and capable o f apprehending as f a r 
as poas ib le the t o t a l i t y o f events would have no need o f these con-
d i t i o n s . 
We have, t h e r e f o r e , l i m i t e d percept ions o f t h i n g s because 
such a c t i v i t i e s are determined both s p a t i a l l y and t e m p o r a l l y , owing 
t o the l imi t edness o f our body i n which the sou l i s and o f our organs 
which are the instruments o f our pe rcep t ions . I t i s here t h a t A b u ' l -
Ba raka t ' s t h e o r y o f a t t e n t i o n ( i l ^ i f a t ) comes t o the f o r e . He d i f f e r -
e n t i a t e s two k inds o f a t t e n t i o n : (a) vb lun t a ry a t t e n t i o n ; f o r example, 
we d r i n k repugnant mix tures because they have a b e n e f i c i e n t e f f e c t , 
and we endure f a t i g u e i n the hope o f p leasure , (b) N a t u r a l a t t e n t i o n 
which i s a lso c a l l e d by h im i n s t i n c t i v e ( i l h i m i ) ; f o r example, a cshild 
avoids what f r i g h t e n s h im and h u r t s h i m , and comes near t o what pleases 
h im. The human sou l cannot a l l a t once d i r e c t i t s a t t e n t i o n t o many 
t h i n g s . For those which i t sees d i s t r a c t i t f rom t h a t which i t hears, 
those which ceacsh i t th rough the e x t e r n a l senses f r o m those which 
i n t e r n a l senses b r i n g t o i t . On the o ther hand, when i t i s t u rned tow-
ards i t s e l f i t i s not occupied w i t h the r e s t . 
Taking the statement t h a t a sou l endowed w i t h a f a c u l t y o f 
1. K , al-Mu^tabar , V o l , I I , , p.351 
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i n f i n i t e percept ions and capable o f apprehending as f a r sa 
poss ib le the t o t a l i t y o f events would have no need o f these con-
d i t i o n s , at i t s f ace va lue , we may be mis l ed t o t h i n k i n g t h a t God's 
percept ions are l i m i t l e s s and encompass e v e r y t h i n g . According t o 
A b u ' l - B a r a k a t , t h i s i s not so even i n the case o f God. God also 
has H i s l i m i t a t i o n s which are due t o the i n f i n i t e number o f t h i n g s 
He would have t o apprehend, not t o Hi s impotence. Th i s view he 
obv ious ly i n f e r s f r o m a pomparison between human percept ions and those 
o f God. This p o i n t w i l l bcrcome c l e a r i f we t u r n our a t t e n t i o n t o h i s 
t heo ry o f God's a t t r i b u t e s . I n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o Avicenna, A b u ' l -
Barakat a f f i m s o f the e s s e n t i a l a t t r i b u t e s o f God, The e s s e n t i a l 
a t t r i b u t e s o f God such as w i l l , generos i ty , knowledge, e t c , , r e s t w i t h 
the essence o f God, i n o ther words, t hey are the p rope r t i e s o f God's 
essence, God can d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the s t a te o f being generous and 
non-generous. As a r e s u l t o f t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n He p r e f e r s generos i ty 
t o non-generos i ty . A l l the a t t r i b u t e s e x i s t i n g i n t h i s wor ld m u s t , . I n , t h e 
l a s t r e s o r t , be r e f e r r e d t o God, He being the o r i g i n a t i v e p r i n c i p l e 
2 
o f a l l a t t r i b u t e s . These a t t r i b u t e s are normal ly abs t rac ted f r o m 
God's essence by the A r i s t o t e l i a n s because i t imp l i e s i m p e r f e c t i o n and 
1. K . a l - M u « t a b a r , V o l , I I I . , pp.67-69. 
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t e m p o r a l i t y i n God. T h i s v i ew , according t o Abu' 1-Barakat i s 
not v a l i d . He exp la ins i n h i s t heo ry of i n t e l l e c t i o n t h a t i n t e l l -
e c t i o n i s one o f the a c t i v i t i e s o f the i n t e l l e c t . A c t i v i t y f o l l o w i n g 
upon the essence f rom which i t proceeds, how cou ld something be 
1 
c o n s t i t u t e d by t h a t which f o l l o w s f r o m i t i n t ime and essence. 
Througih these a t t r i b u t e s God i s i n d i r e c t contact w i t h eve ry th ing 
except those t h i n g s which are outs ide the scope o f God's comprehen-
2 
s i o n and a t t e n t i o n , namely, the non-exis ten t t h ings , and the change-
events.-^ . 
- As i t i s c l e a r f r o m the above account which he gives i n h i s 
Metaphysics , God's a c t i v i t i e s , l i k e those o f man, are not f r e e f r o m 
t e m p o r a l i t y . Th i s culminates i n the view t h a t God i s not beyond 
t i m e . 
The d i f f e r e n c e between man and God i s one o f degree: God's 
knowledge,, and v o l i t i o n are more comprehensive than t h a t o f man. 
U n l i k e the A r i s t o t e l i a n God who i s s t a t i c and acts through the i n t e r -
mediar ies w i t h o u t H imse l f a c t i n g , knows only H i m s e l f , and o ther th ings 
i n a genera l way ins tan taneous ly , Abu '1-Barakat ' s God i s a c t i ve and i n 
1. K . a U t f u f t a b a r , V o l . I I I . , pp.72-73. 
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d i r e c t contact w i t h the m a t e r i a l w o r l d . According t o A b u ' l -
Baraka t , even God's knowledge i s r e s t r i c t e d , but t h i s , i n no way, 
i m p l i e s impotence on H i s p a r t . F o r the obstacle t o such knowledge 
i s n o t f o u n d i n the knower, but i n the i n f i n i t y o f th ings He would have 
t o apprehend. I n t a k i n g such an uncompromising a t t i t u d e , he would 
c e r t a i n l y not have gained the f a v o u r o f e i t h e r the A r i s t o t e l i a n s , o r 
the Theo log ians . 
H i s p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n o f God - i t i s perhaps r i g h t t o c a l l h i s 
God Supreme Man - might have i n f l u e n c e d the l a t e r m y s t i c a l t h e o r i e s 
o f the ' P e r f e c t M a n ' . 
230. 
GONGLUSION. 
A b u ' l - B a r a k a t ' s ph i losophy i s deteimined by h i s c r i t i c a l 
a t t i t u d e against the A r i s t o t e l i a n phi losophy. I n t h i s he was 
helped by h i s f o r e - r u n n e r s among whom J-ohn Philoponus and Abu Bakr 
Zahar iyya a l - R a z I e s p e c i a l l y stands, o u t , not t o mention those i n 
whose w r i t i n g s are found sporadic u n - A r i s t o t e l i a n statements. 
However, h i s o r i g i n a l i t y l i e s i n h i g appeal t o the s e l f -
evident t r u t h s o f the mind. H i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t can be discerned i n 
Avicenna 's t h e o r y o f the s e l f - e v i d e n t nature o f the s o u l , and t h a t o f 
ex i s tence . The fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between Abu ' l -Baraka t and 
Avicenna mani fes t s i t s e l f i n the f a c t t ha t the former uses i t as a 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l method. 
We have th ree a p r i o r i conceptions. That o f Soul , t h a t o f 
exis tence and t h a t o f t i m e . Sou l has apperception o f i t s e l f p r i o r 
t o eve ry th ing e l s e . At the same t ime as i t s apperception o f i t s e l f , 
i t has also appercept ion o f i t s existence and exis tence i n general . 
S i m i l a r l y , t ime i s apprehended by everybody, the learned and ignoran t 
a l i k e , p r i o r t o e v e r y t h i n g and i s inseparable f r o m exis tence . I n f a c t , 
i t i s the measure o f ex i s tence ; Just l i k e ex is tence , i t cannot be 
a n n i h i l a t e d . Therefore t ime and existence are e t e r n a l . 
The A r i s t o t e l i a n c o r r e l a t i v e conceptions o f space, t ime and 
mot ion are not a l t o g e t h e r i n harmony, s ince , according t o them, space i s 
231. 
f i n i t e i n magnitude, whereas t ime and mot ion are i n f i n i t e . Such 
disharmony between these no t ions was considered t o be open t o c r i t -
i c i s m , and incompat ib le w i t h the t h e o r y o f the e t e r n i t y o f the w o r l d . 
Ins tances o f t h i s wer f i n d i n a l - K i n d i and al-Ghazalx. a l - K i n d l , 
accep t ing the f i n i t u d e o f space, t ime and mot ion , put f o r w a r d arguments 
f o r the temporal p roduc t i on o f the w o r l d (Jjudu^h). Aba'1-Barakat h e l d 
the oppos i te view and accepted the i n f i n i t u d e o f space, t ime and mot ion . 
F i n a l l y , the l a rge gap c rea ted by the A r i s t o t e l i a n s between 
the m a t e r i a l and s p i r i t u a l worlds was br idged by Abu' 1-Barakat i n 
accept ing the temporal i tyy- o f bo th domains. 
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